

Frelimo and the armed struggle in Mozambique: origins, process and reasons for success.

Political independence or what can now be more correctly termed "flag independence", was achieved largely through negotiations between the colonial powers and the local African "petit bourgeois" nationalists. Algeria and the Portuguese colonies were exceptions, as in both cases the colonizing powers claimed that these parts of Africa were part of their respective metropolitan countries. Between 1954 and 1962 the Algerians were forced to resort to armed struggle to win national independence. In the 1950s the Portuguese renamed their African colonies provinces, a move designed to counter international pressure on Portugal to decolonize her African territories. Portuguese multi-racialism or luso-tropicalism, Salazar still maintained in 1963, "derives on the one hand, from our character and, on the other, from moral principles of which we are bearers".<sup>1</sup> The Portuguese view on the colonies- whether held sincerely or not is besides the point- was that although the Portuguese nation was made up of many distinct groups, it was, sociologically and politically, an organic and indivisible whole characterised by complete solidarity between the numerous racial groups of which it was allegedly formed.

In his Aug. 1963 speech to the National Assembly on the colonial question, Salazar devoted a lot of time to attacking the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the U.N. General Assembly for demanding Portuguese decolonization of the African territories, quoting the U.N. Charter out of context to justify the Portuguese position in Africa. Morais Cabral, a Salazarist colonial theoretician, had written in 1939: "Our whole policy has been and continues to be to raise the cultural, economic and social level of the Negro, to give him opportunities and to drag him from his ignorance and backwardness, to try to make him a rational and honourable individual worthy of the Lusitanian Community"<sup>2</sup>. By the time Salazar made the speech quoted above, the Portuguese Government had hardly moved an inch from this "paternalistic" approach to the colonial question. Indeed, in that speech Salazar reminded the National Assembly that the Portuguese were trustees of a sacred heritage: the nation was proud of the great generations of soldiers, administrators, missionaries and settlers- "the product of our occupation, pacification and civilizing influence overseas", who brought to Portugal "notable enrichment in moral values which have welled forth from their unequalled strivings and sufferings."<sup>3</sup> Holding this view of Portuguese colonial history, at a time when most African colonies were gaining at least "flag independence", Salazar declared in 1963 that "there are no Angolans, but Portuguese of Angola", and that "Mozambique is only Mozambique because she is Portugal, which is to say: if the ties which bind her and make her part of the Portuguese nation are destroyed, there will be no more Mozambique in history or in geography."<sup>4</sup>

Salazar maintained that the concept of Nation in the Portuguese case, was inseparable from the idea of civilizing mission. Thus for Salazar and his government, there could never be such a thing as Mozambican, Mozambican identity or Mozambican nationalism. Hence, the policy of assimilation to make the African "worthy of the Lusitanian Community". But Portuguese talk of multi-racialism as Duffy<sup>5</sup> points out, was, in practice, only a distraction from "the cultural racism and inequality so evident in a policy that divided the population in her African colonies into categories of indigenous and non-indigenous (white, mulatto and assimilated Africans)"- the former category comprising over 90% of the population having no citizenship. The Portuguese writer Antonio Cardoso, gives a clear picture of Portuguese attitudes towards the majority of the African people during the Salazar era (and after): "This raw native has to be looked at as an adult with a child's mentality. He needs to be tutored... guided in the choice of the work suited to his abilities- in short, educated, physically, morally, and professionally... The practical result is that the educated natives consider themselves truly Portuguese... they are the first to manifest their patriotism."<sup>6</sup> But it was precisely the "educated natives" (or at least an important section of them) who, in the early 1960s, were to lead the peasants of Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau in armed insurrections against Portuguese colonialism.

In the 1940s and 1950s opposition by assimilados took the form of a cultural and poetic revolt. Some assimilado aspirations centred on participation in

Portuguese colonial society, but by the early 1950s, the short stories of Honwana, the paintings and poetry of Malangatana, the poetry of Jose Craveirinha and Noemia de Sousa, had become more political and pan-Africanist.<sup>7</sup> Thus Craveirinha wrote about Mozambican migrant mine workers going to work in S. Africa and about Concession companies forcing African peasants to grow commercial crops. Noemia de Sousa, a mulatto, in rejecting her assimilado status, identified herself with Makonde woodcarvers, with African dockworkers, with the "frenzied dances of the Chopes" and with the "rebelliousness of the Shangaans." She concludes one of her most famous poems: "And ask me no more

if you really wish to know me...  
for I am no more than a lump of flesh  
in which, its cry swollen with hope  
the revolt of Africa has merged. 9

Marcellino dos Santos, a very highly educated mulatto and a founding member of Frelimo (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique) in 1962, summed up the growing rejection of the assimilado status among the educated elite, at the Conference of Nationalist Organizations in the Portuguese Colonies (CONCP) meeting at Rabat in April 1961: "Ce statut de 'assimile' est en effet un véritable certificat de 'personnalisation'."<sup>10</sup> The point to note here is that although mulattos had long been accepted in law as Portuguese citizens, they were not sufficiently "Portuguese" to gain them entry to the ruling group. Their (mulatto) Portuguese citizenship tended to cut them off from the subordinate masses of the people (more so than African assimilados), but leaving them without any real status in Portuguese society either. The rejection of the assimilado status by both black and mulatto assimilados was an important political development in the history colonial struggle in the Portuguese colonies, because it was the assimilado (or potential assimilados) Mozambicans who were to give leadership to the nationalist-armed struggle against Portuguese colonialism. But in the 1950s the assimilado cultural revolt, reaffirmation with Africa as their mother country and cultural heritage and their identification with the sufferings of ordinary blacks throughout Mozambique, were at a "theoretical level" only. The intellectuals were isolated from the Mozambican workers and peasants, whose cause they claimed to champion. For the educated elite to be in the vanguard of Mozambican nationalism, making it serve as the impetus for direct action and struggle for independence, they had, to use Amílcar Cabral's phrase, "commit suicide as a class in order to be restored to life as revolutionary workers, totally identified with the deepest aspirations of their people."<sup>11</sup> In Mozambique the most favourable place and timing of this suicide proved to be with the guerrilla forces, during guerrilla action, which started in Sept. 1964.

