EAST GERMAN RELATIONS WITH
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA:
PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM
VS. "MUTUAL ADVANTAGE"

By Brigitte Schulz

Boston University

African Studies Center
Working Papers



EAST GERMAN RELATIONS WITH SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM VS. "MUTUAL ADVANTAGE"

By Brigitte Schulz

African Studies Center

1985

WORKING PAPERS
NO. 100
AFRICAN STUDIES CENTER
Boston University
270 Bay State Rd.
Boston, MA 02215

EAST GERMAN RELATIONS WITH SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM VS. "MUTUAL ADVANTAGE"

By Brigitte Schulz

This paper will look at the political economy of relations between the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the countries of sub-Saharan Africa. These relations have generated a considerable amount of interest in the West in the past decade, as the former Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique gained their independence and opted for a close alliance with the socialist countries. Almost coinciding with these events, the ancient monarchy in Ethiopia was overthrown by a revolutionary movement which allied itself increasingly with the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies. Relations between the GDR and these three African countries thus became particularly close, leading to a certain amount of hysteria in certain Western circles about the possibility of the entire "black continent" going "red." The GDR was seen by these observers to be a tool for spreading Soviet hegemonic ambitions to the African continent; i.e., a puppet carrying out the wishes of a stern master.

The present paper does not follow in this interpretive tradition. Rather than seeking to locate the motives for East German policy behavior vis-a-vis the Third World in the Soviet Union, it examines the political and economic relations between the GDR and the Third World as a separate, though not necessarily distinct, unit of analysis from that of the Soviet Union. In other words, it is assumed that the East German state has interests of its own in carrying out its Third World policies and that the study of these policies thus warrant merit independent of an examination of Soviet policies. This approach thus ties into similar studies on various East European countries conducted over the past few years which share a common conviction that Eastern Europe deserves to be studied separately from its dominant superpower, the Soviet Union.[1]

The first section of the paper looks at the political factors shaping East German policies vis-a-vis the Third World. It considers the special circumstances of the GDR as a state, the theoretical underpinnings of relations with the Third World and the way its policy of "proletarian internationalism" is translated into concrete political actions. The second section examines the nature of the East German economy and the extent to which it influences economic relations with developing countries. It then turns to a concrete examination of the various types of economic interaction taking place with developing countries. The concluding section seeks to analyze the future of relations between sub-Saharan Africa and the GDR. It will also look critically at the contradictions between an East German political policy based on "proletarian internationalism" and an economic policy based on "mutual advantage."

Political Relations

Political relations between the GDR and the Third World have been influenced by several interrelated aspects: 1) the particular circumstances of the GDR as a state; 2) the closeness of its alliance with the Soviet Union; and 3) an interpretation of the world based on Marxism/Leninism and the necessary consequences deriving from this.

The "German Question." From its birth as a state in 1949, the GDR was considered "the other Germany" by most of the Western world, an illegitimate offspring whose arrival was neither celebrated nor welcomed. As most of Africa gained independence in the early 1960s, the GDR had not yet overcome the obstacles to normal relations with most of the world created by the West German government. Bonn's "Hallstein Doctrine" made the costs of recognizing East Germany extremely high. Should any Third World country grant the Berlin government such diplomatic recognition, the Bonn government would immediately rupture all political and economic ties with that country.[2] Thus throughout the 1960s, Africa was little more than a battleground for the querelles allemandes, with the West German state emerging victorious in almost every instance. The GDR was restricted to relations with the few "radical nationalist" states of Guinea, Ghana, Mali, and Tanzania and even these were limited mainly to bilateral trade and "solidarity" activities.

In 1972, with the ratification of the Basic Treaty which normalized relations between the two Germanies, the GDR's international status changed dramatically. Thirty-four African states established diplomatic relations with the GDR between May 1971 and May 1976 - the dates of the 8th and 9th Congresses of the Socialist Unity Party (SED). Since 1972 open competition between the two German states in the Third World has decreased markedly. An element of tension remains, however, which can be directly attributed to the status of East Germany as as one part of a divided nation, with a population whose patterns of thought and consumption continue to be heavily influenced by the Western (capitalist) part of the the former Germany. This places a particularly heavy burden on policymakers in Berlin to show not only to the world but also to their own population the historically progressive and thus superior nature of socialism over capitalism. East German foreign policy thus has an important internal function and a victory for socialism in Africa is assumed to add to the legitimacy of socialism at home.[3]

Relations with the Soviet Union. Close ties with the Soviet Union again reflect the particulart circumstances of East Germany's birth as a state. That part now constituting the GDR was assigned to the Soviet Union as its zone of occupation after World War II and became an independent state after the British and American zones had combined to become the Federal Republic of Germany. The Soviet Union became the closest political and economic ally of the new socialist German state and the guarantor for its activities domestically and abroad. The GDR's geographic location made it an important country for Soviet security interests and both countries thus entered an alliance which has often in the past led Western observers to see East Germany merely as a "puppet" of the Moscow leadership, a notion which seems as superficial in analytical terms as it is appealing at the emotional level to many in the West. The scope of this essay does not permit a detailed analysis of Soviet/East German relations, but the situation is clearly more complex than a master-serant relationship. The leaders in both countries share a common world view based on Marxism/Leninism and the fates of both countries are closely linked due to a perceived common struggle against imperialism. Coordination of foreign policies is thus more than the Soviets simply telling the East Germans what to do; it it a policy coordination of allies pursuing basically the same global objectives.[4]

The Marxist/Leninist theoretical underpinning. The closeness of the alliance with the Soviet Union has also affected the GDR's relations with the Third World, and its views on development are generally fashioned after the Soviet model. This includes an unquestioning acceptance - at least at the official level - of the Societ leadership position in the world revolutionary struggle. The Soviet Union, having been the first country to build successfully a socialist state,[5] thus was the great force that set into motion a whole new historical epoch: that of the transition from capitalism to socialism/communism. Thus the importance of Lenin's achievements was not national, but global; they established a path which should be followed by all groups interested in establishing socialism in their own countries. In the task of building world socialism, there are three main groups which are united in an objective historical alliance; the socialist world community (with the Soviet Union at its head), the working classes inside the advanced capitalist countries, and the previously colonized world (the world of "national liberation"). To quote an East German official view of this:

> "As an inseperable link in the socialist community of states grouped around the USSR, the German Democratic Republic, in the creation of its relations with the nationally liberated countries of Asia and Africa, operates on the Leninist principle that the national liberation movement is a natural and objective ally of world socialism and the international working class in the struggle against imperialism and for social progress."[6] [authors's italics]

This alliance between the Third World and the GDR is thus objective and not subject to the will of individual countries or heads of state; i.e., it is historically determined and thus inevitable. Temporary setbacks (such as the ones East Germany experienced in Ghana or Somalia) merely slow the pace of ultimate and inevitable victory over capitalism.

The October Revolution and the existence of the world socialist system have made it possible for economically backward agrarian societies with almost non-existent proletariats to embark on building socialism without first going through the capitalist stage. Whereas Marx had argued that societies move through definite stages of development with capitalism becoming eventually replaced by socialism/communism, the existence of the world socialist system has made that capitalist step unnecessary because "socialism has become the determining force for global development."[7]

Thus, the existence of the socialist countries in effect enables African and Asian countries to move straight in the direction of socialism, provided they maintain a close alliance with these socialist countries. Lenin had already postulated the need for this alliance as the crucial external component in this task of building socialism in a backward society. How closely allied a developing country is with the socialist countries is in fact an important gauge for the GDR to establish how "progressive" it is, often irrespective of how that country develops internally or how it deals with the communists inside its own borders.

A "socialist orientation" inside the developing country is considered to have certain important internal components, such as the establishment of political organs able to affect political and economic transformations in the country, and the formation of progressive cadres and party organizations which will ultimately establish a Marxist/Leninist vanguard party, able to carry out the final task of building socialism.[8] This socialist "orientation" is thus seen merely as a necessary and important precursor to the building of socialism itself, which at this initial stage involves changes mainly in the political superstructure. The African countries having embarked on this course[9] are still considered to be part of the capitalist world system at the economic level and are in fact encouraged by the socialist states to continue in that position until they are in effect "ripe" enough to become full-fledged members of world socialism. One of the key areas in this precursory period is the strengthening of the state sector so that imperialism can be harnessed and increasing concessions gained from it for the building up of an independent national economy. As Brezhnev explained this process at the 26th Party Conress of the CPSU:

> It is the gradual elimination of the position held by the imperialist monopolies, the indigenous bourgeoisie and feudal lords, as well as the limitation of the activities of foreign capital. This means to guarantee for the government of the people the commanding heights of the economy and to switch to the planned development of the productive forces and to stimulate the cooperative movement in the rural areas. This means to increase the role of the working masses in social life and to strenghten gradually the state apparatus through cadres working for the cause of the people. This means that the foreign policy of these countries should be anti-imperialist in character. In these countries. the revolutionary parties are strengthened which express the interests of the large masses of workers.[10]

The model thus advanced by the GDR, as by other socialist countries, is one which advocates the primacy of politics over economics. In other words, it is the building up of the state sector and the various mass organizations under its control which, under the guidance of a vanguard party, prepare for the eventual takeover of the entire economy. This key factor is often misunderstood by analysts in the West who show surprise at the fact, for example, that Angola's main economic partners after independence continued to be the capitalist countries of the West, despite a close political alliance with the East. This, however, is completely in line with the program advocated by the socialist countries, who now advocate a program for radical developing countries similar to the N.E.P. period in the Soviet Union in the twenties.[11]

As Elizabeth Valkenier, among others, has pointed out, this approach of building socialism mainly at the superstructural level naturally leads to contradictions of its own. [12] In fact, it has also led to tensions with "progressive" Third World governments eager to rupture all ties with the imperialist West, such as Angola immediately after attaining its political independencen from Portugal. The Angolan government under Aghostino Neto was willing to rupture all ties with the West and immediately join the CMEA, but the countries already members of that

organization were unwilling to pay the economic price of having another weak member join it. Mozambique's request for membership in the CMEA was turned down in 1981 and it has since joined the World Bank and the IMF in September 1984, and signed the Lome III convention with the European Community in spring 1985. Both Angola and Mozambique have only consultative status in the CMEA. The main commitment of the socialist countries to sub-Saharan Africa thus has been the establishment of appropriate political and social organizations able to carry out the task of socialist transformation at some future point.

These priorities have naturally led to particularly close relations with those countries which have opted for the construction of "scientific socialism" as opposed to earlier variants of "African socialism." Relations with Ethiopia, Angola, and Mozambique are thus especially close. Although there are certain differences in the way in which Ethiopia on the one hand and Mozambique and Angola on the other hand arrived at the juncture at which they chose a path of "socialist orientation" - Ethiopia represented an essentially anti-feudal and thus internal class struggle, while Angola and Mozambique fought to expel an external enemy - all have done so on the basis of "scientific socialism."[13] This, along with the establishment of vanguard parties[14] operating on the principles of democratic centralism, has meant a new quality in the GDR's political relations with them compared to its relations with the "radical" states of the 1960s such as Mali, Ghana, and Guinea. The new quality of these relations was given open expression in the ratification of friendship treaties with all three countries.[15]

Since such a high priority is accorded by the GDR to the building up of various mass organizations which are instrumental for the construction of the East European model of socialism, it is important not to focus only on official state-to-state relations. Instead, the coordinated efforts of the various mass organizations in the GDR which work closely with corresponding organizations in the Third World must also be taken into account. Due to their special importance, three mass organizations in the GDR that work closely with developing countries will be discussed below briefly. They are the Freie Deutsche Jugend (FDJ - Free German Youth), the Freier Deutscher Gewerschaftsbund (FDGB - Free German Trade Union Association), and the Verband der Journalisten (VDJ - Association of Journalists). Briefly discussed also will be the work of the East German Solidarity Committee, which largely coordinates the "solidarity" activities of the GDR.

