

ANC's Comment on RSA "Threat" to Mozambique

(a) Radio Freedom, Addis Ababa in English 1930 gmt 11 Oct 86

Text of report - poorly received in parts:

Tonight we present to you a special programme entitled "Hands off the front-line states!":

Fellow countrymen: Events this week have once again exposed the apartheid regime for what it really is [words indistinct] no respect for other countries' sovereignty. On Tuesday [7th October], following the land mine that seriously injured six apartheid troops, the racists issued deadly threats against Mozambique, saying they will hit again if the Maputo government continues to assist ANC freedom fighters. Malan [words indistinct] There are no ANC bases in Mozambique, but they are saying this as a prelude to aggression against that country.

Two and a half years ago the Pretoria regime signed a non-aggression pact with Mozambique - the pact that the racists are preparing to violate openly now. Why are the racists behaving like this? If there are no ANC bases in these neighbouring countries, then why are they being subjected to this unprovoked aggression? This is a question we put to Comrade Chris (?Tensile) Hani, the commissar of Umkhonto we Sizwe and member of the National Executive Committee of the ANC.

[Hani] First [words indistinct] it is faced with the growing resistance by the entire oppressed and exploited people. The people inside the country have reacted to the call by the ANC to organise mass action inside the country very, very well. We have seen an unprecedented (?wave) of patriotic mass organisation inside the country. Secondly, the economy of the country is not [words indistinct]. The economy of the country at the moment is not functioning very well. In fact, we face a serious economic crisis whereby more than 3,000,000 people are unemployed, whereby [word indistinct] of the regime have had to go and borrow from the IMF, because it can no longer generate the necessary revenue inside the country. At the same time, because of the fact that the enemy has had literally to fight inside the country and outside the country, it has found that its own manpower position has had to cope with internal problems and external problems.

And in order (?solve) its apartheid (?progressive war) inside the country, the enemy has had to tinker with his constitutional reforms. And this attempt as at tinkering with constitutional reforms has caused also serious problems within the [word indistinct] movement. We know very well that the nationalists have been seriously (?weakened). [words indistinct] inside the country, the growth of independent and democratic TUs. So, the point I want to make again is that the enemy faces also serious consideration of the position of the morale of the combatants. When the enemy is attacked both politically and militarily, it has got to convince, especially the white population, that it has got the capacity to destroy the ANC and the easiest way to destroy its capacity, having failed to (?deal with) the combatants inside the country and the activity of the organisation inside the country, the easiest way is to go for soft targets and even [words indistinct] is based in Maseru. The (?third) target - the information office of the ANC in Maputo and the (?fourth) targets are information of the ANC in London and [word indistinct]. So, this is the response of the enemy to the escalation of the political and military operations that the organisation and its army are carrying out inside the country. So, in a way, it is a propaganda campaign to convince its followers that it still retains a capacity to deal with the so-called enemies of the people of South Africa [words indistinct] In the vocabulary of the enemy the main enemy of the people of South Africa [words indistinct] is the ANC.

As far as I am concerned, these operations are counterproductive. Immediately the enemy launches its attack against innocent refugees and political workers of the ANC offices, there is an (?angry) [word indistinct] response and an intensive and international (?response), because the people can see that the victims of the South African aggression are not the members of the army of the ANC, but just civilians. But, on the other hand, the actions of our army and the actions of our organisation against the military targets inside the country meet with the complete understanding and total support of (?the country) and our friends throughout the world.

So, the enemy is not really achieving anything - on the contrary. Rather, the actions of the enemy, the brutal and ruthless actions of the enemy - and in fact the enemy creates conditions for growing and rapid support for our movement and for our army and for our institutions and in fact generates a lot of sympathy and support internationally. This is in respect of the frontline states vis-a-vis the apartheid regime. For us, as the ANC, we have enjoyed very warm relations with the frontline states, (?so) our struggle is supported by the independent frontline states. From the very beginning the frontline states have always supported in many practical ways the struggle of the oppressed and exploited people of South Africa. They also accorded the ANC moral and political support and have allowed the ANC to establish propaganda and information offices in these countries. These frontline states have been [words indistinct] for South Africans who are going abroad in pursuit of educational (?opportunities) which they are denied inside our country.