By 1960 peaceful manifestation of Mozambican nationalism had been stifled by the secret police (PIDE), dock strikes had been brutally suppressed and over 500 peasants ~~involved~~ involved in the cooperative movement had been massacred by the Portuguese at the cotton-growing area of Muenda in northern Mozambique.<sup>12</sup> (June 15, 1960). In the preamble to the 1958 Second Overseas Development Plan, Salazar's Government had insisted: "We must people Africa with Europeans who can assure the stability of the sovereignty and promote the 'Portugalisation' of the native population".<sup>13</sup> Elsewhere in Africa, nationalists were demanding and getting political independence. French colonialism, smashed in Indo-China at Dien Bien Phu, was giving way to revolution in Algeria. The Portuguese, as we have noted, allowed no nationalistic manifestations, as they claimed that the colonies were part of metropolitan Portugal, if there was to be any nationalism it had to be Portuguese. It was this repeated unwillingness of the Salazar regime to agree to Mozambican uhuru, even to modest reforms, which drove Mozambican nationalists in the early 1960s to the conclusion that decolonization through negotiations was unrealistic and even dangerous.

All three Mozambican nationalist parties formed in the early 1960s were formed among exiles in neighbouring countries- UDENAMO (Rhodesia, Oct. 1960), MANU (Kenya and Tanzania, 1961) and UNAMI (Malawi, 1960)<sup>14</sup>. All three parties transferred their headquarters to Dar (Dar-es-Salaam) when Tanganyika gained independence in 1961. Encouraged by Nkrumah, Nyerere, COCP and pressured by young militants with more recent experience within Mozambique, the three Mozambican nationalist organizations united on June 25, 1962, to form Frelimo,<sup>15</sup> headed by Eduardo Mondlane, a Mozambican who had studied in the U.S., worked at the U.N. Trusteeship Dept. and taught at Syracuse University. At the extraordinary CONCP meeting in mid June 1962 at Rabat, Marcellino dos Santos, a member of Udenamo since 1960, and Secretary-General of CONCP since its fou-

ndation in 1960, had reported on the weakness of the liberation struggle in Mozambique, especially compared to developments in Angola and Guinea-Bissau. Adelino Gwembe, the leader of Udenamo (affiliated to CONCP) had not sent any news of developments in Mozambique to the CONCP permanent secretariat.<sup>16</sup> CONCP appealed for the unification of Udenamo and Manu into a front "with a strong honest and active leadership capable of guiding the national liberation struggle". Frelimo proved to be such an organization. But the very fact that Frelimo was a front, whose only membership qualification was subscription to "the goal of complete independence now"<sup>17</sup>, ensured ideological conflicts in the movement as the revolutionary struggle developed. There was bound to be varying interpretations on, for example, the last of Frelimo's aims: "To constitute a Government of the people, by the people and for the people." Conflicts within Frelimo will be dealt with at length later, but, we may note at this point that, owing to lack of security, Leo Milas, an American chalatan, gained the position of Frelimo publicity secretary, from which he engineered the sacking of important Frelimo officials, David Mabunda (Sec. General), P. Gumane and ex-Manu leader MM Mmlome (Frelimo's treasurer) - within 18 months. There was also lack of ideological clarity as to the ways in which Frelimo was to achieve its acclaimed goals. Those who left or were expelled from Frelimo formed splinter organizations, most of which united in 1965 to form COREMO, based in Lusaka. However, even in 1965, Frelimo stood head and shoulder above Coremo in organization and prosecution of the armed struggle, and it can be said that Coremo proved to be merely a "paper organization".

Although Frelimo did not rule out negotiations for independence with the Portuguese, the leadership knew, from our brief analysis of the stated Portuguese colonial policy and from the experience of nationalists in Angola and Guinea-Bissau already waging armed struggles, that Mozambican independence would not be achieved without armed struggle. Thus the Frelimo leadership set about organizing Frelimo as a politico-military organization for the liquidation of Portuguese colonialism. Ben Bella's Algeria, which had just won its war of liberation, offered to train Frelimo militants. Samora Machel, the present Frelimo leader, and the man who succeeded Mondlane after his assassination in Feb 1969, was one of the 250 or so young Mozambicans who went for military training in Algeria early in 1963. Cuba, the USSR, China (from 1967) and other Socialist countries supplied Frelimo with arms and later, with helped with military, medical and technical training programmes. (The Portuguese received the bulk of their war planes and arms from the NATO countries)<sup>18</sup>. The Africa Liberation Committee (ALC) set up at the formation of the OAU in 1963, recognized Frelimo as the sole liberation movement in Mozambique in the same year and started to give material support to Frelimo well before military operations started in Sept, 1964. <sup>19</sup>. Because of the relatively low level of armed strength in independent Africa, the ALC support from the beginning and throughout the ten-year armed struggle, tended to emphasise training, financial and diplomatic support (embarrassing Portugal at the UN), rather than direct military aid in arms. Various progressive organisations in the Western countries e.g. Committee for Freedom in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea, in the U.K, and Liberation Support Movement, in Canada, supplied Frelimo with money, medical and educational equipment. The only Western Government to offer financial aid to Frelimo was Sweden. The bulk of military aid and military-related aid throughout the history of Frelimo's struggle, came from the socialist countries. <sup>20</sup>. It must, however, be emphasised that Frelimo was terribly short of nearly everything during the initial stages and that it was only when she had "proved herself" by actually carrying out the armed struggle that more and more supplies began to arrive.

Military training and equipment were no doubt important prerequisites for Frelimo's armed struggle. Another important prerequisite was a friendly neighbouring country (countries) displaying a close alignment of political or ideological views, from which to establish a base from which to organize training programmes for politico-military cadres coming from Mozambique and from which to organize and channel supplies to the war zones. Tanzania proved such an excellent base for Frelimo. But before the actual armed struggle could begin, there had to be basic political mobilisation of Mozambican workers and peasants, at least in the northern provinces where the armed struggle was planned to start. Frelimo was able to profit the experience of Mao and the Chinese Revolution, from Giap and the Vietnamese struggle, and above all, from Cabral and PAIGC. Political consciousness was seen as the base of the struggle, as does

Santos told Sechabain Oct. 1970: "From the very beginning—the task of the organization was to transform the consciousness of the people, to bring them to accept the idea of National Independence, to have a clear idea of the meaning of this and also to convince the people that only an armed struggle would make it possible to reach this goal." 21. Frelimo's initial political mobilization campaign appears to have centred on Cabo Delgado and Niassa provinces. In C. Delgado Frelimo successfully made use of the existing cooperative movement among the peasant farmers of the Muenda area, the scene of the 1960 peasant massacre. Among Frelimo's leading political activists in this region, were elderly Lazaro Kavandane, of whom we shall hear more later, and Joaquim Chipande, a young teacher who became one of Frelimo's top military commanders. As early as September 1963, the Administrado of Manhiça, Niassa Province told Fr Paul of Messumba Anglican Mission: "As you know, several people went to Tanzania in July and Aug. Some... stayed; others were sent back to spread Frelimo propaganda." 22.