The Free German Youth (FDJ). Following Lenin's ideas on the importance of including the youths of a country in the process of building socialism and training them for the political leadership of tomorrow, youth organizations are considered vital in all socialist countries. The FDJ also plays an important part in the GDR's foreign policy by helping in the construction of socialism in developing countries. The FDJ operates a "Youth University" near the capital city of Berlin in which political cadres are schooled in revolutionary politics along the principles of the Soviet "comsomol" youth organization founded by Lenin. Along with young East Germans, about 150 young people from Third World countries are trained here annually in ten-month courses, and forty of them on average are from black Africa. The school

was opened only one year after World War II (on 22 May 1946) to train young Germans in scientific socialism and the experiences of the Soviet Union in building a socialist society; it began training cadres from foreign youth organizations in January 1958.[16] Currently the 25th course is in progress at the school, which means that roughly 1,000 students from sub-Saharan Africa have been trained so far in what the school describes as "Marxist/Leninist training and communist education" with the goal of "enabling the students to acquire Marxist/Leninist theory and to apply it creatively, to recognize fundamental social processes and links, and to develop practical solutions for the activities of the socialist youth organization."[17] The school organizes an annual tribunal entitled "We Accuse Imperialism," at which students from Third World countries give personal testimony about the injustices committed by the imperialist countries. This obviously is a powerful way of allowing these young people to air their frustrations about the international status quo and to channel the critique squarely in the direction of the Western countries. The costs involved in training these foreign students are covered by the FDJ budget and consists of free room and board, plus roughly 400 Marks monthly as a stipend.[18]

In addition to operating this school, since 1963 the FDJ has also assisted in the execution of foreign policy by dispatching so-called "brigades of friendship" to developing countries to set up vocational training centers, work as mechanics (mainly on GDR-supplied equipment), help in bringing in harvests (coffee in Angola, wheat in Ethiopia), and so on. At the end of 1983, there were thirteen brigades in sub-Saharan Africa. Of those, eight were in Angola, three in Mozambique, and one each on Guinea and Guinea-Bissau. The Guinean project has been ongoing since 1967 and the one in Bissau since 1976. Both of these are vocational training centers in which local apprentices learn specific trades. A similar center also exists in Mozambique and Angola. The other two brigades in Mozambique are involved in construction (mainly in connection with coal mining operations in Moatize), and the other seven brigades in Angola work in repair shops for GDR-model cars and trucks. In addition, each autumn a friendship brigade is sent on a special three-month assignment to Ethiopia to repair the East German farm equipment supplied to Ethiopian state farms. This brigade has been sent annually since 1978.[19]

It is interesting that Western interpretations of these friendship brigades normally view them as paramilitary forces in Africa. This comes as no surprise, of course, considering the proclivity of many in the West to see any close levels of cooperation between the socialist countries and the Third World in military/strategic terms. This emphasis seems rather misplaced in the case of the friendship brigades, however, since, if anything, they resemble the US Peace Corps volunteers operating in the Third World. What distinguishes the East German youths, however, is that they are highly trained as mechanics and seem to be dispatched mainly to work on equipment sold by the GDR to their host country. If one needs to look for reasons beyond solidarity which sends these brigades to Africa, then they are clearly economic rather than military in nature. Since the East Germans lack international service networks to provide parts and services for their exports of industrial products, these friendship brigades perform this service function rather than any hidden military activities.

The Free German Association of Unions (FDGB). Another mass organization which naturally plays an important part in building socialism is the union. Union activity in a country in which the means of production have already been expropriated from the capitalist class is deemed different since the fundamental conflict between capital and labor has been resolved in favor of the latter. The work of the union (the FDGB is the only union in the GDR) is thus closely tied to the party as the ultimate decision-making institution in the country, and one of its main functions is to realize the plans established by the party. Part of its responsibility also is to work closely with developing countries in their struggle against imperialism, and the FDGB operates a trade union college in Bernau near Berlin to aid in that purpose. Since 1959, the FDGB has trained 3,300 unionists here from 85 different countries, with an emphasis on Africa. The unionists come to the GDR for courses varying from three to ten months, depending on their level of prior experience in the field. There are normally no more than fifteen students in one course and the school tries to assemble classes on the basis of similar linguistic or national backgrounds. For example, in January 1979, a special six-month course started for Mozambicans which was tailor-made for the needs of their country at that time, and in January 1982, another group of Mozambican unionists was trained in a three-month course. The training includes not only the fundamentals of trade union organizing within the context of a socialist society but also of Marxism/Leninism and the nature of the current struggle in the world. In this way, the GDR hopes to instill in visitors from Africa an understanding of the historical alliance between the developing and socialist countries in the struggle against imperialism. All expenses for the courses are covered by "solidarity contributions" of FDGB members, including a daily spending allowance of 7.50 Marks and a clothing allowance upon arrival. According to school officials, graduates from this union college are now located in just about all African states.[20]

The Association of Journalists (VDJ). Since political propaganda (this is considered a legitimate activity and is not a pejorative term in the dictionary of the GDR) and agitation are also of primary importance in working with the masses, the VDJ's cooperation with colleagues from developing countries is yet another important tool of GDR foreign policy vis-à-vis these countries. The "College of Solidarity" was founded in 1963 by the VDJ to help young African states as part of East German anti-imperialist solidarity. It was financed by each of the roughly 6,000 members contributing one day's wages to the school and even now is financed through membership fees. While in the beginning, students from developing countries were trained mainly in the fundamentals of "socialist" journalism, there has been an attempt in recent years to train people who already hold rather high positions in the journalistic establishments of their countries, since their political impact is potentially much larger. The basic ten-month introductory course is still held (in 1983 a group of fourteen Nicaraguans were trained in it) but there are now also many specialized courses lasting only about two months. From October to December 1983, for example, a course was conducted for radio and television journalists. Among the roughly twenty students in the course (most of them were from black Africa) were the heads of TV news rooms in Ethiopia and Afghanistan. The VDJ pays for the flights (in case this involves hard currency, the government assumes the cost), the room and board of students, plus a monthly allowance of 200

Marks and a one-time 500 Mark allowance in the beginning for warm clothing. The VDJ has also begun training journalists directly in their own countries at newly established journalist schools in Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia. Courses range from two to seven weeks and the VDJ sends experienced journalists and teachers from the GDR to handle the training. In this way, the GDR is able to have an immediate impact on the media in the developing countries involved.[21]

The Solidarity Committee. One final extra-governmental tool of East German foreign policy which deserves mention because of its overall importance for relations with developing countries is the Solidarity Committee. It is the executive committee of all parties and mass organzations in the GDR (it has no members of its own) and mobilizes about 218 million Marks annually for the purpose of showing material solidarity with those involved in anti-imperialist struggles around the world. The organizaton was founded in 1960, a time when the GDR had gained diplomatic acceptance only by the other socialist countries and state-to-state relations with the rest of the world were largely non-existent. The Committee thus served an important function in establishing ties with African countries and liberation movements.

Even now that the era of international ostracism is over, the Committee has maintained much of its importance. Through it, important links are maintained with various liberation movements. For example, both the ANC and SWAPO hold offices with diplomatic status in Berlin through accreditation by the Solidarity Committee. In addition, the Committee prints and mails out free of charge the periodicals put out by the ANC and SWAPO, Sechaba and Namibia Today, respectively. During the times of struggle by the MPLA and FRELIMO against the Portuguese, it offered vast amounts of material aid to these organizations, such as sending teachers to the FRELIMO school operating in Tanzania and providing the necessary school supplies, as well as flying wounded fighters back to the GDR for medical care.

After one of these liberation movements has gained political independence, the emphasis shifts to shipments of "solidarity goods" to these countries as well as to train their cadres inside the GDR. According to an official from the Committee, at the beginning of 1984 it sponsored 37,000 youths from LDCs studying in the GDR, of whom 29,000 received apprenticeships in specific trades and 8,000 university training.[22] According to the same official, roughly half of all trainees are from sub-Saharan Africa. Although precise figures were not provided, due to the particularly close relations with Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia, it is safe to assume that the vast majority of them hail from those countries. Just to show how far-thinking the Committee is about these training programs in the GDR, it should be mentioned that over 200 SWAPO members have already been trained in East Germany in order to enable them to take over the presently all-white railroad system in Namibia after independence from South African rule.

Although the Committee's official mission is to practise "solidarity" with the Third World, a close examination of its practises reveals that it also works in support of bilateral economic relations between the GDR and a developing country. Cooperation with the coal mines in Moatize,

Mozambique serve as a good example of this. There, the East German mining firm "Schwarze Pumpe" entered into a commercial contract for the mining of coal, most of it to be exported to the GDR under the terms of a bilateral government agreement. The Solidarity Committee supported this cooperative venture by financing a camp for 350 miners and 150 construction workers and an FDJ friendship brigade was dispatched to build the camp. The prefabricated parts for the houses were paid for by the Committee and sent from the GDR. In 1982, the Committee spent another six million Marks for the construction of a cultural center at Moatize. When problems developed in shipping the coal to the harbor, the Committee made a gift of forty-five trailers to house railroad workers along the railroad line and financed the dispatch of East German railroad engineers. The official designation of all of these activities on the part of the Committee was "solidarity," although the line between it and "mutual advantage", the East German label for its regular economic relations with other countries, here becomes very fine. Clearly the work of the Solidarity Committee is designed to turn solidarity relations of today into solid political as well as economic relations in the future.

All of the activities described above by the various mass organizations are part of a coordinated East German policy vis-à-vis developing countries, with the Socialist Unity Party (SED) the ultimate instance of decision-making in the country. It is through the party that the overall goals and objectives of GDR foreign policy are formulated which are eventually executed by the various state and mass organizations in the country. A main function of all of the groups discussed thus becomes the dissemination and enforcement of decisions reached by the nation's highest ruling governing body, the SED. In other words, they are de facto a <u>part</u> of the governmental structure and operate inside the parameters set by the political leadership. Interactions between these groups and their respective counterparts in developing countries are thus not spontaneous expressions of partnership but rather a very carefully designed part of East German foreign policy vis-a-vis a particular country. The heads of these various mass organizations are also leading members of the SED[23] and through the organizational mechanism of democratic centralism party decisions are eventually carried out by these social organizations. This makes possible a unified East German approach to dealing with particular developing countries at any particular time.

In addition, the foreign policy of the GDR vis-à-vis these countries is coordinated to a large extent with the other socialist countries at both the party and official government levels. In fact, Soviet foreign minister Gromyko has described the result of this coordination as a "diplomacy of socialism" which alone assures the continued foreign policy successes of the socialist countries.[24]

At the political level then, relations with the developing countries take place through many different channels of cooperation. In ideological terms, they are claimed to be guided by the principles of proletarian internationalism in the joint struggle against imperialism. Socialist foreign policy is thus viewed as a "class policy" whose historic mission is to aid in the destruction of capitalism at the global level.[25] Because the GDR, like other socialist countries, portrays its foreign policies vis-à-vis the Third World in this fashion, many in the West assume that a natural harmony of interests exists between the

socialist countries in this regard. What a close examination of economic relations between the GDR and Third world countries reveals, however, is that this professed harmony quickly dissipates when confronted with the concrete economic needs of each of the countries involved. It is to these economic relations that we turn to next.

