

# Mozambique: Funding for peace

The peace process has frozen in its tracks, not for lack of money but for lack of money in certain places. The *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana* (Renamo) has been demanding large-scale funding for its political operation before it will return to negotiations with the government.

The issue of 'political aid' has moved centre stage since the beginning of March, when Renamo walked out of the negotiation process, which was continuing in Maputo. Without funding or office space in the capital, argued Renamo, it could not fulfil its part in the Peace Accord signed last October in Rome. That meant no demobilisation, no disarmament and no formation of a new, unified army - all prerequisites of the elections.

The idea of providing funds for political activities has proved alien to international donors. Although they agreed in principle last year, they have been loathe to give politicians money they consider earmarked for relief and development. **France, Portugal**, the European Community as a body and some Nordic countries are willing in theory but have not coughed up any money. Even the **Italian** government, which had signed its own agreement to donate political funds to the opposition, has been reluctant to hand over the cash.

The mechanics of the funding were spelled out by the United Nations' Operation in Mozambique (Unomoz). A multi-million dollar account is to be opened to provide Renamo (along with the other emerging parties) with political funds. It will be divided into two 'trust funds': one for Renamo alone as a partner in the peace process and the other for all political parties. The idea is to raise over US\$30 million from donors, with the UN making sure that funds are used strictly for the purposes intended.

Largely because of the sensitivity of funding a former rebel organisation with a particularly bloody reputation, much of the early negotiating was done behind closed doors. Rome played a leading role in the intrigue. In December, it put its signature to a multi-million dollar deal. Both the Mozambican government and Renamo signed the document but its existence was not made public.

Renamo chief **Afonso Dhlakama** waited for three months for the cash to come through from Italy's collapsing (now collapsed) government. By March, he had lost patience and exposed the 'secret deal', which he said had promised \$15 mn. for Renamo. There followed a rapid and ungainly flapping of diplomatic wings.

Dhlakama showed the secret deal to a group of European Parliamentarians who were visiting his headquarters at Maringue in Gorongosa District. 'It was waved in front of us but we weren't able to read the details', said one. Yes, there was a deal, admitted Italy's Ambassador to Maputo, **Manfredo di Camerana**, a few days later but 'No, there were no specific figures contained in it'. Numbers, he explained, were discussed only on a 'purely informal' basis.

## A FRAGILE TRANSITION

Seven months in and demobilisation has still not begun. When it resumes, the current round of negotiations may clear the financial bottleneck but there are other problem areas:

● **Assembly points:** the Ceasefire Commission has approved only 13 of a total 49 - four for the *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana* (Renamo) and nine, government. Whilst Renamo refuses to attend this (and all other) commissions, none can be added. Renamo announced demobilisation would not start until all 49 were ready. The United Nations hopes to start with six priority areas. Official figures are 63,000 government troops and 20,000 Renamo: in practice, Renamo may well have many fewer.

● **Status of Forces Agreement:** all UN peace-keeping operations require formal agreement with government allowing them freedom of movement and immunity from taxes such as import duties and landing fees. Maputo has been refusing to sign. There are two possible reasons: according to UN sources, the UN Operation in Mozambique (Uhomoz) is currently paying some \$1 mn. a day in fees; also, the agreement would force greater transparency in army movements - the government may feel the need to undertake military manoeuvres. For months, the UN has been insisting agreement (in New York) was imminent. It says President **Joaquim Chissano** has given his approval.

● **UN troops:** Renamo has insisted on the entire UN force being present before demobilisation (though it might in fact be satisfied by a two-thirds presence). The majority of the 7,000 UN peacekeepers is now in country, with battalions from **Botswana, Bangladesh, Italy, Uruguay and Zambia**. Unlikely to remain a major issue for long.

● **Accommodation:** Renamo's demands for housing and office space are ever increasing. The government has now supplied 18 houses: Renamo uses one for headquarters but none is considered suitable for **Dhlakama** (who turned down the ex-Yugoslav Embassy). Renamo now says up to 70 people (including office and security staff) will be coming from Maringue for the negotiations. If Dhlakama wants a ready-made excuse for further delays, he has one. '**Tiny**' **Rowland** has now offered Renamo his **Limbo-controlled Cardoso Hotel**.

● **Food:** Mozambique now has too much food. Ships bringing maize for the UN World Food Programme (WFP) are being diverted to needier places. Prices are collapsing, destroying next season's incentives. The surplus has arisen because **United States**' corn pledged a year ago has been slow arriving: at the height of the famine, the WFP therefore acquired supplies elsewhere. Then the rains came, bringing a good harvest.

One factor that pressured Renamo to sign October's Peace Accord was lack of food. Relief supplies recently flown to its Maringue HQ have been left on the runway because storage space had run out. The area's sorghum crop has been excellent: farmers have been able to feed their families as well as satisfy Renamo's demands. Now Renamo is no longer hungry.

● **Military situation:** though ceasefire violations have been remarkably few, there are some ominous signs. In April, Chissano accused Renamo of rearming and named **Malawi** as the origin of flights to Maringue. Renamo was creating an armed police force, he said, to replace its soldiers when they disarm. Renamo had already accused Maputo of transferring soldiers to the police: Unomoz has also expressed concern about this. There are groups in both government and Renamo which have much to lose from peace. The northern provinces of **Zambézia and Nampula** - sites of ceasefire violations in November - are seen as most volatile. Watch out for the Defence Ministry and Renamo's generals.

Many observers took this to mean: 'Dhlakama is telling the truth but he shouldn't be'. Unomoz officials remained as quiet as mice.

All this intrigue seemed unnecessarily Byzantine. Donors had already signed an agreement at a December conference in Rome, pledging \$320 mn. for the transition process, with ten per cent earmarked for opposition parties. That was in addition to the \$260 mn. forecast for the Unomoz operation.

Notwithstanding donor hesitations, the UN Special Representative in Mozambique, **Aldo Ajello**, has remained insistent: 'Democracy has a cost and we must pay that cost'. Around \$30 mn. for the parties was 'just peanuts', he observed, compared to the \$1,300 mn. total pledged. This figure breaks down into \$760 mn. pledged at the Paris donors' meeting late in 1992, \$320 as 'transitional assistance' in Rome and the Unomoz budget, currently put at \$260 mn. The political money still isn't in the bank. Ajello is telling donors that this 'political aid' is the insurance on the rest of their investment which, without peace, will be wasted. Despite murmurs in Maputo about the negotiations

floundering and even accusations by President **Joaquim Chissano** that Renamo is rearming and retraining, Ajello remains adamant that Dhlakama does not want to lose his political 'peace dividend' and will play the game in the end.

The temperature of the diplomatic manoeuvres recently rose dramatically. **Roland 'Tiny' Rowland**, boss of the **British**-based multinational Lonrho, is on the scene again. He flew into Maputo on 6 May to be whisked away by Chissano's Chief of Protocol, **Francisco Madeira**. Rowland said he intended to ask Chissano specifically about the timing of Dhlakama's arrival in Maputo, along with other matters relating to the peace process. The following day, he flew back to Harare, **Zimbabwe**, taking with him two senior Renamo representatives, Secretary General **Vincent Ululu** and **José de Castro**. On the next day again, Ajello chartered an aeroplane to Maringue to meet Dhlakama. Tiny Rowland (who is simultaneously in the throes of similar attempts in **Sudan**) played a key role in the October Peace Accord. He is also reported to have promised substantial funding for Renamo's political activities ●