

Mozambique: Renamo plays for time


Elections will not now be held until October 1994 at the earliest. They have been postponed from this October because of delays in deploying the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (Onumoz) and the continued failure to start demobilising the two opposing armies. The first stage of demobilisation has still to begin properly: after the experience in Angola, UN officials want all troops to be demobilised before the election campaign starts.

Onumoz is now almost at its full strength of 7,500, with 6,505 infantry from **Bangladesh, Botswana, Italy, Uruguay and Zambia**, and support units from **Argentina, Guinea Bissau, India, Japan and Portugal**. Onumoz units provide security in the corridors of Beira (Italy), Tete (Botswana), Nacala (Bangladesh) and Limpopo (Zambia) and along National Highway N1 (Uruguay). They will remain in place until the new *Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique* become operational. **Zimbabwe's** units departed from the Beira corridor in mid-April and **Malawian** troops left the Nacala corridor on 9 June.

The main cause of delay is the difficulty in identifying and obtaining agreement from the government and the *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana* (Renamo) on acceptable sites for cantonment. Both refuse to demobilise till all 49 assembly areas are operational. The Ceasefire Commission (CCF) has approved only 13 so far, six of which (three each) Onumoz has declared ready. However, demobilisation still requires government and Renamo agreement in the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission (CSC). By late June, Onumoz had registered nearly 14,000 government soldiers and resettled over 7,000 in Maputo Province. These troops had been formally demobilised before the General Peace Accord (GPA) last October. A similar demobilisation process has begun in Gaza Province.

One victim of delay is the **British** training centre at Nyanga, Zimbabwe: Renamo has failed to send 270 officers due for training by UK officers alongside 270 government officers. After keeping the empty school open for five months, London has been seriously considering cutting its losses and withdrawing. UN Security Council Resolution 850 of 9 July 'urges Renamo to despatch without further delay' its men to Nyanga. At the 22 July CCF meeting, Renamo offered yet another firm arrival date, the end of July.

This is part of Renamo's strategy to delay the peace process. In mid-February, a Renamo official had told *Africa Confidential* that leaders would be available till June for visits to Maríngue: after that, he expected them back in Maputo. In March, Renamo began a three-month boycott of the commissions and withdrew its officials from Maputo: demanding better housing, transport and communications. Delegates did not start returning to the capital till the end of May. The work of the CSC and CCF resumed on 3 June and the Commission for Reintegration (Core) was convened on 11 June. The Commission for the Establishment of the Mozambique Defence Forces (CCFADM) has also held its first meeting. On 7 July, the UN flew 80 Renamo members



from Maríngue to Maputo to join the commissions.

To break the deadlock, Onumoz obtained access to the Lonrho-owned Cardoso Hotel for Renamo while the government provided 18 houses in the capital, pending the construction of additional accommodation. Renamo has asked for a US\$32 million compound to house 3,000 staff and to include a conference centre and health facilities. A UN Trust Fund for Renamo was set up on 10 May. Italy has contributed \$6 mn. (AC Vol 34 No 10); **France** and **Portugal** have each pledged \$1 mn.; the **Netherlands, Norway and Sweden** have also promised funding.

Renamo's two main objectives are to extract the maximum material wealth from the peace process and to gain time to transform itself into a political movement. 'Marxism meant that only an elite lived in houses: Renamo's democracy means we will all have houses', one Renamo military official told us. Many Renamo fighters believe the GPA was signed because Renamo had won the war and that they therefore deserve their reward for years of sacrifice. The war brought many of them prestige and booty. Peace has brought greater poverty and an uncertain future. Renamo's CSC representative, **Raúl Domingos**, announced in June that Renamo needed \$100 mn. to complete its transformation into a political party and at the June international donors' conference in Maputo, he demanded new uniforms and professional training centres for his soldiers before they

demobilised. Funds for foreign trips and offices were also requested. If these were not forthcoming, he warned, it would 'undermine the peace process and democratisation in Mozambique, with incalculable consequences for the Mozambican people'. He may well have increased donor frustration but he certainly reflected the view inside Renamo's military leadership.

Domingos' relationship with Dhlakama has also continued to deteriorate. Dhlakama feels threatened by Domingos and has attempted to promote **Vincente Ululu** as his number two and Secretary General (AC Vol 33 No 16). This has not gone so smoothly as Dhlakama hoped: Domingos has several times publicly indicated his seniority. Ethnic considerations have reinforced the split: tensions between the Ndaú (Dhlakama) and Sena (Domingos) have also increased over the last year.