On Sept. 25 1964, nearly two years after its formation, Frelimo declared the "General Armed Insurrection of the Mozambican People against Portuguese colonialism for the attainment of complete independence of Mozambique". 23. After being caught unprepared by the Angolan revolt of 1961, the Portuguese had by 1964 taken military measures to forestall a similar situation occurring in Mozambique. In July 1964 a Portuguese colonel at military headquarters at Nampula told a visiting German journalist: "Trouble here can come from outside, as it happened in Angola. But this time we won't be caught unawares." 24. The Portuguese army envisaged Frelimo's tactics as being hit and run in the border areas, from the sanctuary of Tanzania, and had therefore deployed large numbers of troops along the bank of the Ruvuma and removed the population from the frontier areas. But as we have seen from Frelimo's preliminary political mobilization in Niassa and C. Delgado, Frelimo intended to fight a people's war, a war in which Frelimo militants would rely on mass support. Frelimo planned deep guerrilla infiltrations into C. Delgado, Niassa, Tete and Zambezia, before the first attacks on Portuguese postos and military installations on Sept. 25, 1964. Mondlane has noted that Portuguese "underestimation of our intent was certainly beneficial to us in the early stages of the war." 25. Frelimo's strategy and tactics threw the Portuguese into confusion and during 1965 most of the settlers in the north left, never to return. By November (1964) Frelimo had extended the armed struggle to Niassa, Zambezia and Tete provinces, thus overstretching the Portuguese forces. But the Tete and Zambezia fronts were soon abandoned (by Frelimo) (mainly) on logistic grounds. But as Regis Debray has written, "For a revolutionary, failure is a springboard. As a source of theory, it is richer than victory: it accumulates experience and knowledge." 26. Frelimo forces from Tete and Zambezia regrouped in Niassa and C. Delgado and Frelimo set about consolidating its position in these areas. Within a year of launching the armed struggle, Frelimo was attacking places as far south as Vila Cabral.

Opello notes three factors contributing to Frelimo's success in Niassa and C. Delgado during the first two years of the war. First, Frelimo had gained considerable support among the Nyanja and Makonde straddling the Mozambican-Tanzanian border. The Makonde and the Nyanja not only provided the bulk of Frelimo's military recruits, but their areas acted as transmission belts for infiltration of guerrillas, arms and material into Mozambique. The second factor was that, despite Portuguese expectation of hostilities starting, Frelimo enjoyed the advantage of surprise. Opello's third factor is that, despite the arrival of military reinforcements, Portuguese troops did not have the equipment to fight a guerrilla war. He notes that at this time, the Portuguese had only five planes at Vila Cabral, none of them helicopters, and only one gun-boat on the whole of Lake Malawi. Opello is basically right, but he misses one major factor accounting for Frelimo's success: Frelimo had a just cause, a cause well understood by the peasants of the Muenda region who had witnessed the Portuguese massacre of over 500 peasants in 1960. The struggle, as Mondlane pointed out, was "essentially a political struggle in which the military is only one aspect." 27.

In an attempt to deprive the "fish" (Frelimo) of "water" (the masses), the Portuguese resorted to regrouping the population into US-type strategic hamlets in Vietnam (aldeamentos). Lord Kilbraken, the first journalist to be allowed to visit the war zones by the Portuguese, reported in Sept. 1965: "In the 3,000 ~~xxxxxxx~~ terrorised sq miles (Niassa) the Portuguese, both civilian and military, are now confined to isolated garrisons, Metangula, Manhiça, Cobue, Olivença



and Nova Coimbra.... In the 30 mls of lake shore from Metangula to the Tanzanian border, only two African villages are still inhabited." 28. The Kilbraken reports, first published in Rhodesian newspapers, gave the outside world the first picture of the war situation. Up to then, the Portuguese had maintained that they were only dealing with a few bandits crossing the border from Tanzania. Kilbraken commented, "... the Frelimo, a Viet Cong in miniature, are a tough and elusive enemy. They generally operate in very small units; often only half a dozen men.. they are at home in the jungle and bush, where they live off the country, striking silently by night, withdrawing swiftly into the dense cover if the Portuguese are up to strength." 29. Mondlane points out that the Portuguese were fighting on unfamiliar terrain against an enemy which belonged to the terrain and knew it well. The burning down of "subverted"(suspected) villages by Portuguese troops only served to strengthen Frelimo's propaganda about Portuguese colonialism. Fr. Paul has written from his observation in Niassa: "If the Portuguese had killed only Frelimo soldiers, that would have been understandable. But the victims were ordinary villagers... The Portuguese indulged in indiscriminate killings." 30.

The end of 1965 marked the second phase of the war. The Portuguese made an effort to decrease the area of combat in C. Delgado and Niassa, while Frelimo increased its military strength. In 1966 the Frelimo Central Committee (CC) took measures to reorganize the expanding guerrilla army, to facilitate coordination between the various military areas, by creating the National Commanding Council (NCC) (31). Prior to the creation of the NCC, the only coordinating centre had been the Depart. of Defence and Security. The NCC, headed by the Secretary of Defence (32), was made up of the heads of the following army sections: operations, recruitment, logistics, reconnaissance, communications, information and military publications, administration, finance, health, political commissariat, personnel and military security. The result of this reorganization, according to Mondlane, was increased Frelimo military efficiency. The NCC was in close touch with developments in each province through the provincial chief, who was also deputy provincial secretary, the provincial political commissar and the operational chief. In 1966 the Guerrilla General Staff (NCC) itself moved major parts of its headquarters from Tanzania to Mozambique, where it was in a better position to direct daily operations and supervising training. (Officers still trained in Algeria, Tanzania, Egypt and the socialist countries, but about 80% of all enlisted training was now conducted inside Mozambique.). One other result of Frelimo's 1966 military reorganization, as Mondlane points out (33), was the provision of clear channels of command and control between higher and lower echelons and definition of areas of responsibility among the various units. The new organizational structure encouraged uninhibited flow of communications from units in the field to higher authority with greater regularity and aided the flow of men and material to the field with more rapidity. This progressive development made it possible for Frelimo guerrilla units, from 1967 onwards, to come together in attacks on the more heavily defended Portuguese military installations and to carry out more extensive campaigns, the most spectacular of which was the attack on Muenda airfield in which 12 planes were destroyed on the ground. Heavily defended Portuguese positions at Cobue, Nova Coimbra (Niassa), Quissanga, Rucia, Ohinheira, Olumbi and Marere (C. Delgado) <sup>34</sup> came under Frelimo attack in '67. According to Mondlane, Frelimo forces in C. Delgado advanced to the river Lurio and surrounded the provincial capital of Porto Amelia. By 1969 Frelimo units were laying mines as far south as Nova Freixo in Niassa. (35).