Economic Relations

Unlike its political relations, which are coordinated with other socialist countries as discussed in the previous section, economic relations between each CMEA country and individual LDCs are mainly bilateral in nature. Very little coordination takes place at the actual level which would allow for the execution of a unified "socialist economic policy." On the contrary, since each Eastern European country is committed to fulfilling its own national economic plans , competition between these countries for the markets and raw materials of the Third World sometimes is rather keen.

There is agreement among the CMEA countries at the rhetorical level, however, that their economic relations with the developing countries are of a fundamentally different type from those characteristic of the Third World and the imperialist countries.[26] Since the socialist and developing countries are thought to be bound by an objective historical alliance against imperialism, as discussed above, and since in the socialist countries there is no economic group "whose search for profits or export interests would contradict the interests of the peoples of Asia or Africa," the harmony of interests postulated at the political level is also claimed to exist in the economic sphere. Since exploitation of the Third World by the socialist countries is thus a priori impossible, the GDR categorically rejects any responsibility for the poverty prevailing in the Third World as well as a division of the world into "rich" and "poor" and vehemently supports the demands of the "Group of 77" for a new international economic order.[27]

It is important to point out, however, that this position of solidarity with the Third World is beginning to erode, as events in these countries are forcing a reassessment of this theoretical alliance. Clearly, most developing countries have not opted for a non-capitalist road. In addition, the economic advances made by the so-called newly industrializing states have called into question the categoric assertion that developing countries could not improve their lot outside the socialist model. Thus, as Elizabeth Valkenier has shown in her excellent analysis of Soviet thinking on the Third World, for example, opinion in that country on the status and nature of the developing countries can no longer be said to be unified, and revolutionary hopes have given way to sober reflections about what is possible at this particular juncture in history.[28] Similar doubts are emerging in the GDR, particularly in private discussions. At the level of official statements, various scholarly works, and the media, however, the Third World continues to be portrayed as on the road to socialism and closely allied with the GDR. The reasons for this ideologically "hard-line" approach would seem to lie in the particular circumstances of socialism in East Germany as discussed above, in which the leadership is under continuous pressure to prove to its population the historically "progressive" nature of its rule in distinction to that of the West German (capitalist) state.

Before discussing economic relations between the GDR and developing countries, we need to examine the East German economy to understand how foreign economic relations are largely determined by internal needs.

The GDR Economy. The GDR is a highly industrialized country in which by 1984 industry contributed 73 percent of the national income.[29] It has a highly skilled workforce in which even almost all women participate fully in wage labor (over 60 percent of all production workers in the GDR are women and over 90 percent of all working-age women are in paid employment).[30] Agriculture is highly mechanized and machines are used to harvest 100 percent of the grain, 97 percent of the potatoes and 94 percent of the fodder, and the GDR is able to produce over 90 percent of its food requirements.[31]

Two key factors influence the GDR's foreign economic relations: its high level of dependence on imported raw materials and a high level of dependence on the export of its industrial products. This degree of external dependence varies sectorally and "for a number of branches of the manufacturing industry (machine tools, printing machines, food stuffs and the packing industry, electrical engineering and electronics, instruments and the textile industry) exports and imports are a decisive production factor since their expansion depends on the further development of foreign trade."[32] [Author's italics]

The GDR exports roughly one-third of its total industrial production and imports over 60 percent of its industrial raw material requirements. Table 1 shows the structure of the GDR's exports and imports from 1960 to 1979 by commodity groups, reflecting a high percentage of exports in finished products and imports in raw materials and fuels. The GDR is highly dependent on the import of tropical agricultural products such as coffee, tea, and spices. East Germans have among the highest levels of coffee consumption in the world, for example, and Angola and Ethiopia already are supplying roughly one third of the total coffee needs of the GDR. In terms of industrial raw materials, the GDR is dependent on foreign sources for 100 percent of its consumption of crude oil, iron ore, asbestos, titanium dioxide, and cotton, more than 80 percent in aluminum, 78 percent in tin and 52 percent in copper.[31] I[33] Since the GDR does not publish detailed statistics on the origins and type of commodities imported, it is rather impossible to determine how much of these needs are satisfied through imports from Africa.

The regional structure of the GDR's foreign trade shows its close ties with other CMEA countries, particularly the Soviet Union. While the socialist countries combined make up roughly 65 percent of the total foreign trade volume, the Soviet Union alone accounts for around 40 percent of it. Table 2 shows the regional distribution of the GDR's foreign trade.

Table 1

Structure of Exports and Imports by Commodity Groups*
(in percentages)

Commodity Group	1960	1970	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
Exports							
Machines, equipment and means of transport	49.0	51.7	50.7	51.2	53.4	55.0	55.8
Fuel, mineral raw materials, metals	15.7	10.1	12.1	11.3	11.2	10.1	11.8
Other raw materials and semi-manufactures for industrial purposes, raw materials and products of the food industry	5.9	7.4	9.1	10.4	7.3	7.8	6.1
Industrial consumer goods	15.1	20.2	15.6	14.4	15.3	15.0	14.9
Chemical products, fertilizers, rubber building materials, and other goods	14.3	10.6	12.5	12.7	12.8	12.1	11.4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Imports							
Machines, equipment and means of transport	12.7	34.2	30.8	31.5	33.3	34.0	33.1
Fuel, mineral raw materials, metals	38.5	27.6	30.5	28.9	29.0	29.8	32.8
Other raw materials and semi-manufactures for industrial purposes, raw materials and products of the food industry	39.2	28.1	22.6	24.9	22.0	20.8	19.4
Industrial consumer goods	5.3	4.5	5.6	4.8	4.6	5.1	5.3
Chemical products, fertilizers, rubber, building materials and other goods	4.3	5.6	10.5	9.9	11.1	10.3	9.4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

* According to the uniform commodity nomenclature of foreign trade of CMEA member countries.

Source: UNCTAD/TD/B/858, 18 August 1981, Annex, page 3

Table 2

Regional Distribution of Foreign Trade 1975-1982
(as percentage of total)

	Exports				Imports			
	1975	1980	1981	1982	1975	1980	1981	1982
Developing countries	7.6	10.2	9.7	9.2	7.0	8.6	6.8	7.3
Developed market economies	22.4	24.0	27.4	27.0	29.0	30.5	29.5	23.9
Socialist countries	70.0	65.7	62.8	63.8	64.0	60.9	63.7	68.8

Source: UNCTAD/TD/B/965, 1 September 1983, pp. 11-12.

Traditionally, the Soviet Union has been the GDR's largest trading partner and has supplied the GDR with most of its raw materials needs. This, however, has not cushioned the GDR from the effects of the massive rise in the price of crude oil and other raw materials in the seventies. In 1975, the CMEA revised its price structure for raw materials to adjust the price annually on the basis of the world prices in the previous five years. Since the average price index for finished industrial products went up by only 230 percent between 1970 and 1978 compared to 556 percent for mineral raw materials, the terms of trade for the GDR vis-à-vis the Soviet Union deteriorated rapidly during this time period.[34] For example, while in 1970 the GDR was able to finance its oil imports from the Soviet Union with only 8 percent of its exports to that country, by 1982 roughly one-third of its exports to the USSR were needed to finance oil imports alone.[35] Erich Honecker acknowledged these changed circumstances when he told the eleventh plenary session of the central committee of the SED in 1979 that "the share of machines and equipment in our exports needed to pay for oil imports has more than tripled since 1970."[36] This led to a massive accumulation of debts to the Soviet Union, which from 1975 to December 1980 were estimated at ten billion Marks[37] and by 1984 reached the accumulated total of 17 billion Marks, according to the Institute for Economic Research located in West Berlin.[38]

Much like in other Eastern European countries, the GDR leadership had projected the 1970s as the decade in which a massive modernization of the technological base of industry via imported (Western) technology paid for by credits from the West would take place. With this modernization in place during the first half of the decade and industrial goods now more

competitive on the markets of the advanced capitalist countries, increased exports to the West would provide the funds to repay these debts. These ambitious plans were not realized inside the country, however, and the deep recession in the capitalist countries coupled with increased sanctions and trade barriers imposed by Western governments on goods from Eastern Europe drastically decreased sales opportunities. Thus by the end of 1980, debts to Western banks amounted to $7.4 billion, with an additional $3.9 billion owed in trade with the Federal Republic of Germany (so-called inter-German trade).[39] In 1983, the GDR was able to reduce its hard-currency debts to Western banks to $6.7 billion, with repayment amounts scheduled for 1984 estimated at another $2 billion. Meanwhile, projections for 1984 trade with the Soviet Union show this to be the first year in a long time that the GDR achieved a positive trade balance with the Soviet Union.[40]

These developments were made possible by certain forced changes in the foreign economic strategy of the GDR in the 1981-85 plan. They essentially amounted to (1) a dramatic increase in exports, even at the expense of domestic consumption in certain products; (2) an increase of hard-currency sales to LDCs and the aggressive opening up of sales markets, particularly of complete plants, to these countries; (3) replacing hard-currency imports such as grain from the United States with barter trade involving LDCs, and reducing imports from NATO countries to products which cannot be gotten on any other market, mainly high technology and industrialized goods. Hard currency earnings became even more important to foreign economic transactions than previously in order to be able to repay the extensive debts to the West. Table 2 above reflects how this policy translated into a shift in the regional distribution of East Germany's foreign trade. The following table shows how this has affected trade with the developing countries.

Table 3

Foreign Trade with Developing Countries, 1960-1983
(in million US $)

	1960	1970	1980	1981	1982	1983
Imports	90	182	1,288	762	965	1,000
Exports	89	183	1,356	1,268	1,797	1,700

Source: CIA, Handbook of Economic Statistics, September 1983 and September 1984, quoted in: Robin Remington, "The East European Bloc and the Third World: Interests, Capabilities, Objectives." Paper presented at the Wilson Center, Washington, D.C., February 1985.

Economic relations with developing countries. Having outlined the nature of the East German economy and the difficulties which it has faced during the past decade, we will now look at economic relations with developing countries. The GDR includes under the rubric of economic relations with developing countries not only trade but also scientific and technical cooperation. These relations are carried out almost exclusively on a bilateral basis between the GDR and the respective "partner" and are claimed by the GDR to operate on the basis of "mutual advantage."[41] Bilateral trade takes up the major share of these economic relations, although the component of scientific and technical cooperation is growing. Included in the latter category are:

1)the exchange of scientific information, technological know-how, and scientific or technical expertise;

2)joint projects at research institutions;

3)assistance in education and training;

4)sending experts and scientists; and

5)the transfer of licenses.[42]

Discussed first will be bilateral trade, followed by more complex forms of economic cooperation such as compensation agreements and tripartite cooperation. Finally, scientific and technical cooperation will be analyzed, since the GDR counts these among its economic relations with LDCs.