So, the reaction of these frontline states to the escalating [words indistinct] cross-border raids has been one of anger and bitterness, and in fact these raids have tended to unite the African frontline states in their abhorrence and hatred of that apartheid regime. And these states have now begun to realise that the key to peace, stability and prosperity in this region, in other words in the region of southern Africa, lies in the destruction of the apartheid regime inside South Africa. So, the frontline states, like the rest of the progressive international community, have (?promised) to increase their moral and political support for the (?banned) [words indistinct] organisation inside the country - the ANC.

Of course, the ANC is sympathetic and understands the problems that the frontline countries face, being themselves a product of a colonial [word indistinct], a system of colonialism that neglected their economic development and plundered (?the products of) their economic activities [words indistinct] racist South Africa. So, the ANC understands the fact that some of these countries literally depend economically on racist South Africa and that there is a limit to what they can do for the ANC. This situation is understood by the ANC, but the ANC appreciates the sort of help [words indistinct] within the limitations of [words indistinct].

[Announcer] In conclusion, Comrade Chris Hanu stresses that we have to intensify the political and military struggle inside the country.

[Hani] The success of our current struggle depends on maximum political mobilisation inside the country. It depends on the skilful combination of the legal and illegal forms of our struggle. It depends on the correct interaction or interconnection between our armed struggle and the mass united action [words indistinct]. For our armed struggle to be successful, we have got to strengthen our bases inside the country so that we should have the capacity, within our own country, of delivering paralysing and lethal blows against the enemy. (?This is) the reality of the South African situation. [Sentence indistinct]. [Words indistinct] our main objective, in fact our existence inside the country, our capacity to wage a concerted political and military struggle amongst our own people and within our own country. [Revolutionary song]

[Announcer] The threat issued by Magnus Malan last Tuesday has a direct bearing on the Incomati accord. When signing the accord, the racists hoped that it was going to help them to liquidate the ANC, but now that our armed struggle has proved to be (?stronger) than such accords, the enemy sees no need of adhering to them. That is why an attack against the PRM is now imminent. But how far, on the other hand, have the ANC and Umkhonto adjusted to the Incomati accord? This was a question we

posed to Comrade Joe Slovo, the COS of Umkhonto we Sizwe, National Chairman of the South African CP and member of the National Executive Committee of the ANC.

[Slovo] Speaking about this problem, in my mind I can see the men who put their signatures [words indistinct] and the people who serve on the strategic committees and planners: I can see them in my mind's eye, sitting around the committee rooms, looking very puzzled and emptying their aspirin bottles, because they must have lots of headaches - and the cause of their headaches is crystal-clear. (?Outside) the Incomati accord was described by them as signalling the beginning of the end of the ANC and the beginning of the end of the armed struggle in South Africa, and the reality has proved otherwise. If anything, Incomati accord has proved beyond any shadow of doubt that the ANC-led liberation front and its strategy, which includes revolutionary violence, just cannot be eradicated (?either) by attacks, by agreements or other (?similar) measures.

(?Indeed), this is certainly not the first time in recent history that the enemy has threatened the ANC [words indistinct]. I (?saw) in particular in Soweto that each time the police score a success and arrest one of our cadres deep inside the country, an announcement is made that [words indistinct] and that the ANC is on the point of being finished. And within a short time of such claims, the enemy once again felt the blows of Umkhonto we Sizwe. And the fact is that it is precisely the escalation of that struggle deep inside the country that has forced Botha, Malan and their clique to run to every neighbouring territory to threaten them with military aggression, with economic blackmail, to offer them bribes, to corrupt some of the people involved in running the state, with one basic single purpose in mind and that is to get them to close down this ANC, which they continue to claim is on the point of being finished. And now, once again, and perhaps in an even more dramatic fashion, the deep roots which the ANC has and which the Umkhonto we Sizwe has inside the country are being demonstrated in unmistakable form. And not only does this demonstrate the basic health and strength of the ANC-led internal struggle but it also unmistakably gives the lie to the claim which they are always making that our struggle is outside and not inside the country.