The extent of Frelimo's political and military activities is reflected by the Portuguese counter-insurgency programme of aldeamentos, particularly between the Messalo and the Montepuez rivers among the Makuwa, and in Niassa in the extreme north-west corner, among the Yao. By 1969 Niassa had 113 aldeamentos, C. Delgado, 216; and Tete, 25. By 1969 over 380,000 peasants had been resettled and by the end of 1970, about 60% of the population in Niassa (45% in C. Delgado, and 6% in Tete) was in aldeamentos (36). Opello maintains that the defensive barrier formed by increased patrolling on Lake Malawi and by the resettlement of Makuwa and Yao, whom he sees as traditionally hostile to the Makonde, forced Frelimo to focus on the Tete front, where military operations ~~xxxx~~ restarted in March 1968. 37. It seems more likely that the re-opening of the Tete front was the result of Frelimo's growing confidence, resulting from consolidation in Niassa and C. Delgado, and Zambia's support by allowing Frelimo forces and arms on their way to Tete to pass through her territory. Opello's thesis (also adva-

ned by George Martelli.38) on why Frelimo forces made little advance into Zambezia ( traditional Yao and Makwa hostility to the Makonde) is dangerous and results in distortion of contemporary Mozambican history. The fact that the Portuguese military and PIDE tried to exploit ethnolinguistic differences among Mozambicans did not result in Frelimo being entirely confined to the Makonde and Nyanja for support and recruits. The different~~xxxx~~ ethnolinguistic groups of N. Mozambique are not as homogeneous as Opello implies in his analysis. This is not underplaying the problems of tribalism in the Mozambican Revolution, but to indicate the limitations of such an explanation.

By 1968 Frelimo had a guerrilla army of 8,000, plus thousands of unequipped men and militia. The reopening of the Tete front in March 1963 marked a new stage of the armed struggle, but even <sup>more</sup> of greater significance to Frelimo's morale, was the holding of the Second Congress inside Mozambique (Niassa) in July of the same year. Two points about the congress are worth noting. First, the CC, which since its formation in 1964, was made up of the heads of all departments and their assistants, was expanded from 20 to 40 members, bringing in more young men (including Samora Machel) from the army.39) Administration was more democratised to allow more popular participation: the circle became the base organ of Frelimo (at least in theory), followed by the locality, the district and provincial councils. The second point is that the congress had been preceded by disagreements between 65-year old Lazaro Kavandame, provincial secretary of C. Delgado, and his close associates, on the one hand, and the rest of the Frelimo leadership, on the other, over the venue of the Second Congress. It appears that Kavandame wished the Congress to be held in Southern Tanzania, where he thought he enjoyed popular support among the Makonde, and hoped to influence proceedings of the Congress with the help of certain less progressive but strategically placed elements in the Tanzanian leadership. Kavandame, who in the 1950's had worked hard organizing peasant cooperatives (in C. Delgado), to undermine the strength of the local concession companies, was not worried about outside influence from China or the USSR, as he told the Portuguese after his defection on April 3rd, 1969, but unwilling to accept "new post-colonial structures brought about by the young men brought to the top by guerrilla warfare and unwilling to accept the traditional position of elders and local chiefs among the Makonde."40. Thus, although Kavandame and seven other political delegates from C. Delgado refused to attend the congress, all the nine politico-military delegates from C. Delgado attended, and as Davidson who was at the Congress, has pointed out: "These military and politico-military delegates from C. Delgado took an active part in the Congress, some of them were elected to the newly enlarged CC of Frelimo."41.

But if the holding of the 2nd Congress inside Mozambique was a big morale booster to Frelimo and a defeat for elements within Frelimo who saw the struggle as being merely national and not social as well, the assassination of Mondlane on Feb. 3rd 1969, was a big blow to Frelimo, and a morale booster to Portuguese forces and PIDE, most likely behind the assassination. Mondlane had been central in the setting of Frelimo's direction and in holding it together. Beside, he was highly respected in certain Western intellectual circles. The Portuguese hoped that Mondlane's elimination would deprive Frelimo of an essential uniting figure, cause disunity, and cripple Frelimo's fighting powers. There was some disunity. Frelimo, as we noted earlier on, was a 'front', welcoming all anti-colonialist Mozambicans. Anti-colonialism, as Marcellino dos Santos(42) put it. "in 1973, was the minimum ideological framework at the formation of Frelimo in 1962. But armed struggle had the effect of radicalising many members of Frelimo (including Mondlane himself), as clearly indicated by the 2nd Congress' passing of a series of revolutionary resolutions on national reconstruction, calling for the "organization of agricultural, commercial and industrial cooperatives", and "the development of schools for political training".43. Thus, by the time of Mondlane's assassination and Kavandame's defection, a growing section of Frelimo's leadership was thoroughly committed to national and social revolution.

