

AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL

CONTENTS

- MOZAMBIQUE: BRAG POKER IN ROME
- GHANA: MOVE OVER DANQUAH AND NKRUMAH
- ZIMBABWE: BACK TO THE LAND
- MADAGASCAR: A CLERGYMAN'S COUP
- POINTERS: SOMALIA, UNITED NATIONS, BANKING, SOUTHERN AFRICA

Mozambique: Brag poker in Rome

The government and the *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana* (Renamo) are to sign a cease-fire agreement ending 16 years of civil war on 1 October in Gaborone. This was the commitment made in a Joint Declaration of Intent signed by Renamo leader **Afonso Dhlakama** and President **Joaquim Chissano** in Rome on 7 August after three days of talks in the Villa Madama.

The breakthrough in the peace process is the culmination of a convergence of self-interest and complex international and diplomatic pressures. This round of talks started in the small hours of 5 August with only Dhlakama, Chissano, Lonrho's **Roland 'Tiny' Rowland** (AC Vol 33 Nos 2 & 12) and Zimbabwean President **Robert Mugabe** present. In spite of the positive statements made after this preliminary meeting, Mugabe only just managed to keep talks from breaking down. Formal talks followed later that day and on 6 August, attended by the Italian mediators and observers from France, Britain, the United States and Portugal, as well as Botswana's Foreign Minister, **Gaositwe Chiepe**. Progress was slow, with Dhlakama refusing to sign an immediate truce or cease-fire and demanding constitutional guarantees.

The breakthrough came only at the eleventh hour, after a 90-minute private meeting between Mugabe and Dhlakama. Up to 3 a.m. on 7 August, it still looked as if no agreement could be reached. What appears to have clinched the issue was Mugabe's personal guarantee of safety and support to Dhlakama, convincing him to compromise and agree on a cease-fire date.

A declaration was then drafted committing both sides to the spirit of the three protocols already signed in Rome and ensuring that the constitutional guarantees they outline will be submitted to the Assembly of the Republic and adopted as law before a general peace agreement is signed. Mozambique's first multi-party elections will then be held in October 1993, if the cease-fire is signed this October and holds.

Meanwhile, discussions continue in Rome between the government and Renamo delegations to resolve issues blocking Protocol Four on military issues and the calling of a conference of main aid donors: Italy, France, Britain, Portugal and the USA. South Africa is also likely to be invited. The donors will be asked to pledge money for

reconstruction. The conference will also work out the support the United Nations will need to monitor the cease-fire.

Two military issues remain outstanding. Renamo's military chief, Lieutenant-General **Herminio Morais** (also known by his *nomé de guerra* as **Bobby Charlton** or Gen. **Bobo**) and the government's Lt.Gen. **Tobias Dhai** will try to settle differences over what the future army should be called, how many men it should have and what role the intelligence service should play. Some progress has already been made on numbers. Renamo has moved up its bid from 15,000 to 24,000, plus 1,000 for the airforce and 800 for the navy, to be drawn half from Renamo and half from government forces. The government has so far reduced its figure from 50,000 to 35-36,000. Renamo is still demanding the abolition of the intelligence service, the *Serviço de Informação de Segurança Estatal*. These talks will continue until 20 August and resume on 1 September, to iron out problems before the 1 October cease-fire.

The possibility of holding the Rome summit came after a five-hour meeting in Gaborone on 4 July between Mugabe, President **Quett Masire** and Dhlakama. Rowland and US Ambassador **David Passage** also attended. This meeting marked a significant mood shift, with Dhlakama announcing that he would sign a cease-fire if he met Chissano and obtained guarantees on the constitution. He also presented to Mugabe a document containing the seventeen

Renamo will go for territorial gains up until the October deadline

constitutional articles with which Renamo disagreed. Mugabe in turn guaranteed Renamo assistance in transforming itself into a political party once it has signed a cease-fire. As an immediate sign of good faith, an interview with Dhlakama was broadcast on Zimbabwean television.

Rowland was one of the driving forces behind the Rome summit. In direct contact with Renamo since at least 1982, he also used his jet to transport Maputo officials to the Pretoria proximity talks in 1984. He became more fully involved in the peace process in 1987, assisting President **Daniel arap Moi** of Kenya's attempts to mediate. He also arranged for Dhlakama to meet Zambia's then President,

Kenneth Kaunda, in State House in December 1990 in a failed attempt to convince Chissano to meet Dhlakama. But in a December 1991 meeting with Chissano, Rowland got the go-ahead to bring Mugabe and Dhlakama together in Malawi on 10 January, as prelude to an eventual Chissano-Dhlakama meeting if all went well. Rowland met Dhlakama in Nairobi on 3 August and used the Lonrho jet to fly them both to Rome and then Dhlakama back to Nairobi on 9 August.