Incomati has failed precisely because the arena of struggle is amongst our own people deep inside our country and the people who are acting are there and not in the surrounding territory. Of course it is true that there has never been a people's struggle, whether in Africa or elsewhere, which did not include an external element. [Words indistinct] is an [words indistinct]. Frelimo was helped by Tanzania, the MPLA was helped by Congo Brazzaville, ZANU was helped by Mozambique. And indeed, this is not only just, it is understandable. It is the enemy which these movements were fighting and it is the same with us. It is an enemy which is not standing alone. It is an enemy which is reinforced and supported by its external allies. It is an enemy which has deprived its people of the possibilities of obtaining the skills of their [word indistinct]. It is an enemy which deprives its people of the right to own and to handle weapons. And when you face such an enemy that these other movements and we have faced and are facing, the external element obviously plays a part.

But in this connection I think it is important to emphasise that the actual reality of the power relationships in southern Africa has made the ANC perhaps more modest than any other liberation movement in Africa in its search for rear base facilities. We have never had, nor have we accepted to have, the kind of rear base facilities which all those movements in Africa which [words indistinct] had in the territories bordering on their countries. And much (?of) the ANC strategy [words indistinct] has been based on the fact that even in the initial stages of the armed struggle we could not obtain in the same way and to the same degree those kinds of facilities. And there is no doubt [words indistinct] that the training, the arming, the infiltration and replenishment of relatively large armed units which operate in proximity to friendly borders, which is the pattern of other struggles, has never been the basis of the ANC programme.

It is well known to the enemy [words indistinct] in its assessment of what is going on. We have concentrated on internal growth deep inside the country, internal growth around a core of trained, revolutionary, political, military cadres in both rural and urban areas. And we have deliberately avoided the pattern of using adjacent territories to (?hit) close to the border and to run back to friendly territory. We have done this [words

indistinct] struggle. We have done this out of consideration for the newly-emergent states on the border with South Africa and we have done it because we believe that the only way in which our armed struggle will [words indistinct] it is from inside and not from outside. And it is for those reasons, it is because of the way in which we have worked, that the Incomati accords or any other similar agreements have not and cannot knock out our struggle inside the country.

But, having said this, let me add [words indistinct] that these kinds of agreements have not created any problems for us. Two: As I have said: We have no camp in Mozambique, we've never had training in Mozambique, we've never been given weapons by Mozambique. But what we did have, and this our President made clear in a public statement, was a degree of access and transit, which, of course, we know is now cut off. But despite this fact, as you can see from the events which I have already described, the actual escalation of armed raids since Incomati, we have in fact managed to adapt and, despite difficulties which were created at a certain level by these kinds of agreements, we have actually confidence that we will be able to pursue our political struggle with the element of revolutionary violence it requires with greater intensity in the coming days.

(b) Maputo in English for abroad 1800 gmt 13 Oct 86

Text of report:

A senior official of the African National Congress of South Africa has replied to South African government allegations that the ANC has military bases in Mozambique. Thabo Mbeki, the ANC's Information Secretary, said today that all the ANC's military operations are carried out from bases inside South Africa.

[Mbeki] The ANC has no military bases in any of the countries of southern Africa. All the ANC's military operations are planned and executed within South Africa and from within South Africa. To conduct a military struggle requires exactly that; that the unit, the military unit, must be within South Africa. We do not have an army of invasion which starts off from a neighbouring country, whether it is Mozambique or any other country, and then crosses the border to carry out some operation and possibly retreats to that neighbouring country. We have military units that are based within South Africa, that have got a broad general direction in terms of military activity that they must carry out. They must then, from within South Africa, determining the targets which they must attack, carry out surveillance of those targets, bring to whatever war materiel is necessary to carry out such an operation, and then actually carry out such an operation. All of that is done from within South Africa by units based within South Africa.

Therefore, there is no relationship whatsoever with neighbouring countries. It's a conflict between ourselves and the apartheid regime, and that is how the conflict stands from our point of view. That is how our offensive and plans, [the] military offensives, have been planned to be carried out.