But the CC's appointment of a triumvirate of Vice-President Uria Simango; Secretary of Political Affairs, dos Santos; and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Samora Machel, to succeed Mondlane, instead of Simango as Vice-President moving up to the Presidency, was a reflection of the internal divisions within Frelimo. Of the three members of the Presidential Council, dos Santos and Machel were thoroughly committed to revolutionary goals of restructuring Mozambican society along collectivist lines and improving the living conditions of

the people. They aimed at not only eradicating Mozambique of negative Portuguese influences, but at fostering a national consciousness, as distinct from ethnic or regional separatism. Ironically, the third member of the triumvirate, Simango, on Nov. 4th 1969, issued to the press (without consulting the CC) a 13-page pamphlet, "The Gloomy Situation in Frelimo", whose text John Saul has described as "a locus classicus for students of the disintegration of conventional African nationalism in the context of truly revolutionary conditions" (44), and in which he (Simango) accused fellow members on the Presidential Council, of tribalism, murder and nepotism, and made a personal attack on Janet Mondlane, (the white widow of the assassinated Frelimo leader and) director of the Mozambique Institute in Dar. The following day Simango told a Guardian reporter in Dar that he had made his quarrel public because he was afraid of being murdered, especially by Southern leaders. 45. It is significant that TANU's daily, The Nationalist, immediately described Simango's public statement as "highly irresponsible and a service to the Portuguese propaganda machine." 46. The Nationalist was basically correct when it commented on Nov. 5th: "His (Simango) bid to take over the party's leadership following the assassination of Dr. Mondlane in Dar last Feb., was thwarted and it is quite clear that he has not been on good terms with the other two members of the Presidential Council for the past 9 months." 47. Clearly, Simango's "revolutionary outlook" had come into question when the CC appointed the Presidential Council. It is significant that he now accused Machel and dos Santos for "introducing the question of scientific socialism and capitalism in Mozambique" prematurely. 48. Attempts by Nyerere and the ALC to patch up differences between Simango and the other two members of the Presidential Council failed, and when the Executive of Frelimo met on Nov. 9th (1969) to assess "The Gloomy Situation in Frelimo", it suspended Simango from the Presidential Council (49), accusing him of failing to present his problems to the CC and of lying in his pamphlet. Only seven days after Simango's public accusations, Machel was on his way to the front to continue organising the armed struggle. While it is dangerous to attribute the success of a revolution to one or two individuals, I would say that the tremendous ideological unity shown between Machel and dos Santos during those fateful Nov. days and ever since, has been a vital asset to Frelimo's success. Opello maintains that the general picture of conflicts within Frelimo between 1962 and 1969 is that middle-educated assimilados mostly from ethnolinguistic groups in the central and northern areas of Mozambique, primarily Nyanja, Makuwa-Lomwe and Makonde, opposed more highly educated mestizos and assimilados, most of whom came from the southern part of the country, especially the Shangaan, for positions of authority within Frelimo. Opello's thesis goes like this: while the first CC was heterogeneous in nature, with membership ranging from Mandlane, an intellectual from Gaza; to Kavandame, a 60-year old Makombe regional organizer; to Jorge Rebelo, a mestizo law student (barely half Kavandame's age); to Simango, a priest from central Mozambique- and therefore fairly representative of different parts of and social groups in Mozambique, "elite groups used appeals to ethnic and class cleavages in an ideological manner as they vied for the relatively few high level prestige and power positions available." 50. Opello maintains that ideology, age and personality played only a minor part in Frelimo's internal conflicts, and concludes that "competition within the elite was structured without much direct connection with popular feelings, and each side buttressed their own positions with appeals to one sort of ideology or another, the losing factions normally to ethnolinguistic discrimination, the victorious group to nationalistic and class rhetoric." 51. Such an analysis is misleading, for among other things, it gives the impression that the masses in the liberated areas were not involved in or concerned about politics and that rank and file members of Frelimo had no concept of Mozambique as a country. Opello's analysis also begs the question: who was Frelimo and what gave rank and file members of Frelimo the drive to fight the Portuguese (and to follow the victorious group which appealed to "nationalist and class rhetoric)?

Kavandame's defection to the Portuguese and Simango's expulsion from the Presidential Council and other expulsions or defections (52) were correctly regarded by Frelimo as impure elements which a revolution's progress rejects. Contrary to Opello's thesis above, conflicts within Frelimo's leadership were primarily ideological, as the activities of the defectors to the Portuguese clearly shows, both before and After the Lisbon coup in April 1974. (53). Kavandame,

whom a Portuguese High Command communique described on April 3rd 1969 as "the supreme military leader of Frelimo" 55, signed Portuguese propaganda leaflets asking Makonde members of Frelimo to stop fighting, and broadcast similar messages from a helicopter loudspeakers to the people in the liberated areas. Kavandane's efforts bore no fruit; before his defection he had been accused by peasants in C. Delgado of using his position as provincial secretary and head of commerce for economic aggrandizement for himself and his close associates. Marcellino dos Santos was basically correct when he told Boubakar Adjali of Algeria: As always, the task of building a society economically poses the problem of the type of production and distribution, and especially who is going to benefit from what society produces. This life process also raises much more sharply than in the classroom the deeper question of the type of ideology to embrace." 56. We can conclude this brief summary of conflicts and defections in the Frelimo leadership by saying that the defections strengthened Frelimo's "correct political line", enabling the movement to intensify the armed struggle.

The Appointment of one of Portugal's top guerrilla war experts, General Kaulza de Arriaga, as Commander-in-Chief of Portuguese forces in Mozambique early in 1970, marked the third and very important phase of the armed struggle. Kaulza, a Salazarist from top to bottom, who saw the struggle in Mozambique as primarily the work of what he called communist world expansionism, described Portugal as "a Euro-African state, a nation that is not in Africa but is also African." 57. Kaulza held the view (incorrect) that Frelimo had "inherent weakness resulting basically from the fact that its top leadership is Russian-inspired, its middle cadres are inspired by Continental China, and its field personnel come from traditionally non-communist tribes". 58. Arriaga also believed that these <sup>alleged</sup> weaknesses were magnified by Portuguese military and social policies (primarily the aldeamento programme). But even Arriaga himself wrote in 1972: "In C. Delgado district, the situation by spring 1970 was giving considerable concern... the enemy also had a number of well-organized bases inside C. Delgado itself, with large garrisons, from which they had launched a southward offensive" - aimed at reaching Mozambique and Zambesia provinces. 59. By early 1970 the 10,000 Frelimo army controlled much of C. Delgado and Niassa and Muenda was ringed with large Frelimo military camps with dugouts and artillery and could only be reached by air. The roads north of Montepuez were impassable because of Frelimo mines.