Rowland is acting out of enlightened self-interest. Early this year he promised his shareholders he would bring peace to Mozambique by the end of 1992. Peace will bring dividends to Lonrho investments in Mozambique and should also reduce transport costs for his companies in Malawi and Zimbabwe.

Mugabe's role is also critical, reversing that played by Mozambique's late President **Samora Machel** in 1979 in pushing for a constitutional settlement to the Rhodesian war, which brought Mugabe to power. Mugabe has always felt indebted to Mozambique. It was during a 20 July meeting in Harare with Mugabe that Chissano finally decided to go ahead with the summit. Mugabe, looking for a political boost in the face of growing domestic problems, wants to escape the crippling costs of guarding vital trade routes through Mozambique with 7,000 Zimbabwean troops. Harare is spending 70 per cent of its defence budget, about Z\$500,000 (US\$102,000) a day, on its Mozambique operations.

The mediators were themselves divided over the 'summitisation' of the peace process. Reluctant agreement came in mid-April when, following US lobbying, **Dom Matteo Zuppi** of the Sant'Egidio Community and other mediators agreed to support Rowland's summitisation initiative. With this backing, US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs **Herman Cohen** pushed the initiative during separate April meetings with Chissano and Dhlakama.

The Italian government also gave its support. It had budgeted for a cease-fire being signed in June. With the costs of two years of negotiation at over US\$2 million and with Renamo's telephone bills since 10 January at over \$60,000, Rome was keen for the process to end soon.

The summit was a piece of carefully balanced diplomacy. Although no set agenda was drawn up, it had been decided in mid-July that its objective should be a declaration of intent rather than a cease-fire. Gaborone was settled on for the cease-fire signing. This ensured that the process was kept inside the Rome negotiating framework and balanced the sensibilities of various interest groups. It was also designed to avoid the mistakes of the 1989 Gbadolite summit, which had failed to end **Angola's** civil war: Rome would provide

a written declaration and a tight timetable.

Only Portugal is unhappy. The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and Overseas Cooperation, **José Durão Barroso**, had described the Rome meeting as 'unimportant' and sent his cabinet chief, **Alvaro Mendonça e Moura**, in his place. The central involvement of Lonrho and of Zimbabwe is seen as confirming that Mozambique is being brought deeper into the Anglophone world, a further erosion of Portugal's historic interests.

There were also serious divisions in Maputo over negotiating strategy, with tensions between chief negotiator **Armando Guebuza** and Chissano and **Francisco Madeira**, his Diplomatic Advisor. Madeira managed to push for greater negotiating flexibility, allowing an agreed minute to be signed on 12 June which altered the agenda for Protocol Four to include discussion of constitutional guarantees. This is a calculated gesture of compromise to Renamo.

Guebuza was also opposed to the summitisation of the process at this stage, regarding it as a 'gamble'. The timing of Chissano's meeting with Dhlakama was in part a response to growing domestic tensions and criticism: he needed to impose his mark on the peace process. The gamble was calculated.

Renamo was also divided over strategy. During its December congress, tensions became clear between **Vincente Ululu** and the chief Rome negotiator, **Raul Domingos**. Ululu is not from Renamo's military ranks. For many years he lived in Kenya. Better educated than most Renamo members - he holds a degree - he has since December been a messenger, travelling frequently between Rome and Dhlakama. His stock with Dhlakama has grown rapidly, as was shown by his sitting next to him in Rome.

Ululu has been an advocate of negotiating flexibility, often contradicting Domingos. Ululu's appointment on 29 July to Renamo's re-created post of Secretary-General (replacing the late **Evo Fernandes**, removed from the post in August 1986) has increased tensions.

Although as Head of Organisation, Domingos technically remains number two, Ululu has greater influence and access to Dhlakama. Domingos has nevertheless a dedicated following in Renamo and could therefore be a threat; he and many military colleagues are unhappy with the October cease-fire agreement, fearing it could herald Renamo's collapse.

To strengthen its weakening position, Renamo will feel the need to make significant territorial gains before 1 October. But the major question is whether Dhlakama had his commanders' backing for a peace agreement. In the countdown to October, this will become clear ●