					sugal's history onlin	_		Ty OIII	. <u>.</u>		., .	٠٠, '	E		Ζ.,	·	****	4 4			
					v.cphrc.org						/	6			Fo	r Depar	tment U	se Only	···		
. }			لمسقو		rier Pouch	TOR	<u> </u>		CONFI	DENT	AL f	 X		20	7.5	e.0	0/	10	, , l		
;	٠	,			FOREIG	N S	ERA	ICE	D E	SPA	LOT.	.	1:1/6	\ 4/	6	0,0	96	-/ 7 (02		
!				1					: . :			268	12.				•				
ŀ		FRO	M	:	Amembassy D	AR E	S SAL	AAM •	ę .	,	<u>_,</u>	200	NÖ.		;		_				
~	(то		;	THE DEPART	MENT	OF 8	TATE,	HRAW	INGTO	N.		-	Jur	10 <u>19</u>	. 196	2	-1 ,	Am		
0) 21	RF	•	:														(A	p. 10		
1.6.		100	4	_	<u>"-</u>	т.	1			T	I''' =:				5/5	SIF	<u> </u>	1/	74		
		F.	13 0		Î AF	PEPT	FM/R	REP	A F	ARA	EUR L	FE	NEA	cu	INR	F.	"	12	g		
ع ا	31	ž u	, (Anly	-	i	-	ĀĞR	COM	FRB	INT	LAB	TAR	TR	хмв			3	ŪŠI	7		
		4) 0	_	N REC'D	HER	AIR	ARMY	CIA	NAVY	OSD	ocs	USTA	NSA	NSC.		R	100 T	P		
3	, g		S()		6-25				-	•					ست		P	7	, <u> </u>		
7	ptto	\$U1	gct:	1	Conversation This doc	_			-		/ / .,						#80 m				
á	1 25	l I	ì	_	This doct Number LIMIT DISTRI	enteners.		1000	_copi	۵, ره.	eries	iriti	Willia	A. KIA		1	SF	RIES	A		
REVIEWED by	Ow PAcemptions	Ĕ	DOWNGRAD	1	LIMIT DISTRI	BUTI	ON					1	CUP	(NU		···			• • •		
EVTE		CLASSIFY	8		Mr. Edu	ardo	MOND	LANE.	Moza	umbio	ie na	tiona	list	and F	rofe	ssor :	at Sv	racus	e		
2	ç	100	9		University,	calle	ed on	the	Repor	rting	Offi	cer o	n Jur	ae 18	to r	eport	on h	is ef	forts		
1.	-		_		to unite the cratic Union														10-		
A/CDC/MR		¥.	d		organization								1410		,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,	que I	or ag o				
9	ز خ	Y 10:		ī	Mondlar		no nt a	d the	+ ha	STOR A	di ama	d +	A 7 A	h	NT 60	Com	പെ പ	owni t	++43		
	333	ž M) į	1	Adelino GWAN																
TAT.	Ž,				nist Bloc, and alleges that Gwambe is a regular recipient of substantial funds																
OF STATE	Ž		₹ √		from Ghana and from the Soviet Union. As an illustration, Mondlane insists that only last week Gwambe had received \$11,000 from Ghana. He was also dis-																
뉡		ĩ		61	turbed to le	arn	that	M. M.	MMO	LE, P	resid	ent o	f MAN	W, a	nd hi	s lie	utena	ints w			
6	RELEASE	_	0													subvention the manu					
DEPARTM	RELE			3	had ceased a	and t	hat t	he M	INU o	ffici	als h	ad be	come	сотр	letel	y dep	dependent upon				
	\$	Ē	ı											d that he had proof that for delivered MANU into Gwambe's							
- 1	N	[57	۵	control. Me	ondla	ne ir	siste	d th	at hi	s inv	estig	ation	ns re	veale	d tha	t UDE	CNAMO			
	little or no real support among the few Mozambique political refug							_													
			7 1		workers.	and t	mau r	IAINO I	140 5	UIII.	4111	, ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,	Ong .	mong.	One	PAROL		51 100			
	Copy No(a)	The state of the s		ŀ	Mr. Mo	n 47 nn		יני מי	d ma	וה תמ	d aaa	not nt	.020	ehin :	ud +h	مب د کا 1 در ت	-	agagr			
:	-	3			President of																
	, g	į		Λ	factory. H	e ref	erred	l to 1	yere:	re as	a "T	angan'	yika	n Eis	enhov	rern 🔻	ho_re	filse			
become involved in strife, suggesting that Mondlane take up that TANU was favoring the absorption of MANU by UDENAMO with																					
				I	Home Affair			_		-			_				1. T.	·			
			•	Ĺ	11 = \$2.8 0										٠, ١	=		\mathbb{A}			
				l	•		::								i N	MA		ν'			
		_		_	RTHennemeye:	r:mp	_;_;		COM	MEDI	TIAL .				,	O.					
	FORM 6-61 FS-439 GPO B 12596 For Department Use Only - To be Filled In on Yellow Original ONLY																				
		^<	SIGNE					A	CTION AKEN												
1		77	ME O	F	OFFICER SYMBOL				DATE					RECTION	NS						
		_		_						_											

www.cphrc.org

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 2 of
Encl. No 268
Desp. No 268
Erom Dar as Salaam