President **Joaquim Chissano** is also preoccupied: attempting to keep his *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* (Frelimo) together through compromise. He seems reluctant

to reshuffle and still refuses to allow Prime Minister **Mario Machungo** or Defence Minister **Alberto Chipande** to step down, though both have indicated they want to leave politics. Rumours of an imminent reshuffle have been circulating in Maputo since January. Many expect Foreign Minister **Pascoal Mocumbi** to replace Machungo. **Salame Moiane**, who increasingly has access to Chissano, would be a strong candidate to replace Mocumbi, as would Transport and Communications Minister **Armando Guebuza**. Moiane's post as Deputy Foreign Minister is much sought after by, amongst others, **Agostinho Zacarias**, Director of Maputo's Centre for Strategic and International Studies.

Chissano has turned to transcendental meditation (TM), introduced to him by Zambia's ex-President, **Kenneth Kaunda**. Chissano's wife, **Marcelina**, and many ministers have adopted TM and it has become the court style. It has also been introduced into the military, on a voluntary basis: officers complain about 'brainwashing'. Chissano takes TM so seriously that he visited the Netherlands in early July

LIVING IN THE RUINS

The *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana* (Renamo) insists there are two administrations, which should be legally recognised by the General Peace Accord (GPA) of 4 October 1992. United Nations' Special Representative **Aldo Ajello** disagrees. The GPA is ambiguous, giving Renamo authority to administer areas it controlled on 4 October but also demanding it obey existing state laws. In several decrees, Renamo has told the population to seek its permission to enter its areas and to clear investment proposals with its leadership. It also says any economic projects linked to the government will be turned down.

The two administrations issue became a crisis on 24 June. Renamo detained 19 people, including government parliamentarian **Aurelio Manhica**, near Salamanga, 50 kilometres south of Maputo. Renamo claimed they had broken three Renamo laws: 'No illegal hunting, avoiding the extinction of animal and vegetable species and avoiding panic among people by the sound of shooting'. The 19 were released on 14 July after UN mediation. On the same day, a national commission to facilitate cooperation between the state administration and Renamo was set up, as agreed in the GPA. It has yet to start functioning. Then in late July, Renamo demanded the existing provincial governorships of Sofala, Zambézia and Nampula, in contradiction of its previous aim of setting up its own provinces.

The largest town under Renamo's control is Inhaminga. Sofala. Once a major railway centre, it switched hands several times in the late 1980s. In 1990, the army decided that, with the railway closed since 1986 when Renamo destroyed two spans of the lower Zambezi bridge, the isolated garrison was not strategic enough to maintain. Renamo's 505 Battalion (*Dragão*) then occupied the town and looted it. What was left was damaged by government air attack. Vulnerable to the MiGs, Renamo withdrew and the ruins remained virtually deserted until after the GPA.

Now Renamo has been recolonising the town, setting up an administration. Inhaminga is now the capital of a Renamo province under Governor **João**: Residents admitted to *Africa Confidential* that many were not locals; Renamo had encouraged them to come and settle. With more deliveries of UN World Food Programme aid, many are building homes from the empty shells of buildings. Renamo changed its food policy in May: for the first time, civilians receive food before soldiers. Taxation has been much reduced, though civilians must still provide Renamo with free labour on demand.

Soldiers told us they were now hungrier and less well looked after. Many are poorly clothed, distinguishable by their boots. They complained of boredom: their weekly highlight is a Sunday afternoon football match between civilians and Renamo military in the ruins of the grand old stadium. In June, the troops were thrashed three weeks running. They blamed poor food rations.

Renamo controls people's movements. Travel outside the locality requires a *guia de marcha* - a travel permit signed by the town administrator. All decisions are made at Renamo's political office, the *Sede Politico*. Anything difficult is referred to headquarters at Maringue. There is extreme poverty. The town is outside the cash economy: there is little commerce, except for wood carving and some ivory trading. Renamo's infant bureaucracy lacks even the paper and pencils to function properly: communication is by tiny bits of paper. Soldiers and civilians alike hunt animals for the pot. A Swiss non-governmental organisation is helping to rebuild part of the hospital and improve water and sanitation, while British agency Action Aid's tractors and trailers are the main source of transport. On 27 July, the Lonrho-linked Gurkha Security Guards finished clearing the road to Caia of mines: the jubilant people of Caia sacrificed their last goat in appreciation - the Gurkhas have become famous for their goat curry. Inhaminga's tractors are now transporting people to recolonise other deserted settlements. Rudimentary health clinics are being hastily set up but many Renamo 'doctors' have had only a couple of weeks' medical training.