Arriaga mounted the biggest Portuguese land and air offensive since the beginning of the war. Operation Gordian Knot (OGK) which started in July and August, 1970, in Cabo Delgado, was designed to wipe out Frelimo once and for all. OGK and the smaller operations that followed it in Niassa enabled Arriaga to occupy some Frelimo bases near Muenda and along the Ruvuma river. The Portuguese aimed at stopping any further guerrilla infiltration from Tanzania and at stopping all Frelimo operations south of the Messalo river. But in April and May 1971 the Portuguese found it necessary to announce the beginning of a new offensive, Operation Frontier (OF), as Frelimo regained initiative. The second phase of OF included the asphaltting of hundreds of miles of road in C. Delgado to prevent mine laying and the construction of a number of new airfields, asphaltting runways of existing airfields to increase troop mobility and logistics. The operation also included the building of a new town at Negade and three aldeamentos (60) and provision of health and educational services in some rural areas - what Arriaga called "a pilot-solution of social promotion." 70

In 1972 Arriaga stated that OGK had enabled the population previously under Frelimo to get "a glimpse of the better life that they could enjoy as the Portuguese they really are." 71. Arriaga stressed three points in counter-insurgency psychological warfare: (1) to tell the truth to the population, "explaining the rightness of the Portuguese cause", (2) promotion of social progress (education, health ..), and (3) as a last resort, destruction of the enemy. In practice the policy was a stick and carrot one - with very little carrot and plenty of stick. Arriaga's programme, which derived heavily from the American experience in Vietnam, included the partial Africanization of the army, to lessen the financial and human resource <sup>burden</sup> on metropolitan Portugal (72). However, Arriaga's more aggressive approach to the war did not lead to Middelmass' conclusion that, "To a greater extent, the 'liberated areas' ceased to exist". 73. Samora Machel who had been elected Frelimo President in May



1970, summarised Arriaga's "military and psychological" offensive in a message to Frelimo fighters on Sept, 25, 1971: "In 1970, the enemy tried to win a quick victory and met with defeat. This year, 1971, they have tried to be more flexible, less adventurous, they have attempted to combine crimes against our people with political manoeuvres aimed at sowing confusion." 74. It was one thing for the Portuguese to launch a huge operation like OGV, and another to maintain a force of over 60,000 troops in the field a year after year, in the face of an enemy with popular support. A New York Times report on July 26, 1970, from Maputo had made a correct prediction when it pointed out that: "...The Portuguese offensive (OGV) can change the nature of the war in Mozambique, but is not likely to have a decisive influence on the course of events, in the views of independent military observers. These sources believe that the Portuguese misjudged the strength of Frelimo, overestimated the repercussions of the murder of their leader, Eduardo Mondlane, ... and underestimated the force of his successor, Samora Machel." 75.

Frelimo's intensification of the war in Tete from March 1971 (76) and the instructive Portuguese response of designating Tete a special military region, marked the fourth phase of the war. The Tete front was of crucial importance because of the Cabora Bassa hydroelectric project, financed by a number of Western companies and S. Africa, and whose construction Frelimo viewed as likely to buttress Portuguese colonialism. Arriaga states that from March 1971 "the main military and psychological effort was moved to the Tete district". The Portuguese military speeded up the aldeamento programme (often with inadequate planning), and by June 1972, had built 123 aldeamentos with 96,000 people and were planning another 85 to hold about 100,000 people. (77). The DGS (formerly PIDE) increased its activities in the region and units of the Portuguese army adopted "search and destroy" tactics (the Viriyamu massacres first brought to world attention in the London Times in 1974, and later confirmed by the U.N. - must be seen in this light). The "military and psychological" effort of the 20,000 Portuguese troops in Tete can be said to have failed, as indicated by a report by Wilf Nussey, an editor of the Johannesburg Star, back from a tour with the Portuguese army in Tete in June 1972: "It must be stated clearly, now, though it may irk the Portuguese, that the state of the war in Tete is serious and carries grave military and political dangers for all Southern Africa in the long-term." 78. Nussey made three important observations: (a) Frelimo was infiltrating across most of the over 400km border with Zambia, "with disturbing rapidity"; (b) Frelimo had crossed the Zambezi, penetrating several hundred miles along the Rhodesian Mozambique border, a development which enabled ZANU to use Tete as a base to launch armed struggle in N.E. Rhodesia from Dec, 1972; and (c) Frelimo had a lot of local support, as indicated by the little information the Portuguese were able to get from the people, and that compared to the other war zones, few of the 40 to 80 daily operations were based on reliable information. The Smith regime in Rhodesia expressed the view that morale among the Portuguese forces in Mozambique was at a low ebb. Caetano immediately went on nationwide TV to rebuke Rhodesia for spreading alarm: "Some of our neighbours with less experience do not conceal their fears. They have been told more than once that there is no reason for the great fright." 79.

The opening of the Manica e Sofala front at the end of July 1972, and in particular, Frelimo's attack on a convoy of lorries (on June 25, 1973, near Vila Gouveia), taking material to the Cabora Bassa works, mark the fifth and final phase of the war before the Lisbon coup. From their main base in the Gorongosa Game Reserve, Frelimo guerrilla units mounted operations against Portuguese farms, road convoys and railway lines and military installations, the most spectacular of which was the attack on the Inhame Barracks on the Beira-Sena line. In an attempt to stop Frelimo units advancing through the 'neck' of Mozambique, the Portuguese flew in 10,000 battle-seasoned troops from Angola where the war had slowed down. But in January 1974 Frelimo units cut the vital Beira-Umtali line on 19 separate occasions, and settlers in Vila de Manica, Vila Pery and Beira rioted, complaining about the army's failure to give them protection. In less than two years, Frelimo forces had taken a giant step from north Tete to almost within striking distance of Beira. In Nov. 1972, a Financial Times reporter back from a recent visit to the Beira area with the Portuguese army, commented, "The problem of the Portuguese in seeking out infiltrators is enormous, since they melt into local tribal settlements and appear again once the Portuguese have passed." 80. By the end of April Frelimo guerrillas were laying ambushes on the Beira-Maputo road.