him for several days but he finally succeeded in discussing the problem with Kambona on June 17. According to Mondlane, Kambona's partiality for UDENAMO was determined by a desire to placate Dr. Nkrumah. Mondlane said that he told Kambona that Mozambique nationalists would not in the long run accept a position as Nkrumah's political football and that there should be a single Mozambique independence organization, all support for which should go into a single treasury which would be subject to audit. Mondlane said that a continuation of the existing arrangement whereby Gwambe had ample resources while both the UDENAMO and MANU treasuries were empty meant that the Mozambique nationalist movement belonged to Gwambe and he in turn could deliver it to his Ghanaian and Russian paymasters. Mondlane urged Kambona to consider the advantage of securing funds from Western sources in order to free the Mozambique movement from Gwambe. According to Mondlane, Kambona agreed and suggested that Prime Minister Rashidi KAWAWA be the recipient of such funds for disbursement to a united Mozambique independence movement.

Mr. Mondlane stated that he met with Gwambe in Dar es Salaam on June 15 and that he was in regular touch with Gwambe's lieutenants, many of whom were disturbed by Gwambe's Ghanaian and Communist connections. According to Mondlane, the 30 or more young Mozambique refugees in Dar es Salaam, as well as Gwambe's lieutenants and the officials of MANU, forced Gwambe to accept the designation of an eight-man committee to discuss the unification of the rival organizations. However, Mondlane did not believe that this implied any major concession on Gwambe's part, since, as long as Gwambe is the source of funds for his own people and for the MANU leaders, there was little danger that anything would be agreed that Gwambe would not find acceptable. A development which Mondlane found very disturbing was the departure on June 17 of Gwambe for New Delhi. Mr. Mondlane stated he knew for certain that Gwambe was scheduled to have discussions with Krishna Menon concerning the release of Mozambique soldiers captured during India's invasion of Goa. These soldiers are to be flown from India to Ghana to receive ideological training and to form the nucleus of a Mozambique army of liberation.

According to Mondlane, Gwambe was somewhat disturbed by Mondlane's presence in Dar es Salaam in that Mondlane was proving to be more difficult to handle than the poorly educated and ill-informed MANU and UDENAMO leaders. Mondlane states that Gwambe discussed this problem with Joe-Fio MEYER, Ghana High Commissioner to Tangan-yika, and concluded that it would be desirable to secure the services of a Western-educated Mozambique refugee to counter Mondlane. Gwambe allegedly telephoned Los Angeles from the Ghana High Commission and talked to Leo Eldridge MILAS, a graduate student at UCIA, offering him a position as educational coordinator for Mozambique refugees in East Africa. Mondlane states that Milas accepted and is to secure air-plane tickets and a Ghanaian passport in New York from Ambassador QUAISON-SACKEY, Ghana's Permanent Representative to the United Nations. (Mr. Mondlane states that Mr. Milas had been contacted by the African-American Institute and offered a position in connection with a proposed educational institution for Mozambique refugees to be established at Dar es Salaam.)

While in general Mondlane was rather depressed by Gvembe's success in securing considerable control over the Pozambique refuges movement, he was nevertheless hopeful that the growing dissatisfaction with Gwambe's Ghancian and Soviet connections among his own lieutenants and the few articulate Mozambique refugees in Dar

CONTRACT	T1 T2 T2 T A T
CONFI	DENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Page_	3		of
Encl.	No_		
Desp.	No_	268	Salaam
From	\mathtt{Dar}	es	Salaam

es Salaam might serve to temporarily block a complete victory by Gwambe. Mondlane proposes to leave Dar es Salaam in about a week's time to return to Syracuse to fulvill a teaching commitment for the summer session. Enroute home he plans to stop in Cairo, Tunis, Geneva, London and New York in an effort to raise funds with which to strengthen the resistance within the Mozambique refugee movement to Gwambe.

Mr. Mondlane plans to get in touch with Deputy Assistant Secretary Wayne Fredericks as soon as be weeker the Darled States. Mondlane plans to return to Dar es Salaam in September with a view to continuing his work among Mozambique refugees.

Comment: The foregoing is as accurate a recapitulation of Mr. Mondlane's conversation as possible. Mondlane is a likeable, intelligent and highly articulate individual, but the Reporting Officer has the impression that Mondlane's estimate of dissatisfaction with Gwambe on the part of Mozambique refugees is at least partially based on wishful thinking. Mondlane is attempting to play in a very tough league and it is doubtful that he has the resources to make an impact. Both MANU and UDENAMO have pathetically few adherents, the overwhelming majority of the approximately 250,000 Makonde in Tanganyika who are almost exclusively sisal estate workers, have no knowledge of, or interest in, the Mozambique independence movement. Mozambique refugee politics are the work of a handful of people who have the support of the few score authentic refugees. These people are desperately poor and Gwambe is on the spot with money at hand, he has the Ghanaian High Commission as a powerful ally and probably has at least the sympathy of Kambona. Given the fact that Gwambe need only buy a comparatively few of these easily-purchased professional "refugees" in order to control Mozambique's expatriate political movements, it would appear that the odds are against Mondlane neutralizing the energetic and prosperous Gwambe,

Thomas R. Byrne (by ROH)
Thomas R. Byrne

Thomas R. Byrne Charge d'Affaires ad interim

Sobsequent events seem to have praved to of ani that misposerished visiture can uni over well. besled evanystimi! o HD

*

CONFIDENTIAL

GPO 80246