

## Mozambique: Looking to Luanda

Events are moving towards a tragic replay of the demobilisation and election disaster of two years ago in Angola. The schedule is getting increasingly tight. The United Nations Security Council, because of financial constraints, wants the UN Operation in Mozambique (Unomoz) to be wound up by the end of November, which means elections would have to be held in October, by which time demobilisation is unlikely to have been fully completed.

Previously, UN Special Representative **Aldo Ajello** had insisted that elections could not be held until after demobilisation and that further delays were possible. The UN Secretariat in New York is now determined to wind up Unomoz in 1994 and believes strong gestures and language are necessary to quicken the pace.

On 22 February, the Security Council unanimously passed

Resolution 898, requesting Secretary General **Boutros Boutros-Ghali** to prepare for Unomoz's withdrawal by the end of November. It also authorised the establishment of a 1,144 police component (Civpol) of Unomoz - currently there are only 128 UN civilian police in Mozambique - and the cutting back of the 6,200 member military peacekeeping force to avoid additional costs on top of the annual US\$210 mn. budgeted. We hear that UN Under-Secretary **Marek Gouling** is to leave for Maputo to emphasise to both sides that the November deadline is serious and that both the government and the *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana* (Renamo) should quicken their demobilisation efforts if they want to benefit from full international assistance.

Demobilisation still has to get properly under way. A 1 March deadline passed with no movement, making October

elections difficult to achieve. By 10 March, the total number of troops in cantonment areas was 43,413; that means that of their respective demobilisation targets, the government has 50.2 per cent (31,000 troops) in the cantonments and Renamo, 65 per cent (12,413). The government began demobilising troops on 12 March and Renamo is scheduled to start on 18 March. A donors' meeting in Maputo on 31 January approved \$20 million to cover 18 months' supplementary support for the process.

Western diplomatic efforts continue to push a Renamo-government pre-election deal. Both **Francisco Masquil**, *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* (Frelimo) Central Committee member and Governor of Sofala Province, and Beira Catholic Archbishop **Jaime Gonçalves** have publicly also called for this. In late January, President **Joaquim Chissano** publicly rejected talk of a deal which would establish a government of national unity of two or three parties, calling it a distortion of democracy. Behind the scenes, however, there is mounting pressure for a pre-election agreement on a formula similar to **South Africa's** Transitional Government of National Unity and Reconciliation scheduled to take over after the 27 April elections.

The government can still surprise foreign observers. On 28 January, Brigadier **Lagos Lidimo** (Frelimo's appointee) and Lt. General **Mateus Ngonhamo** (Renamo's appointee) were named as Joint Supreme Commanders of the future joint army, the *Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique* (FADM). Ngonhamo's appointment was less unexpected but Lidimo's has taken foreign military intelligence and diplomats by surprise. Lt. Gen. **Tobias Dhai**, the government's head of delegation at the *Comissão Conjunta para a Formação das Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique* (CCFADM) had been regarded as heir apparent. Dhai, who has developed a good relationship with Renamo, participated in the final Rome peace negotiations for Protocols Four to Seven, signed as part of the General Peace Accord on 4 October 1992. In Maputo, the new **United States** Ambassador, **Dennis Jett**, represented the observer nations on the commissions and lodged their concern with Chissano. Mozambique Ambassador in Washington **Hipolito Patricio** was summoned to the State Department to be told of its concern. Government officials were surprised: the decision to appoint Lidimo had been finalised several weeks earlier and they had expected the appointment to be challenged before the official announcement (on the basis that Western intelligence has fully penetrated Frelimo's crumbling administration). In fact, Western intelligence sources told *Africa Confidential* that they had been caught off guard, having expected Dhai to be appointed.

Ethnic balancing is an increasingly important component of government policy. Lidimo is a Makonde while, like Ngonhamo, Dhai comes from Manica province; this counted against Dhai's appointment. Lidimo's intelligence roots, as a former director of *Contra-Inteligência Militar* (CIM) also contributed to his appointment. *Human Rights Watch-Africa* has voiced its concern about Lidimo's reputation for numerous human rights abuses in the late 1980s, especially during the fighting for control of Zambézia province. Renamo has also bitterly opposed the appointment. Chissano wanted a compromise which would hold Frelimo together (the does

not plan any major reshuffle before the elections) and keep the peace process on track. The thinking is that Lidimo's appointment will placate the hardliners in Chissano's military and intelligence and is an attempt to restrain them from exposing Renamo's 'dirty linen' in the build-up to elections.

Renamo leader **Afonso Dhlakama** is preparing for another international trip in late March and early April. He will visit **Spain, Portugal** and, for the first time, the USA, visiting the UN in New York and then Washington. Renamo's **Raul Domingos** has just returned from the USA, having tried to pave the way for Dhlakama but also receiving private medical treatment. Domingos' USA visit does not reflect his standing within Renamo which, in fact, is falling sharply (AC Vol 34 No 15). Erratically behaved on several occasions, Domingos has not impressed officials at the Supervision and Control Commission (CSC) meetings: on 9 February he was demoted from being Renamo's second-in-command and head of its Political Affairs Department. He now serves only on the CSC: **Jeronimo Malagueta** has taken over some of his responsibilities on an interim basis.

In Washington, Domingos contacted lobbyists JDS International, managed by **John Sassi**. Whether JDS takes on Renamo depends on payment: previous approaches have failed because Renamo has been unable to produce the down payment. Indeed Renamo's finances continue to be an international concern. The UN estimates that some \$15 mn. is needed. Renamo's middle-ranking officers are a particular problem and some \$250,000 a month is earmarked for them as handouts. Western donors in particular have found it difficult to allocate the necessary sums because of tight legislation about their supporting opposition parties. This has now been ingeniously circumvented by the 'Edis Plan' - named after **Britain's** Ambassador to Maputo who suggested that funds should be paid to the government. The government would then reassign them as a monthly allowance to Renamo. Britain has allocated some £2 mn. (\$2.9 mn.) left over from the current financial year to invest in Renamo in this way. **Germany** has earmarked DM1 mn. (\$585,000) and the **Netherlands** and **Sweden** have deposited \$500,000 and \$200,000 respectively into the original trust fund for Renamo expenses. **Italy** remains the single largest contributor to this fund, having provided \$5.8 mn. of the total \$7.5 mn. received.

Meanwhile lawlessness, corruption and independent armed banditry are on the increase throughout Mozambique. Armed robbers are getting more audacious in the cities at night. On 10 March, a car was stolen and its driver killed on the Maputo-Ressano Garcia road. In Tete province, the situation is far more serious. In Zumbu district, *garimpeiros* attracted from across southern Africa and **Zaire** have started illegal workings: emeralds in particular are being shipped into **Zambia** in growing numbers. Again, the increase in armed robbery and breakdown in authority is a disturbing replay of Angola's experience prior to the elections. The UN is seriously under-financed and recent developments are calling into question its political will to avoid another catastrophe. Budget-conscious Western officials appear oblivious to the argument that more resources at this stage for the UN programme could not only save thousands of lives but could obviate much greater expenditure on emergency assistance and rehabilitation at a later date ●