(1) Bilateral trade. Traditionally, trade has been the main instrument of economic interaction with developing countries and is claimed by the GDR to constitute an important element of its "aid" relations with these countries as well. The GDR has a marked trade emphasis on only a few developing countries, many of which are important trading partners for Western countries also. For example, in 1980 73 percent of all GDR exports to the Third World went to only fifteen LDCs: Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Nigeria, India, Brazil, Columbia, Argentina, Mexico, Egypt, Syria, Libya, Iraq, and Iran. Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia alone accounted for 15.9 percent of trade within that group, while the oil-exporting countries of Algeria, Iraq, Iran, Libya and Nigeria accounted for almost half, clearly because of their considerable internal markets and also because of their oil exports to the GDR. Most developing countries appear to be of little economic interest to the GDR, particularly the resource-poor least developed ones.[43] The following table shows the trade volume with the major partners in sub-Saharan Africa.

Table 4

Volume of Foreign Trade with Major Partners in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1965-1982
(in million Valuta-Marks and current prices)

	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1982
Angola	-	-	-	-	275.0	264.3
PR Congo	2.8	0.2	0.3	0.1	3.6	28.6
Ethiopia	0.3	0.4	0.6	0.2	132.3	129.1
Ghana	7.0	53.0	2.2	13.7	49.5	74.7
Mozambique	-	-	-	-	274.5	411.8
Nigeria	0.9	13.4	12.9	3.3	47.5	137.9
Sudan	11.1	9.9	25.0	33.3	26.7	16.0
Tanzania	-	2.0	6.6	6.3	49.1	2.6

Source: Statistical Yearbook of the GDR, 1980 and 1983

What is striking about the figures in table 4 above is how quickly the countries with a "socialist orientation" have become the main trading partners in sub-Saharan Africa. Relations with these countries are clearly assuming a more important position than those with the "radical" states of the sixties - Ghana, Guinea, Mali, and Tanzania. Guinea, despite its close alliance with the socialist countries throughout the sixties and seventies, never became an important trading partner. Neither did Mali. Likewise Tanzania's trade relations with the GDR never reached any sizeable proportions. The PR Congo, with which the GDR enjoys excellent political relations, also does not figure prominently in East Germany's foreign trade. On the other hand, relations with Nigeria, which is clearly not committed to a non-capitalist development path, are on the rise. This is not surprising, of course, considering that country's large internal market for industrial goods and, at least until recently, its availability of hard currency earned through the sale of crude oil. Trade with all other sub-Saharan African countries is just about non-existent.

It is impossible to determine from East German statistics how much of the foreign trade conducted constitutes either imports or exports, as statistical yearbooks published by the GDR after 1975 give only aggregate foreign trade volumes. Thus is is virtually imposssible to determine negative or positive trade balances with sub-Saharan Africa, or indeed with any other region of the world, by looking at East German sources. The following table shows East German trade with Africa as compiled by

the United Nations, using data provided by the GDR's trading partners.

Table 5

Trade with Africa, 1970-1983
(in million US $)

	Imports	Exports
1970	52	60
1975	124	172
1980	137	181
1981	185	236
1982	20	121
1983	24	259

Source: UN Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, July 1984.

What is striking about the figures in table 5 is that imports from Africa fell radically in 1982 and 1983. This would fit neatly into the economic strategy of the 1981-85 plan which called for drastic reductions in imports as discussed earlier. If one compares the figures for Africa with those for all of the developing countries as shown in table 3 above, the reduction of imports is even more severe than that from all LDCs combined. One of the problems in trying to assess this situation is that the data on which table 5 is based includes the entire African continent, including such traditional North African trading partners of the GDR as Algeria, Libya, and Egypt. Data for Mozambique, for example, which is the GDR's main trading partner in sub-Saharan Africa, is not available for almost the entire past decade, and it is thus impossible to tell from either East German or any other available sources the amount of imports and exports undertaken between these two countries. Statistics are available through the United Nations on GDR trade with Ethiopia, and Table 6 shows the breakdown of that trade.

Table 6

Trade with Ethiopia, 1970-1982
(in million US $, FOB)

	Imports	Exports
1970	0	0
1975	0	0
1979	0	18
1980	2	17
1981	8	13
1982	7	15

Source: UN Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, July 1984

The data provided by Ethiopia does not confirm the radical drop in imports shown for all of Africa. One would assume that one reason for this lies in the regulated bilateral trade agreements through which the GDR commits itself to regular purchases from Ethiopia. In terms of imports from Angola and Mozambique, the other two main partners of the GDR in sub-Saharan Africa, no data is available. Even if a reduction in imports from Mozambique had taken place over the past few years, however, this would not necessarily prove an East German unwillingness to purchase more of that country's products. The economic situation in Mozambique has deteriorated so severely in the eighties that it is hard to imagine the GDR, or any other country, being able to import much from it. Since the GDR unfortunately does not reveal information concerning the compositon of its foreign trade, all of these matters ultimately become a matter of speculation and thus extremely limited in their utility to facilitate understanding.

Based on the evidence available it thus seems reasonable to assume that the GDR in fact enjoys a considerable trade surplus with sub-Saharan Africa. Too little information is available on the conditions of this trade to determine conclusively, however, whether the GDR is using this surplus to balance its hard currency commitments to the West. Istvan Dobozi, an economist at Hungary's World Economics Institute, argues that this is in fact the economic strategy pursued by the East European countries.[44] Money made in the developing countries is thus spent in the West rather than on purchases from the South.

The structure of trade between the GDR and its trading partners in the Third World shows the usual pattern between a highly industrialized country and LDCs. At the begining of the eighties, finished products constituted over 90 percent of the exports of the GDR to that region, while over 80 percent of all imports were agricultural products plus oil and raw materials of all types.[45] Here again, however, due to the lack of detailed information from the GDR, much is left to speculation. In the summer of 1984, a GDR publication maintained that at that point "roughly" 40 percent of imports from developing countries were in the form of semi-finished or finished products, compared to 24 percent in 1973.[46] Trusting these figures from the GDR essentially amounts to a matter of faith, however, because no data is published that would substantiate the claim. In terms of trade with sub-Saharan Africa, the structure of trade is of a very traditional type in any case, since the productive forces there are so underdeveloped that the export of finished products is not a primary concern for that continent at this time.

In seeking to locate the impetus behind the GDR's foreign trade relations, the traditional argument to explain the need for this trade has been the need to "create conditions for the steady purchase from these countries of such products as crude oil, cotton, cotton fabrics, protein fodder, vegetable oil, coffee, cocoa and tropical fruits."[47] The very high dependence of the East German economy on these products as discussed earlier, is certainly a fact. Since overall energy self-sufficiency in the CMEA is going down and the Soviets are also seeking to diversify their exports to earn more hard currency themselves, GDR imports from non-CMEA sources will become correspondingly more important in the decades to come.[48] Thus raw materials from Africa will play an even greater role for the GDR in the years ahead.

The need to pay for these imports with East German products is not the only, nor necessarily the most important reason, however. In fact, it is argued here that these markets are important to the GDR in any case because of the need to sell its industrial goods. The LDCs provide a market for East German goods which would be difficult, if not impossible, to sell in another part of the world. This is so because the industrial products manufactured in the GDR with few exceptions do not meet the international technical standards to make them competitive in the West. Thus the Third World offers a market for socialist countries in "capital goods and manufactured consumer goods which they could not sell in the advanced capitalist countries because of their low competitiveness. It is well known that the great majority of capital goods exported to non-socialist markets go to developing countries and, in particular, to the African countries."[49] Despite past attempts at integration within the East European economies, they essentially remain similar rather than complementary in structure and thus offer few opportunities for exporting industrial products to one another. Since the GDR has only a limited internal market for its industrial goods and the CMEA market does not absorb all of the industrial goods produced, the importance of the African markets is certainly not insignificant and, it is argued here, is growing.

Until a few years ago, the primary mechanism for regulating trade with the LDCs was through clearing agreements, which essentially amounted to barter trade, enabling both trading partners to avoid hard currency transactions. Such trade on a clearing basis takes place at present with Mozambique, for example, through which the GDR is able to import tea, sisal, cashew-nuts, citrus fruits, and bananas without paying for them in hard currency. In turn, it sends to Mozambique finished products such as electrical household equipment, canned goods, clothing, and soap. This does not mean, however, that the entire trade between Mozambique and the GDR takes place on a clearing basis. As Schoeller has pointed out, items placed on the clearing list tend to be of inferior quality on both sides because any items in demand on hard currency markets will not be traded on barter terms by either country if at all possible. Thus both countries benefit by getting rid of items which they would not have been able to sell on the international market, such as third-grade Mozambican tea for technologically inferior finished products from the GDR.[50] Investment and capital goods are normally not supplied by clearing but rather on the basis of credits repayable in hard currency. Because of the deteriorating economic situation in Mozambique, East Germany has recently been forced to accept goods such as citrus fruits and tea in repayment for deliveries of W-50 trucks because of Mozambique's incapacity to repay in hard currency as had been previously agreed.[51]

The volume of trade is regulated by trade agreements signed annually by the GDR and its partner countries in the developing world. By 1984, the GDR had ratified bilateral trade agreements with sixty-three developing countries and worked in regular economic commissions with fifteen of them.[52] For example, on 24 March 1984 the new trade agreement signed between the GDR and Ethiopia (and announced on Radio Addis Ababa) stipulated that the GDR provide Ethiopia with tractors, mopeds, motor vehicles, spare parts, agricultural machinery and various other equipment in exchange for coffee, skins, oil fruits, grain, T-shirts, underwear, and wine.[53] Trade agreements also regulate the

trade with Angola and Mozambique, and special joint commissions meet annually to work out the trade for the following year. The prices established for this trade are based on current world market prices, although competition sometimes drives down the price of certain goods just as it does in trade between Western countries and LDCs. For the GDR this means competing not only with Western firms but also with fellow CMEA countries equally eager to sell their goods on these markets.

It should be pointed out, however, that it is almost impossible to determine the exact prices agreed upon by the GDR and its respective partners, since this information is considered secret and thus not published in any available East German source. One suspects that one reason for the GDR's insistence on secrecy lies in that fact that it does not want to give critics a chance to admonish it for using prices set on the imperialist world market, prices which the GDR insisted until recently served as a vehicle of resource extraction from the Third World on the part of the capitalist countries.[54] The logic that this exploitation is somehow nonexistent when practised by a socialist country naturally escapes many and the GDR's habit of not making prices public only enhances the suspicions of many observers.

It is this practise of trading with the developing countries on the basis of world market prices which has been a source of irritation between the East European countries and their friends in the South. As early as 1964, Che Guevara, addressing the Afro-Asian Economic Seminar in Algiers, criticized the socialist countries for exploiting the underdeveloped countries through unequal exchange just as the imperialist countries were doing, since both trade at prices set by capitalist monopolies.[55] Too little is known to make a precise evaluation of this accusation in regard to the GDR's trade with sub-Saharan Africa, but, as Andre Gunder Frank has pointed out, "what experience does show is that the socialist countries of Eastern Europe stick to business and drive as hard a bargain in international trade as anybody else."[56]

If in fact the GDR trades with sub-Saharan Africa on the basis of world market prices, then African countries have experienced the same deterioration of the terms of trade for their primary commodities as they have through trading with advanced capitalist countries. The prices for raw materials (with the exception of oil) are the lowest they have been in forty years in real terms, and between 1977 and 1981, the terms of trade for African developing countries have gone done by 50 percent.[57] The African countries exporting coffee, copper, cocoa, bananas, vegetable oils and tea alone lost $2.2 billion between 1979 and 1981 due to the deteriorating terms of trade.[58] It thus seems totally unconvincing when the socialist countries maintain that "there is no general problem in the exchanges between developed and developing countries... Socialist countries, in distinction to the imperialist ones, share no responsibility for the economic situation in developing countries and in that sense have no obligation toward them."[59] If the structure of trade is very similar to that between capitalist industrial countries and LDCs, and the prices underlying the sales transactions likewise do not differ from those with capitalist countries, it is difficult to accept the logic advanced by the GDR that trading with it is a priori more beneficial for a developing country than trading with any capitalist enterprise.