In order to understand the reasons for Frelimo's successes and why the peasants gave support to the armed struggle, it is necessary to understand Frelimo's political line. Frelimo was fighting a people's war, such as fought by the PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau and by Ho and Giap in Vietnam. Frelimo was not only soldiers but also propagandists, helping to raise the political consciousness of the people and explaining to them the aims of the armed struggle and the reasons why it had to be a protracted one.<sup>81</sup> From the very beginning, Frelimo, and in particular, Mondlane, stressed the importance of education as an essential aspect of the struggle.<sup>82</sup> While the Mozambique Institute and Frelimo schools at Baganoyo and Tunduru in Tanzania, provided secondary and upper primary schooling, many schools were established in the liberated areas to provide basic primary education. Frelimo's educational programmes provided a base for raising the political consciousness of the political and military cadres. What Amílcar Cabral said to PAIGC guerrillas in 1966 applied to Frelimo forces as well: "The struggle is very important. But the most important thing is an understanding of our people's situation."<sup>83</sup> Cabral defined the PAIGC fighters as "armed activists". Machel's dictum to Frelimo forces has been that "a soldier without politics is an assassin."<sup>84</sup> Frelimo guerrilla forces were thus constantly reminded of and instructed in the basically political nature of the overall struggle for Mozambican *uhuru*. The more "advanced" elements of the Frelimo leadership learned from start that a guerrilla force cannot develop on the military level if it did not become a political vanguard.<sup>85</sup> Only with heightened political consciousness among Frelimo cadres, fighters and peasants in the liberated areas, could Portuguese efforts of sending African puppet troops and PIDE/DGS agents to create dissension within Frelimo ranks, be defeated. Thus Machel urged cadres from Tete and Manica e Sofala at a meeting held in Tete in August 1973, "Constantly raise the political consciousness among the cadres and fighters, deepening understanding of who is the enemy..."<sup>86</sup> which Frelimo defined as Portuguese colonialism, its imperialist allies and all those who collaborate with it. Frelimo's system of mixing fighters from different ethnic groups at platoon and cadre level was aimed at creating a revolutionary consciousness, which was seen as an essential part of political education. In a broadcast to the Mozambican people on Sept. 25, 1973, Machel pointed out that it was necessary "that we all learn and understand what Mozambique is... To wish to return to tribalism and regionalism is to fight against our revolution."<sup>88</sup> The formation of the women's detachment at the end of 1967 was part of Frelimo's social revolution programme. As Machel has pointed out, "The emancipation of women is not an act of charity, the result of humanitarian or compassionate attitude. The liberation of women is a fundamental necessity for the revolution, the guarantee of its continuity and the precondition of its victory."<sup>89</sup>

In addition to raising political consciousness, it was important for Frelimo to raise production and to establish elementary social services.<sup>90</sup> Giap has written, "One cannot speak of the armed struggle and the building of the revolutionary armed forces without mentioning the problem of the rear." Frelimo understood this point, as indicated by 'practices' in the liberated areas and by the CC's message to the Mozambican people on Sept. 25, 1967: "The purpose of our struggle is not to destroy. It is first and foremost aimed at building a new Mozambique..."<sup>91</sup> Liberation was not simply a matter of expelling the Portuguese, but the "reorganization of the life of the country and setting it on the road to sound national development"<sup>92</sup>, and as a Frelimo militant, M. Gondola wrote in a poem, "He who works the soil of his country and waters it with his sweat... He too is a revolutionary!"<sup>92</sup> Frelimo established cooperatives in some liberated areas, built rural clinics and launched literacy campaigns. Like TANU in Tanzania, Frelimo stressed self-reliance in all fields of development (as a long term aim). Wherever possible, Frelimo troops were encouraged to take part in production with the peasants, thus indicating their authenticity as a people's army. In a directive widely distributed in the liberated area in 1971, Machel said, "To our army we give the tasks of fighting, producing and mobilising the masses."<sup>93</sup> In the liberated areas Frelimo aimed at shaping human relationships which mirrored a socialist Mozambique after liberation. As far back as April 1967, a Portuguese High Command communique indicated the strength of Frelimo's politicisation programme (and support): "The coercion exerted by the enemy and the false propaganda are two factors which prevent the masses from coming to the authorities."<sup>94</sup>

Ry Feb.(23rd) 1974, Star Weekly a S. African paper, was commenting: "Even their most ardent detractors now grudgingly admit that the Frelimo guerrilla attack on Mozambique is making formidable strides." In the same month, Samora Machel declared with confidence: "...the fundamental question has now become the triumph of the Revolution, and not just national independence."95. The point being that Frelimo was going for "flag" independence as has happened elsewhere in former colonies in Africa, but for the genuine liberation of the Mozambican people. This liberation could come about by defeating Portuguese colonialism, by establishing people-centred economic and social institutions, and by what he called "the decolonisation of the minds" from years of colonial poisoning. For Mozambican women, Liberation was to be double- liberation from colonialism and liberation from male oppression.

Frelimo's military and political successes provided the climax to the Lisbon coup on April 25, 1974. Middelness writes, "The army revolt grew out of the impossible nature of the tasks set by the politicians, and drew strength from the grievances accumulated during the 13 years of colonial wars."96. Spínola, the junta's leader after the April coup, had himself been dismissed from his specially-created job as Deputy Chief-of-Staff on his return from Guinea-Bissau as a national hero, for publishing a book (Portugal E O Futuro Feb. 1974) in which he stated that Portugal would never win the colonial wars and that a political solution had to be found. He wrote: "To want to win a subversive war with a military solution is to accept defeat in advance, unless one possesses unlimited capability to prolong the war indefinitely, turning it into an institution."97. (Portugal was spending nearly half of her annual budget on defence). Spínola was not in favour of decolonization but for giving more power to the colonies, within what he called a Lusitanian Federation- because, "The overseas territories are a prerequisite for our survival as a free and independent nation. Without the African territories, the country (Portugal) will be reduced to a voiceless corner of a gigantic Europe and will have no possible trump cards to play to assert itself in the concert of nations."98. The objective of Spínola's plan on the African colonies was "to prevent the amputation of the African territories one by one." 99.

Frelimo rejected Spínola's solution and on May 3rd, 1974, Machel went on Frelimo Radio to tell Mozambicans that the differences between Spínola on the one hand and Caetano and Arriaga, on the other, were merely differences of tactics, that "The enemy are resorting to manoeuvres which they call 'political solution'..."100, and that peace was inseparable from independence. A day before the April coup a Guardian report commented that Caetano was making "discreet attempts" to create an African political grouping in order to halt the deteriorating military and political situation. It was hoped that a number of elite African intellectuals would form the embryo of a political party in order to defeat the Frelimo programme of politicization of the African population in the rural areas. But Frelimo's assertion that it was the authentic representative of the Mozambican people in the liberation struggle had already gained international legitimacy. None of the five new political groups formed or created by the Portuguese and which united in Aug. to form the National Coalition Party (PCN) and which included ex-Coremo leader, P. Guane, and Sofia Simango, had any deep rooting among Mozambicans. Frelimo would not compromise on its exclusive leadership of the Mozambican people, as Machel told journalists in Dar on May 2nd before leading a Frelimo delegation to the first meeting with a Portuguese Government delegation led by Foreign Minister, Mario Soares in Lusaka: "We are not going to discuss Independence with the Portuguese. That is our inalienable right.... The Portuguese must negotiate with Frelimo to study the mechanism of transmitting power to the people of Mozambique and the leadership of Mozambique. Peace is inseparable from Independence."101.