This seems to be a pattern: there are similar reports from Manica, Zambézia and Nampula provinces. Renamo is trying to build up a coherent administration in its central zones, the first since the mid-to-late 1980s, when joint government-Zimbabwean operations destroyed its previous administrative structures. Though Renamo is trying to attract people into its areas again, it remains fearful of permitting freedom of movement, worried perhaps that many people might leave its zones for their home areas. It is also worried that any reduction of its tight control could weaken its support. The government was initially reluctant to see roads into Renamo areas opened but since March has come to recognise that open roads can be to its advantage. Government officials quietly hope Renamo's administration, with its *guia de marcha* and bureaucratic controls, will remind voters that Renamo is repeating past unpopular - and later scrapped - government policies.

to receive an honorary doctorate from Indian guru Maharishi **Mabesh Yogi** at the Maharishi Vedic University in Vlodrop. During the ceremony, Chissano praised the impact of TM on improving climatic conditions and security in Mozambique and announced he is sending eleven students on scholarships to the Maharishi International University in Fairfield, Iowa. All this has surprised Zambians: Kaunda's attachment to TM was ridiculed in the Zambian press and many people saw it as an 'Asian conspiracy'. It even contributed to Kaunda's 1991 electoral defeat.

TM seems to have boosted Chissano's confidence in his political fortunes. He is relying once again on trusted, longstanding government members. In the Political Commission (Cabinet), the new blood brought in since 1990, such as Attorney General **Eduardo Mulembwe**, has been marginalised. Widely known as the '*dinossauros*', Information Minister **Rafael Maguni** and Minister-without-Portfolio **Mario Matsinha** have regained their influence and once again have good access to Chissano. They are now attempting to improve party fortunes in charge of Frelimo's public relations and electoral campaign, with Maguni handling the parliamentary side and Matsinha the presidential.

So far, this has been ineffectual, and slow to react to growing political challenges. Frelimo has been losing ground to Renamo in parts of the centre and north. Though Renamo's behaviour in the Maputo commissions has provided Frelimo with favourable international publicity, this has not been translated into domestic support.

In central Mozambique, Frelimo's presence is weakening. In the second city, Beira, it looks impotent. Beira has always been a problem for the government but peace has brought no effective strategy to win support and few signs of investment. City Governor **Francisco de Assis Masquil** is known in Beira as 'Chiquinho Ndau', because of his strong Ndau links. Ndau nationalism is rising to the extent that many powerful Beira Mulatto families are adopting Ndau customs, such as forms of greeting or clapping. Unlike in many other towns, Beira's *tchuneca moyo* (informal markets) are full of stalls selling *capulanas* (sarongs) emblazoned with Renamo slogans and pictures of Dhlakama. Produced at Chimoio's TexAfrica factory, the cloths adorn a growing number of women: political affiliation blends with prices several thousand meticais cheaper than for other designs. Although Renamo and Frelimo deny it, Frelimo officials in Beira are

developing economic links with Renamo. Timber has become a particularly important link, with Frelimo officials putting up the capital and organising transport, especially from Gorongosa district.

Although the twelve other self-styled 'non-armed' political parties are campaigning in Beira, they have not gained significant support. A recent meeting of the locally rooted *Partido da Convenção Nacional* in the Hotel Moçambique attracted fewer than 20 people. Meanwhile the slogan '**Saddam Hussein**: hero of the Third World' painted on several Beira walls is seen locally as a sign of the growing Islamic fundamentalist activity along the coast. Outside Manica and Sofala provinces, Renamo's fortunes are dropping, especially in northern Nampula, Niassa and Cabo Delgado provinces. Southern provinces are still generally unsupportive of Renamo, though ambivalence towards Frelimo is on the increase. If elections took place now, Frelimo would win, though probably not in the centre.

In an attempt to inject some urgency into the peace process, **United States'** Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs **George Moose** held a symbolic meeting with Dhlakama in Maringué on 24 June, pressing for Renamo to re-engage fully in the process. He had previously met Chissano in Maputo. Dhlakama told Moose he would pay his first visit to Maputo on 17 July. In late July, he revised this to 'early August'. Moose also welcomed Dhlakama's plan to visit the USA in September and gave him a vehicle as a goodwill gift.

Moose's visit followed that of Italian Foreign Minister **Beniamino Andreatta**, who has been lobbying Dhlakama to agree to a power-sharing formula with the government before elections or to a pre-electoral coalition. In May, the US Embassy had already circulated the State Department document 'Conflict Resolution in Africa: Lessons from **Angola**', which argues that 'winner-takes-all' elections may not be conducive to reconciliation. Late in July, Dhlakama said he would not rule out a coalition government with other parties, including Frelimo. On power-sharing, Chissano carefully ruled nothing out and nothing in. Concerned by the delays, international donors have warned they will not supply further funding for the peace process after the October 1994 deadline. Yet in practice, donors will find it hard to disengage and both sides are likely to continue to try to extract maximum benefit from the process. ●