Nor does it look like trade relations between the GDR and LDCs, including Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia, will change drastically in the decade to come. Dobozi and Inotai have projected a commodity composition between the CMEA countries and LDCs to 1990 to be roughly the same as at present,[60] and an analysis of the types of long-term economic agreements ratified between the GDR and Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia over the past years confirms this projection. The pattern of trade between the GDR and LDCs of whatever political variety thus does little to alter existing divisions of labor but merely shifts the geographical distribution of this trade from one part of the world to another. But, as Deepak Nayyar has pointed out, "such traditional patterns of trade can neither transform the structure of production in the South nor make for a new international division of labor."[61]

Although bilateral trade is by far the most important type of transaction in economic relations with the developing countries, the GDR, has been trying to increase its share of more complex forms of cooperation in order to integrate these countries into a "socialist division of labor." Included in this "promotion of mutual complementarity"[62] are joint ventures on the basis of compensation agreements which basically guarantee developing countries a market for their export-oriented industrial or agricultural projects.

(2) Compensation agreements. In this form of economic cooperation, the GDR generally provides the experts and the necessary industrial equipment for which it gets compensated in future production from the investment project. The East German involvement in the coal-mining operations in Mozambique is an example of this type of arrangement, in which the GDR will receive much of the coal mined at Moatize in return for the material and technical assistance it rendered there. Mozambican tantalum mining is another example of this type of arrangement: the GDR supplies the investment goods plus the experts in exchange for the exclusive right to this tantalum, with the option to resell it on hard-currency markets. The mines themselves, however, stay in the possession of the Mozambican state and do not themselves become the property of the GDR.[63] One further example of this type of transaction, which is also one of the few cases of multilateral cooperation within the CMEA in developing countries, is the textile plant in Kombolcha, Ethiopia, built jointly by the GDR and the CSSR. While Ethiopia presently exports raw cotton, the operation of this plant will enable it to export cotton fabrics to the GDR from this plant in the future.[51]

(3) Tripartite cooperation. In this economic undertaking, which is growing in importance, socialist countries and Western firms cooperate in an LDC, with the role of the developing countries mainly limited to being the "purchasers of goods and services jointly provided by enterprises in the East and West."[64] While East German policy-makers appear to have had some ideological misgivings about this type of cooperation in the past, these seem now to have been abandoned in light of the increased business opportunities in the Third World which this offers. The projects underway on this basis in which the GDR was taking part in mid-1984 were twice the total number of those completed in all previous years.[65] Past examples of this type of cooperation include the establishment of a textile plant in Mozambique, in which the GDR

cooperated with the Italian firm Snamprogetti,[66] and the erection of a cotton-spinning facility in Ethiopia. In 1977, the East German enterprise "Unitechna-Textimaprojekt" and West Germany's Krupp steel-exporting works decided to cooperate in the construction of this Ethiopian plant. While Krupp initially had charge of the overall management function, this changed after the Ethiopian government moved closer to the GDR, and the East German firm supervised the completion of the project in 1981.[67]

Both compensation and tripartite cooperation agreements are praised by the GDR as contributing to the "development" of their African partners and as presenting real alternatives to the traditional North-South economic transactions. The evidence is not as unambiguous, however. For example, what does it mean for the Mozambican state to retain ownership of its tantalum mines if the East Germans have the exclusive rights to mine the tantalum and to sell it on the international market for hard currency? In what way does this differ from Western forms of economic interaction, except in rhetoric? The reality is that the Mozambicans have relinguished their rights to a natural resource in their country to a foreign power, be it a foreign government or a foreign company. The net effect of this type of an economic arrangement may be beneficial in the short and/or long term for both parties. However, one fails to see how this relationship differs in fundamentals from a situation in which a foreign capitalist firm takes over the management functions of a state-owned enterprise in the Third World and markets the product. The only difference would seem to lie in the specific financial arrangements that were agreed upon and not in the 'nature' of the relationship itself.

Likewise, the increasing trend toward tripartite economic cooperation does little to clarify the differences emphasized in GDR literature between East and West in the South. To argue that projects jointly undertaken by an Eastern and Western enterprise somehow become more beneficial for the developing country involved is again more a matter of faith than any real evidence. It also casts some doubt on the GDR's categoric assertion that multinational corporations do not aid in the development of the Third World but merely operate there to maximize their profit opportunities. If this is so, how does the investment undertaken jointly between East and West become different in its impact on the South, just because one side calls itself socialist? Did the nature of the cotton-spinning plant in Ethiopia change because the construction of it switched from West to East German hands? It is these kinds of questions to which the GDR will be increasingly subjected as it intensifies tripartiate cooperative ventures in the developing countries.

(4) Scientific and technical cooperation. The main emphasis here is on the training of personnel from, and sending of experts to, the developing countries. It is in this type of cooperation that the GDR's operations in the developing countries differ the most from the West and make a real contribution toward the improvement of conditions in the South. Cooperation in this sphere, like all other types of economic transaction, are regulated on the basis of bilateral government agreements. For example, the first such agreement signed with Mozambique on 13 August 1975 included: (a) the dispatch of GDR experts and specialists to Mozambique, (b) the acceptance of Mozambicas for vocational training in East German firms and institutions, and (c) the

training of leading Mozambican cadres in special courses and symposia in the GDR in various subject areas.[68] While this initial agreement stipulated that GDR experts be paid in local Mozambican currency, according to Moeller the GDR now increasingly seeks payments in hard currency for these expert services due to its own economic situation.[69]

Cooperation in the field of expert services and apprenticeship training normally closely complements commercial relations between the GDR and developing countries. In Africa, over 80 percent of all GDR experts are in Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia, the countries which are also its main customers in the sub-Saharan part of that continent. The sending of experts and training of cadres normally is part of a sales transaction of GDR machines and equipment on these countries. For example, the commercial agreement with the East German enterprise "Schwarze Pumpe" to help in the operation of the coal mine in Moatize was accompanied by the sending of GDR experts under the scientific and technical cooperation agreement between the GDR and Mozambique. Since one of the main export items of the GDR is complete plants (turnkey or product-in-hand) and this is an area in which international competition is particularly keen, East Germans consider the training programs which they can offer in conjunction with the sale of such plants as a real competitive advantage over capitalist firms.[70]

The training at both the vocational and university levels inside the GDR is an important element of cooperation in the scientific and technical sphere. At present, about 9,000 foreign citizens study at East German universities and thousands more receive technical training through apprenticeship programs. In 1982, 4,222 completed their vocational training, bringing the total number of graduates from LDCs since 1970 to more than 54,000. In 1982 also, 1,435 students from developing countries graduated from East German universities, bringing their total number since 1970 to about 14,500.[71] Between 1977 and 1982, more than 400 Ethiopians alone were trained at East German universities.[72]

A word of caution about these figures seems in order, however. Figures abound in East German literature about the number of foreigners being trained in the country, and they are normally presented as part of the GDR's active solidarity with the South. However, some of the young people studying in the GDR are there on a regular commercial basis, with their home country paying their tuition expenses as well as providing the students with a monthly stipend. In these cases, the East German government accepts the payments in hard currency and gives the students a monthly stipend in its own non-convertible currency. This would thus appear to be more of a straight-forward economic transaction certainly also working to the advantage of the GDR than an act of "solidarity." For example, a large contingent of Libyans is in the GDR receiving vocational training on this basis. The author also met several students from sub-Saharan Africa (e.g., Zambia and Zimbabwe) who were studying in the country under such terms.

Thus it is often difficult to determine the precise nature of the relationships existing between the GDR and developing countries in this regard. Frequently they are presented as part of scientific and technical cooperation (which is thus part of overall economic relations), and simultaneously praised as part of the GDR's "aid" efforts within the

context of solidarity activities. Thus it is often impossible to tell precisely under what terms these young people are trained in the GDR. One can say in overall terms, however, that these training programs constitute a major part of the interaction between the GDR and sub-Saharan Africa. They clearly make a real contribution toward the needs of that continent by building the human infrastructure necessary for subsequent economic development. The GDR is clearly justified in pointing with pride to these programs and their importance cannot be underestimated. Although the East Germans do not spend as much money on these "aid" programs as Western countries spend on so-called official development assistance, a comparison of monetary spending would never be able to do justice to the real impact which these training programs have.[73]

The cooperation in the agricultural sector deserves a few comments because of the enormous importance this sector has in the economies of developing countries. Cooperation here is mainly in the area of promoting cooperatives and state farms. The GDR supplies agricultural equipment, fertilizers, and experts in exchange for agricultural products. In Mozambique, for example, a project for growing grain crops over a total area of 120,000 ha in three Mozambique provinces is being planned, with the largest project in Manica Province in the center of the country with a total area of 80,000 ha.[74] In Niassa Province, 1,000 ha of corn are being planted with GDR assisstance, including tractors from Schönebeck.[75] Between 1978 and spring 1984, the GDR exported agricultural equipment to Ethiopia totalling 90 million Marks, including 1,850 tractors, 285 harvest combines, 300 drilling machines and over 100 other agricultural machines.[76] The Ethiopian government plans to open up 300,000 ha of new land to agriculture by 1994 and GDR agricultural machines and equipment will play a prominent part in this venture if past experience is a guide. The 200,000 ha of new agricultural land opened up so far have been accomplished almost exclusively with tractors and ploughs from the GDR. In the Highlands of Ethiopia, on Garadella state farm, about 900,000 tons of grain were harvested last October for the sixth time with the help of "Fortschritt" harvesting combines serviced by the FDJ friendship brigade.[77]

As events in Mozambique over the past few years have shown, however, this East German agricultural model based on the use of machines and cooperative farming on large state farms is not necessarily applicable to the conditions prevailing in sub-Saharan Africa. Even today, most African peasants produce mainly for their own subsistence, while in Eastern Europe commodity production was generalized even at the rural village level at the beginning of this century. In Angola and Mozambique for example, many peasants who had been forced through the coercive mechanism of colonialism to work on large plantations returned to subsistence farming in their own villages once that coercion ended and it has been difficult to get them to return to work on the state farms, many of which were the colonial plantations from before. In Ethiopia even today around 90 percent of the working population is involved mainly in subsistence agriculture and only 20 percent of the harvests actually reach the market.[78] In Angola in 1979, about 80 percent of the population mainly lived off subsistence agriculture,[79] and in Mozambique at the time of independence, only around 30 percent of the population was involved in wage labor, while 80 percent of the population was involved in the

agricultural sector.[80] Even in Cuba, the country which often serves as the model of successful socialist development in the Third World, at the time of its revolution, 64 percent of all people involved in agriculture were wage laborers on big estates and another 30 percent were small-hold tenants or owners involved in commodity production. In addition, the rate of urbanization in Cuba in 1953 was 57 percent of the population.[81] Thus, in addition to economies distorted to meet foreign needs, Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia have to take into account populations that as a whole are still far removed from their "homo economicus" counterparts in both East and West.

In addition, this model overlooks certain key sociological factors in Africa which were brought up again recently at an FAO conference in Zimbabwe: most agricultural work in Africa is performed by women and most Africans still live in extended family settings.[82] This is not to say that women cannot be taught to operate tractors and other big agricultural equipment, nor that extended families cannot also be incorporated into rural cooperatives. It is argued, however, that any successful rural development strategy in Africa must take these factors into account. The simple transfer of models which does not take into consideration these real sociological differences does not necessarily bring "development." The negative experiences made on Mozambican state farms in recent years, for example, have shown that establishing such an operation takes more than importing a few experts and tractors from the GDR. FRELIMO basically admitted this at its Fourth Party Congress in 1983, arguing self-critically that the agricultural model which it pursued after independence was doomed to failure because it sought to emulate Eastern Europe and thus failed to take account of the specific conditions prevailing in the country at that time.[83]

The largest difficulty for the construction of socialism in sub-Saharan Africa might prove to be, however, that they are attempting to build socialism while remaining embedded in the capitalist world economy. The dual model advanced by the GDR of building socialism at the superstructural level while gradually gaining concessions from imperialism seems fraught with contraditions. The logic of this model assumes that imperialism is equally interested in all developing countries and that the latter have considerable leverage over the interests of foreign capital. Yet the situation in Mozambique, for example, has shown that the power of a very poor and economically backward country to harness imperialism for its own advantage is actually extremely limited. Imperialism simply goes elsewhere if the conditions imposed on it by a "progressive" country are not to its liking. Even the signing of the Nkomati accord with South Africa in early 1984 did not bring the foreign investors the FRELIMO government had hoped for. The CMEA countries, on the other hand, have shown themselves unable to fill the gap economically and, like the GDR, have pursued a strategy of "mutual self-interst" in dealing with that country.

Preliminary Conclusions

East German foreign policy, like that of any other nation state, is a complex web of factors conditioned not only by domestic needs but also an external environment which acts either to constrain or aid in the execution of national goals. Thus the GDR's relations with sub-Saharan

Africa during the past quarter of a century have been the result both of the specific conditions prevailing in the GDR, in sub-Saharan Africa, as well as the global system as a whole.

Until the early seventies, the GDR's relations with the rest of the world were largely conditioned by the country's lack of diplomatic recognition outside of the Warsaw Pact area. This, as Michael Sadaro has phrased it, put the GDR into the position of "supplicant," making the search for diplomatic recognition the cornerstone of its foreign policy vis-a-vis the non-socialist world. [84] Thus the Deutschlandfrage as discussed above was the primary determinant of the GDR's relations with sub-Saharan Africa during the immediate post-independence periof of the early sixties. Since no formal diplomatic ties were established even with the "progressive" states of that era such as Ghana, Guinea, and Mali, relations focused mainly on the establishment of bilateral trade as well as on "solidarity." It was during this era that the Solidarity Committee was of enormous importance in the execution of foreign policy, and the visit of a liberation movement leader was treated like an important state visit from a foreign dignitary. It was during this first phase then that the GDR established its international reputation in terms of aiding national liberation movements and acting in a radical anti-imperialist fashion.

It is during the second phase of East German involvement in Africa, however, that the GDR became the focus of intense international attention. [85] Only a few years after the wave of diplomatic recognitions in the early seventies had ended the decades of relative isolation, events within Africa itself led to a rapid intensification of contacts with that continent. The Portuguese empire finally crumbled in the mid-seventies and the GDR, like the other socialist countries, was now the beneficiary of years of close ties with the anti-Portuguese liberation movements, the MPLA in Angola and FRELIMO in Mozambique. The fact that these countries after independence chose a path of "scientific" rather than "African" socialism made relations even closer, and the treaties of friendship ratified with them in the late seventies announced to the entire world relations of unprecedented intensity between the GDR and the developing world. In addition, the unexpected overthrow of emperor Haile Selassie in Ethiopia by a revolutionary group headed by Mengistu Haile Miriam led to a rapid intensification of relations between Ethiopia and the Soviet Union and its allies.

Thus, within a few years, the GDR had experienced a transition from "supplicant" to a foreign power with considerable influence on the continent. The role now played by the GDR was seen by many in the West as that of a "surrogate" for Soviet designs.[86] This argument, it is argued here, it entirely too simplistic for several reasons. It overlooks the reality of intensive relations between the GDR and these liberation movements throughout the sixties, as well as the growing economic interests which the GDR has on the continent. It also rests on the dubious assumption that the Soviet Union operates on the basis of a "master plan" for world domination, rather than seeing it as a country which, despite its revolutionary ideology, responds to situations outside its own borders much like the other superpower, the United States. It is clearly the case that the Soviet Union takes into account both the United States and China in its Third World relations but that in itself does not

prove a carefully designed program for global domination.[87]

Beginning with the eighties, it is argued here, the GDR's relations with sub-Saharan Africa entered a third phase, one which has seen the loss of much of the optimism for the revolutionary changes in the Third World and a much more aggressively self-interested economic policy. As was outlined above, the economic situation of socialist Germany as it entered its 1981-85 plan required some shifts in policy which affected not only relations with the West but also with the South. Increasingly, the developing countries came to be looked upon more in terms of their markets for industrial goods and suppliers of raw materials rather than the revolutionary engines for the global construcion of socialism. Thus this current phase is characterized mainly by considerations of economic self-interest rather than solidarity in the anti-imperialist struggle.

Coupled with this shift in domestic priorities has come a certain sense of disillusionment on the part of the GDR with the unfolding events in sub-Saharan Africa. The inability of the revolutionary governments in Africa, particularly in Mozambique, to make significant economic progress and to carry out the promises made at independence has led the East Germans to a reassessment of the revolutionary possibilities in Africa at the present time. While the reasons for this are seen on the one hand in the continued strength of imperialism , on the other one now appears to appreciate more the backward nature of the forces of production on the continent. As was discussed above, the agricultural model advanced by the GDR, for example, has proven to be of limited utility for the conditions prevailing in Africa at the present time, and the prospects for building up industry along the East European model are also extremely slim.

In many ways, then, the East Germans are now confronted with the insufficiency of their own model of development for the specific conditions prevailing in sub-Saharan Africa. They are also confronted with the inadequacy of their theoretical position concerning the "world of national liberation" which actually never had much explanatory value for understanding the forces shaping events in that part of the world. The position of the GDR, as well as the other socialist countries, was in reality an undifferentiated "Third Worldism". It was bound to fail because it did not account for the class antagonisms inside the developing countries themselves and the ways in which the nascent bourgeois classes allied themselves with imperialism against the interests of their own peasantry and working classes. Thus the 'natural' alliance postulated at the ideological level was never more than wishful thinking on the part of the GDR, except in a few cases in which Third World leaders decided to opt for a radically anti-capitalist development path.

On the African side a certain sense of disillusionment with the ability or willingness of the socialist countries to help overcome economic underdevelopment is also taking place. As discussed above, the East European countries have been unwilling to use the CMEA as an instrument of economic cooperation with the developing countries. Mozambique's request for membership in the CMEA was turned down in 1981, and it and Angola both have only observer status in that organization. Clearly the present members of the CMEA did not feel that they could bear the extra burdens imposed by admitting another poor and needy developing

country into the group and were either unwilling or unable to make the additional sacrifices. This naturally led to a sense of frustration and disillusionment in both Angola and Mozambique, especially since both of these countries were willing to ally themselves much more closely with the socialist countries in the immediate post-independence period. It was precisely in anticipation of this level of disillusionment that the East Germans apparently voted for the admission of Mozambique into the CMEA and were willing to accept the additional economic hardships that this admission would have entailed.[88] The other CMEA members obviously would or could not go along with the East Germans and voted for a rejection.

It is precisely this question of credibility which will haunt the GDR's relations with black Africa, at least in the near future. Despite its many expressions of solidarity with the continent, in actual state-to-state relations this solidarity has been confined mainly to the rhetorical level. It has not shown that it is able to provide more than the Western countries in terms of aid once independence has been achieved, and has proven that in economic terms it will drive as hard a bargain as any Western country would. There are some who argue that the GDR's policy of "mutual advantage" in economic relations does not differ in essence from relations between the advanced capitalist countries and the South, since the GDR trades at world market prices and the structure of trade is very typical for industrialized and developing countries, as discussed above. Thus Andre Gunder Frank reaches the conclusion, for example, that "as far as the terms of trade and the internatinal division of labor in general goes, we have seen that the 'socialist' countries behave no differently from, and sometimes worse than, the imperialist ones, except that for reasons of their own they prefer longer-term price and delivery arragements, unless they become burdensome."[89] Furthermore, Kunibert Raffer argues that the socialist countries, including the GDR, although they have given adament support to the developing countries in their call for a new internatinal economic order (NIEO), in practice have shown to be every bit as unwilling to give in to specific demands of the Third World as have the advanced capitalist countries. [90]

This unwillingness to meet concrete demands made by the developing countries which would prove to be economically disadvantageous to the GDR has several components. Firstly, the GDR emphatically rejects any responsibility for the existing division of labor as well as for the economic underdevelopment of the South. It thus points to the West as the locus of blame and the source from which aid (as a form of reparation) should come. As the GDR increases its trade with the developing countries and the era of direct colonialization recedes more into history, this argument will become subject to growing cynicism, however, since it will be increasingly difficult to distinguish between the business practices of the East and the West. To argue that one is innocent because one follows unfair practices established by others is hardly a convincing line of defense. Secondly, as the GDR makes more of its GNP dependent upon imports from and exports to the non-CMEA areas, it will subject itself increasingly to the pressures of the capitalist world economy. The result of this will be not only a deterioration of past attempts at integration within the CMEA, since all of the East European countries are basically pursuing the same economic strategies vis-a-vis the non-CMEA

area, but also that this growing level of commodity production for exchange on the world market will undermine the very nature of socialist production inside the GDR itself. In terms of economic relations with the South, this means that the GDR cannot afford to be more concessionary than the West in these dealings since it cannot afford to lose its current level of competitiveness on the international market. Thirdly, as long as the GDR looks to the South not only for raw materials but also for markets for its industrialized goods, there will be little incentive to change the status quo, political or ideological considerations notwithstanding. As Istvan Dobozi, among others, has pointed out repeatedly, the socialist countries of Eastern Europe occupy an intermediate position in the international division of labor, which means that while in East-South trade, the East occupies the traditional position of the North (raw materials in exchange for industrial goods), while in East-West trade, the East becomes the supplier of raw materials and thus holds the traditional "South" position.[91] Thus the GDR is locked into the operations of the global economy and is subject to the same law of value. To expect it to be able to act more in line with its socialist ideology would be to ignore the fundamental fact of its dependence on the capitalist world economy, which thus is able to shape both its political and economic options.[93]

In many ways, then, it is argued that the second phase of interaction was ultimately atypical for the nature of relations with sub-Saharan Africa and was more of a response to events there than part of a deliberate East German policy. As the GDR has gained the international diplomatic recognition it sought after throughout the fifties and sixties, it has become much more of a status quo power in the world, willing to play the game of international relations more or less by the established rules. Thus the current third phase will characterize relations between the GDR and sub-Saharan Africa in the years to come. The harsh reality is that the GDR cannot afford any more Mozambiques, either at the economic or political level.

FOOTNOTES

[1]In West Germany, the study of the GDR has always held a separate position from Soviet Studies. For example, the political foundation of the Social Democratic Party, the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, put out Entwicklungspolitische Aktivitäten kommunistischer Länder, edited by Henrik Bischof, until a few years ago, when budget cuts forced it to stop publication. For other examples of West German scholarship on the GDR in the Third World, see Hans Siegfried Lamm and Siegfried Kupper, DDR und Dritte Welt (Munich: 1976); Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, et al, Drei Jahrzehnte Aussenpolitik der DDR (Munich: 1985, second edition). On the American side, a series of special research papers on Poland, Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and one on Eastern Europe as a whole were published by Radio Free Europe in 1979. These reports in many ways marked the beginning of a more detailed look at Eastern Europe in the Third World separate from the Soviet Union. See, for example, Michael Radu, ed., Eastern Europe and the Third World: East vs. South (New York: 1981); Edwina Moreton, "Foreign Policy Perspectives in Eastern Europe," in Karen Dawisha-Harmstone and Philip Hanson, eds., Soviet-East European Dilemmas: Coercion, Competition, and Consent (London: 1981); Roger Kanet, "East European States," in Thomas H. Henriksen, ed., Communist Powers and Sub-Saharan Africa (Stanford, Ca: 1981); Daniel Nelson, "Eastern Europe and the Non-Communist World," in Stephen Fischer-Galati, ed., Eastern Europe in the 1980s (Boulder, Co: 1981); Vernon V. Aspaturian, "Eastern Europe in World Perspective," in Theresa Rakowska-Harmstone, ed., Communism in Eastern Europe (Bloomington, Ind.: 1984), second edition); Christopher Coker, "The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: Patterns of Competition and Collaboration in Southern Africa," in R. Craig Nation and Mark V. Kauppi, eds., The Soviet Impact in Africa (Lexington, Mass.: 1984); Robin Remington, The East European Bloc and the Third World: Interests, Capabilities, Objectives. Paper presented at the Woodrow Wilson Center, International Security Studies Program, Session on the Third World and International Security, Washington, D.C., 30 January 1985.

[2]For a full discussion of this, see Brigitte Schulz and William Hansen, "Aid or Imperialism: West Germany in Sub-Saharan Africa," Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 22, Nr. 2, Spring 1984, pp. 287-313..

[3]Hans-Joachim Spanger offers an excellent analysis of this in "Die beiden deutschen Staaten in der Dritten Welt," Jahrbuch des DGFK 1982/83, pp. 1-26. See also Eberhard Schulz's essay in Jacobsen/Leptin/Scheuner/Schulz, Drei Jahrzehnte Aussenpolitk der DDR (Munich, 1980), pp. 201-231.

[4]The scope of this essay does not permit a closer examination of the GDR's relations with the Soviet Union, but see Die DDR im Warschauer Pakt und im Rat für Gegenseitige Wirtschaftshilfe (Bonn, 1981) for an excellent analysis of the GDR's position in Eastern Europe and vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

[5]There has been much discussion about the nature of real existing socialism and the extent to which it actually conforms to Marx's vision of a socialist society. The Soviet Union and its allies in Eastern Europe naturally view themselves was having established socialism, a claim challenged by a wide spectrum of observers in the West, ranging from

bourgeois to various shades of New Left and Trotzkyist. For the purposes of this essay, however, the Soviet and Eastern European designation of themselves will be used. In that sense, then, the term "socialist countries" is used merely to distinguish them from the capitalist countries of the West and the developing countries of the South, and not to make a statement regarding the nature of their societies.

[6]Klaus Willerding, "Die DDR und die nationalbefreiten Staaten," Asien, Afrika, Lateinamerika (AALA), No. 5/1974, Vol. 2, p. 687.

[7]Vasilii G. Solodovnikov, "Problems of Non-Capitalist Development," in Developing Countries on the Non-Capitalist Road (Proceedings of the Third International Conference of Africanist Marxists of the Socialist Countries Varna, September 5-12, 1971), Sofia 1974, p. 13.

[8]J. M. Primokov, "Länder mit sozialistischer Orientierung: ein schwieriger, aber realer Übergang zum Sozialismus," in AALA, No. 6, 1981, p. 967.

[9]There is actually a lot of confusion in East German literature on exactly which African countries are in this group. A book recently published by a prominent East German scholar lists the following black African countries in this category: Tanzania, Madagascar, Benin, Burundi, Guinea, Zimbabwe and Zambia. This list shows the readiness of many in the GDR to count any country which has shown its willingness to work closely with the socialist countries at the economic or political level as having a "socialist orientation." This type of classification thus lacks any analytical rigor in trying to understand the class forces shaping events inside the respective countries and also tends to portray the state of world revolution too optimistically. This author incidentally "promoted" the PR Congo (!), Mozambique, Ethiopia and Angola to full membership in "world socialism." See Erich Hanke, Ins nächste Jahrhundert: Was steht uns bevor? (Berlin, 1984), pp. 236-240. It should be pointed out, howeverm that most East German and Societ authors consider the latter group in Hanke's book as having a "socialist orientation," while the first group now only gets peripheral attention by contrast to the sixties and early seventies.

[10]Quoted in Primokov, "Länder mit sozialisicher Orientierung," p. 969.

[11]For an example of this type of misunderstanding, see Christopher Coker, "Patterns of Competition," pp. 59-86. Peter Wiles, on the other hand, takes the contrary view and argues forcefully that Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia are in the process of building socialism along the Soviet model and that this has been insufficiently grasped by the West. See Peter Wiles and Alan Smith, "The General View, Especially from Moscow," in Peter Wiles, ed., The Communist Third World (New York: 1982), pp. 13-52.

[12]See Elizabeth Kridl Valkenier, The Soviet Union in the Third World: An Economic Bind (New York: 1984).

[13]On the special characteristics of the revoution and subsequent developments in Ethiopia, see, for example, Jelena Alexejewna Birgaus, "Die Revolution in Athiopien: Allgemeines und Besonderes," in Deutsche Aussenpolitik, 2/82, and Christian Märdel, "Die äthiopische Volksrevolution: Voraussetzungen, Wesen, Perspektiven," in Asien, Afrika, Lateinamerika, Nr. 1, 1982. From a Western perspective, see Paul B. Henze, "Communism in Ethiopia," in Problems of Communism, Nr. 3, 1981. On Angola, see, for example, Albin Kress, "VR Angola - Kampf eines vom Kolonialismus befreiten Volkes fur eine sozialistische Zukunft," in Asien, Afrika, Lateinamerika, Nr. 6, 1980. On Mozambique, see Günther Thole, "Probleme der sozialistischen Orientierung in Afrika: VR Mozambique," in Deutsche Aussenpolitik, Nr. 5, 1980, and "Gründzuge der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung der VR Mozambique," in Asien, Afrika, Lateinamerika, Nr. 4, 1980. For Western analyses, see John Saul, "Mocambique: The New Phase," in Monthly Review, Nr. 3, 1979; Wolfgang Schoeller, "Mozambik: Struktur und Krise einer Dienstleistungs-Okonomie im Sudlichen Afrika, in Africa Spectrum, Nr. 3, 1981.

[14]While both the MPLA and FRELIMO declared themselves to be Marxist/Leninist vanguard parties shortly after independence, Ethiopia did not formally take the step until the celebration of the tenth anniversary of its revolution in September 1984. Before that time, the "Commission for Organizing the Party of the Working People of Ethiopia" (COPWE), established in 1980, was founded to organize the establishment of a vanguard party.

[15]The GDR ratified friendship treaties with Angola on 19 February 1979, with Mozambique on 24 February 1979, and with Ethiopia on 15 November 1979. The treaty with Mozambique includes a clause on military cooperation (Article 5), which in light of the current situation in Mozambique and the lack of military involvement on the part of the GDR does not appear to be of much utility.

[16]Unsere Jugendhochschule 'Wilhelm Pieck', (Berlin: 1980) p. 30.

[17]Ibid, p. 20.

[18]Data gathered at school during visit in December 1983.

[19]Interview at FDJ headquarters in Berlin on 8 November 1983.

[20]Visit to school and interview with school officials on 2 July 1984.

[21]Visit to school and interview with school officials from 14-18 November 1983.

[22]Interview with official at the Solidarity Committee headquarters in Berlin on 9 March 1984. The figures quoted by this official are roughly the same as those submitted by the GDR government to UNCTAD, in which it states that at the beginning of 1983, "a total of 29,249 persons from developing countries were undergoing trades training or upgrading their job qualifications...in enterprises and institutions of the German Democratic Republic...In 1982, 4,222 cadres completed their training, bringing the total of developing country citizens having received job

training in the German Democratic Republic since 1970, to more than 54,000...In the same year, 1,435 persons from developing countries successfully completed studies at German Democratic Republic institutions of higher or technical education, bringing the corresponding total of graduates since 1970 to roughly 14,500." UNCTAD/TD/304, Communication from the Minister of Foreign Trade and Head of Delegation of the German Democratic Republic, Sixth Session, Belgrade, Yugoslavia, 6 June 1983, p. 3.

[23]Harry Tisch, the head of the FDGB, Kurt Seibt, head of the Solidarity Committee, and Egon Krenz, who headed the FDJ until spring 1984, are all members of the Politbureau of the SED. Krenz is now considered the likely successor to Erich Honecker, who himself was the first head of the FDJ after being founded.

[24]A. A. Gromyko, "Die zunehmende Koordinierung der aussenpolitischen Tätigkeit der sozialistischen Länder - Unterpfand ihrer Erfolge," in Deutsche Aussenpolitik (July, 1981), p. 12.

[25]E. A. Tarabrin, "Internationalism: Basis of the Policy of the Socialist Countries Toward the Independent Countries and National Liberation Movements of Africa," in Economic Relations of Africa with the Socialist Countries, Vol. II, Budapest 1978, p. 114.

[26]See Jürgen Nitz and Paul Freiberg, "Okonomische Zusammenarbeid zwischen der DDR und befreiten Ländern," in Deutsche Aussenpolitik (August, 1981), p. 45.

[27]For representative samples of of the East German position, see DDR Aussenwirtschaft, No. 48, special supplement, p. 2; Deutsche Aussenpolitik, Special Issue UNO Bilanz 1978/79; Helmut Faulwetter, Entwicklungsländer und Neue Internationale Wirtschaftsordung (Berlin, 1982). For a Western analysis of the general position taken by the Soviet Union and its allies, see Toby Trister Gati, "The Soviet Union and the North/South Dialogue," in ORBIS, Summer 1980. Also of interest are Kunibert Raffer, Official Declarations and Everyday Trade: Some Observations on East/South Relations. Paper presented at the IV. EADI General Conference, Madrid, 4 September 1984; Robert M. Cutler, "East-South Relations at UNCTAD: Global Political Economy and the CMEA," in International Organization, Winter 1983, Vol. 37, Nr. 1; Colin Lawson, "The Future of East-South Trade after UNCTAD VI," in Third World Quarterly, Vol. 6, Nr. 1, pp. 145-154.

[28]See Elizabeth Kridl Valkenier, The Soviet Union and the Third World, passim.

[29]Neues Deutschland, 14/15 July 1984, p. 3

[30]Berufsbildung: Zeitschrift für Theorie und Praxis der beruflichen Bildung und Erziehung, April/May 1984.

[31]UNCTAD/TD/B/858, Prospects in Trade with the Socialist Countries of Eastern Europe: German Democratic Republic - Policies, Developments and Institutional Framework. Study by the UNCTAD Secretariat, 18 August 1981, pp. 3 and 7.

[32]UNCTAD/TD/B/858, p. 9. For an East German view of their foreign trade relations, see, for example, Mit den Weltmarkten Verbunden, (Berlin: 1983); Otto Hofmann and Gerhard Scharschmidt, DDR Aussenhandel gestern und heute (Berlin: 1980).

[31]Ibid, p. 11.

[34]Hofmann and Scharschimdt, DDR Aussenhandel, p. 38.

[35]Maria Haendcke-Hoppe, "DDR-Aussenwirtschaft unter neuen Vorzeichen," in Deutschland Archiv (April 1983), p. 384.

[36]Neues Deutschland, 14 December 1979.

[37]Maria Haendcke-Hoppe, "DDR-Aussenhandel unter dem Zwang zum Erfolg," in Deutschland Archiv (March 1982), p. 263.

[38]Die Rheinpfalz, 9 August 1984.

[39]Haendcke-Hoppe, "DDR-Aussenwirtschaft," p. 378.

[40]Die Rheinpfalz, 9 August 1984.

[41]See, for example, Friedmar Clausnitzer, "Prinzipien und Praxis der Aussenhandelspolitik der DDR gegenüber Entwicklungsländern," in AALA, No. 5, 1974; Jürgen Nitz and Paul Freiberg, Okonomische Zusammenarbeit zwischen RGW-Staaten und national befreiten Ländern," in Deutsche Aussenpolitik, 4/80, and "Zur ökonomischen Zusammenarbeit zwischen der DDR und befreiten Ländern," in Deutsche Aussenpolitik, 8/81.

[42]UNCTAD/TD/280, Trade Relations Among Countries Having Different Economic and Social Systems and All Trade Flows Resulting Therefrom, UNCTAD VI (Belgrade, June 1983), Item 3 d - Policy Paper, p. 24.

[43]For fuller discussion of the trade between the GDR and LDCs, see, for example, Bernard von Plate, "Die Handelsbeziehungen der DDR mit den Entwicklugnsländern," in Deutschland Archiv, 8/1980; Hans Siegfried Lamm and Siegfriend Kupper, DDR und Dritte Welt , pp. 100-107.

[44]Istvan Dobozi, "Ost-Süd Wirtschaftsbeziehungen: Ungesund," in Entwicklungspolitik, Bonn, Nr. 22, 1984, p. 13.

[45]Heinrich Machowski and Siegfried Schultz, "Die Beziehungen zwischen den sozialistischen Planwirtschaften und der Dritten Welt," in Deutschland Archiv (July 1981), p. 739.

[46]Ralf Schaarschmidt, "DDR/Entwicklungslander. Traditionelle und neue Formen der wirtschaftlichen Zusammenarbeit," in Horizont, Vol. 17, Nr. 7, July 1984, p. 23.

[47]UNCTAD, Prospects in Trade, p. 14.

[48]For a thorough treatment of the energy and raw materials situation in the CMEA and cooperative ventures between it and LDCs, see Istvan Dobozi, "Arrangements for Mineral Development Cooperation between

Socialist Countries and Developing Countries," in Natural Resources Forum (United Nations, New York 1983), pp. 339-350; also Intra-CMEA Mineral Cooperation: Implications for Trade with OECD and Third World Countries, paper presented at the Workshop on East-West Mineral Trade, IIASA, 5-7 March 1984.

[49]T. Bartkowski, "The Conditions for Effective Economic Relations of the Socialist Countries with the African States," in Economic Relations of Africa with the Socialist Countries, III (Budapest 1978), p. 43.

[50]Wolfgang Schoeller, "'Komparativer Nachteil' und 'wechselseitiger Nutzen': Zur Kooperation zwischen COMECON und Entwicklungsländern am Beispiel Mosambiks," in Deutschland Archiv (December 1983), p. 1307.

[51]Ironically, just as the socialist countries have switched their trading practices from clearing arragements to hard currency transactions, Western firms have "discovered" clearing and are increasingly looking for barter agreements with Third World countries to improve their sales opportunities. For a very useful overview of these developments in trade between the West and the South, see John E. Parsons, A Theory of Countertrade Financing of International Business, Working Paper Nr. 1632-85, MIT Sloan School of Management, March 1985.

[52]Ralf Schaarschmidt, "DDR/Entwicklungsländer," p. 23.

[53]Radio Addis Ababa, 24 March 1984

[54]For a discussion of this gradually changing view of the role of trade as a mechanism of surplus extraction from the Third World, see Kunibert Raffer, Official Declarations. Of particular interest in this regard is a recently published book by a brilliant young East German economist, Hans-Peter Krueger, for which he received highest academic recognition in the country. Krueger argues that in the Marxist view, exploitation can only take occur at the place of production and not in the sphere of circulation since it fundamentally represents a relationship between capital and labor. Thus trade itself cannot be exploitative. The timing of this book is interesting, of course, since it coincides with a time when the GDR, like the other socialist countries, is under increasing attack for its trading practices with the South. This argument ironically also exonerates the West from a lot of the previous attacks levelled against it by the socialist countries for its trade with the developing countries, which was seen in the past as working against the interests of the latter due to constantly deteriorating terms of trade. See Hans-Peter Krueger, Werte und Weltmarkt: Zur Bildung und Realisierung internationaler Werte (Berlin: 1984).

[55]Quoted in Andre Gunder Frank, "Long Live Transideological Enterprise! The Socialist Economies in the Capitalist International Division of Labor," in Review, Vol. 1, Nr. 1, Summer 1977, p. 114.

[56]Ibid., p. 114.

[57]UN Economic and Social Council, The Critical Social and Economic Situation in Africa, Report of the Secretary-General, E/1984/68 (26 April 1984), p. 4.

[58]Ibid., p. 7.

[59]S. I. Tjulpanow, Politische Ökonomie und ihre Anwendung in den Entwicklungsländern (Berlin, 1975), p. 192.

[60]Istvan Dobozi and Andreas Inotai, "Prospects of Economic Cooperation between CMEA Countries and Developing Countries," in Christopher T. Saunders, ed., East-West-South: Economic Interactions between Three Worlds (New York: 1981), p. 51.

[61]Deepak Nayyar, comments on Part I of Saunders, East-West-South, p. 82.

[62]UNCTAD/TD/B/965, Trade Relations Among Countries Having Different Economic and Social Systems and All Trade Flows Resulting Therefrom (1 September 1983), p. 26.

[63]Schoeller, "Komparativer Nachteil," p. 1309.

[64]Carl H. McMillan, The Political Economy of Tripartite (East-West- South) Industrial Cooperation (Ottawa, 1980), pp. 10-11.

[65]Gerhard Scharschmidt, "Stellung und Perspektiven der Ost-West-Zusammenarbeit auf Drittmärkten aus der Sicht der DDR," in IPW Berichte (July 1984), p. 12.

[66]Ibid, p. 13.

[67]Information included in talk delivered by Egon Overbeck, former chairman of the board of Mannesmann AG (an important West German multinational) at an international symposium on "Economic Cooperation between Socialist and Capitalist Industrialized Countries on Third Markets" in Berlin (GDR) from 15-17 May 1984. The Scharschmidt essay in footnote 65 was actually that author's speech delivered at the same symposium.

[68]Abkommen zwischen der Regierung der DDR und der Regierung der Volksrepublik Mosambik über die wissenschaftlich-technische Zusammenarbeit, AW-Dokument 43/75 (Berlin, 1975).

[69]Schoeller, "Komparativer Nachteil," p. 1309.

[70]Interview with officials at the Institut für berufliche Entwicklung (IBE) on 7 March 1984. This organization is responsible for coordinating the vocational training of all foreigners in the GDR.

[71]UNCTAD/TD/304, Communication from the Minister of Foreign Trade and Head of Delegation of the German Democratic Republic, 14 June 1983.

[72]Horizont, No. 30 (1982).

[73]For such an attempt, see, for example, Economic Assistance by CMEA Countries, OECD (Paris, 1983).

[74]Radio Maputo, 29 September 1982.

[75]Neues Deutschland, 24 February 1984.

[76]Neues Deutschland, 7/8 July 1984.

[77]Ibid.

[78]Munzinger Länderheft Äthiopien (Ravensburg 1983), p. 5/3.

[79]Munzinger Länderheft Angola (Ravensburg 1984), p. 4/3.

[80]Munzinger Länderheft Mosambik (Ravensburg 1981), p. 4/2.

[81]For an excellent analysis of the experience of China, North Korea, Albania, and Cuba in building their versions of socialism, see "Sozialismus und autozentrierte Entwicklung: Zur Korrektur eines entwicklungspolitischen Modells anhand der Beispiele China, Nordkorea, Albanien und Kuba," in Hilfe + Handel = Frieden? Die Bundesrepublik in der Dritten Welt (Frankfurt am Main, 1982), pp. 307-358.

[82]FAO Conference in Harare, Zimbabwe from 16-25 July 1984, reported in Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt, 29 July 1984.

[83]For detailed analyses, see Joseph Hanlon, Mozambique: Revolution under Fire (London: 1984); John Saul, ed., A Difficult Road: The Transition to Socialism in Mozambique (New York: 1985)

[84]See Michael Sadaro, "The GDR and the Third World: Supplicant and Surrogate," in Michael Radu, ed., Eastern Europe and the Third World, pp. 106-141.

[85]For a discussion of the almost hysterical reaction in some Western circles to the close ties established between the radical African states and the socialist countries in the seventies, see, for example, David and Marina Ottaway, Afrocommunism (New York: 1981). For examples of this type of reaction regarding East Germany's relations with sub-Saharan Africa, see Melvin Croan, "A New Afrikakorps?" The Washington Quarterly, 3, 1, Winter 1980, pp. 21-47; "Honeckers Afrika-Korps," Der Spiegel, 10, 1980, pp. 42-61.

[86]Paul Marer, for example, argues that "proxy interventions (especially by East Germany) have supported the Soviet Union's global political and military objectives," in "Intrabloc Economic Relations and Prospects," in David Holloway and Jane M.O. Sharpe, eds., The Warsaw Pact: Alliance in Transition (Ithaca, NY: 1984), p. 229.

[87]This Soviet policy was labelled as "pragmatic opportunism" by James Mayall, who also argues against the idea that the Soviet Union's foreign policies follow a closely coordinated masterplan. See "The Soviet Union in Africa: How Great a Change?" in E.J. Feuchtwanger and Peter Nailor, eds., The Soviet Union and the Third World (New York: 1981), p. 192.

For an excellent overall analysis of Soviet relations with Africa to the early seventies, see Christopher Stevens, The Soviet Union and Black Africa (New York: 1976). A more recent and equally balanced work is that of Winrich Kuhne, Die Politik der Sowjetunion in Afrika (Baden-Baden: 1983).

[88]Information obtained by author during interviews conducted with Africa scholars in the GDR in 1983/84.

[89]Andre Gunder Frank, "Long Live Transideological Enterprise!", p. 139.

[90]Kunibert Raffer, Official Declarations and Everyday Trade.

[91]Istvan Dobozi, "Ost-Süd Wirtschaftsbeziehungen," p. 15.

[92]For a world-system approach to analyzing the role played by the socialist countries in the international division of labor, see the interesting collection of essays in Christopher Chase-Dunn, ed., Socialist States in the World System (Beverly Hills, Ca.: 1982).