A joint communique at the end of the second Frelimo-Portuguese meeting in Lusaka on June 5th and 6th stated that "both delegations recognized that agreement on a cease-fire is conditional on a prior global agreement regarding fundamental political principles." 102. But on June 11 Spínola, referring in particular to the breakdown of Portuguese negotiations with the PAIGC on June 4th, declared that "democracy must precede independence", and went on to insist on pre-independence referenda for all three African colonies. 103. The Frelimo view was that there could be no such thing as "democratic colonialism" and two days later, Machel rejected the Portuguese call for a cease-fire and called upon Frelimo forces to intensify the war. And to show that he meant business,

Machel announced the reopening of armed struggle in Zambezia province at the beginning of July. It was only when the left-wing members of the Portuguese Armed Forces Movement had assumed power in Lisbon, with the installation of the Second Provisional Government, headed by the 'brain' of the Movement, Col. Vasco Goncalves in mid July, that Frelimo entered into independence negotiations (Sept. 5-7) with the Portuguese, on condition of Frelimo's three points. These were, (a) "recognition of Frelimo as the Mozambican people's legitimate representative; (b) recognition of <sup>the</sup> Mozambican people's right to complete independence in their territorial integrity; (c) acceptance of the transfer of sovereignty still exercised by the Portuguese authorities to the representative institutions of the Mozambican people, in other words to Frelimo." 104. The Lusaka agreement (105) of Sept 7, 1974, between Frelimo and the Portuguese Government, set the date for the complete independence of Mozambique for June 25, 1975, the anniversary of the foundation of Frelimo. In the meantime a Frelimo-dominated Provisional Government was to run Mozambique and a Joint Military Commission was to control the implementation of the cease-fire agreement.

In conclusion, we can say that Frelimo was the direct product of repressive Portuguese colonial policy and the armed struggle the direct product of Portuguese refusal to negotiate or even recognize in principle the right of Mozambicans to self-determination. Samora Machel is not incorrect when he states that, "State Power has been won through the struggle of our people, united by our correct line, under Frelimo leadership." 106.

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Footnotes (cont. from p. 14)

85. Regis Debray, Revolution in the Revolution, Penguin, 1968, p. 107.
86. Mozambique Revolution, No. 56, July-Sept. 1973, p. 12.
87. John Saul, op cit. p. 379-380, discusses the concept of revolutionary nationalism.
88. Middelmas K, op. cit. p 180.
89. Machel, Sowing the Seeds of Revolution, p. 24.
90. See Machel's speech to Cadres on a Health course, Moz. Revolution, no 58, Jan-March, 1974.
91. Mondlane, op. cit. p. 161.
92. quoted from Building Freedom: Mozambique's Frelimo, C. Bengelsof and F. Roberts (eds.), (Africa Research Group, Massachusetts), p. 19.
93. Sowing the Seeds of Revolution, p. 58.
94. Mozambique Commander-in-Chief communique, April 16, 1967, R. Davidson Collection: Mozambique Press cuttings.
95. Mozambique Revolution, no 58, Jan-March, 1974, p. 3.
96. Middelmas K, op. cit. p. 308.
97. Excerpts from Spinoza's Portugal E O Futuro, quoted from Africa Report, Vol. 19, No 2, 1974, p. 37.
98. Middelmas K. op. cit. p. 316.
99. Spinoza, Portugal E O Futuro, quoted from Moz. Revol. No 58, Jan-March, 1974.
100. Mozambique Revolution, No 59, April-June, 1974.  
J. MacManus in The Guardian 2/14/74: "The political and military crisis in Portugal's African territory of Mozambique has prompted the Govt. in Lisbon to take steps towards an 'African Solution'".
101. Quoted from Africa Research Bulletin, May 1974, p3274.
102. ibid.
103. Middelmas K, op. cit. p 327.
104. Mozambique Revolution, No. 60, July-Sept. 1975, p 5.
105. ibid, Text of the Lusaka Agreement, pp 14-15.
106. Quoted from Middelmas K, op. cit. p. 344.



1. Portuguese Overseas Policy: Dr. Salazar's Forthright Declaration, African World Annual (London), 1963, p. 19.
2. quoted from J. Duffy, 'Portuguese Africa, 1930-1960', in L.H. Gann and P. Duignan (eds), Colonialism In Africa 1870-1960, CUP, 1970, 179.
3. Dr. Salazar's Forthright Declaration, op. cit. p. 25.
4. ibid, p. 19.
5. J. Duffy, op. cit. p. 180.
6. quoted in Chilcote R.H., Portuguese Africa, Prentice Hall (US), 1967, p 16.
7. Mondlane E, The Struggle for Mozambique, Penguin, 1969, p. 103.
8. quoted in Women of the Revolution, Committee for Freedom in Mozambique, Angola and Guine, Topic No. 3.
9. quoted in Dickinson M, When The Bullets Begin to Flower, FAPH.
10. M. dos Santos: Report to the April 1961 COCP meeting, p 11, in the Basil Davidson Collection: COCP, SOAS library.  
CONCP stands for the Conference of Nationalist Organizations in the Portuguese Colonies. dos Santos was the first COCP Secretary-General when the organization was formed in 1960.
11. Amilcar Cabral, Revolution in Guinea, Stage 1, (1969, 1974), 89.
12. Mondlane E, op. cit. p. 117.
13. quoted from Duffy J, op. cit. p. 178.
14. Udenamo- Mozambique National Democratic Union, Manu- Mozambique African National Union, Unami- Union of Independent Mozambique.
15. Mondlane, op. cit. p. 119.
16. Information Bulletin CONCP, Rabat, Sept. 1966, 9. Basil Davidson Collection: CONCP.
17. The June 25, 1962 Declaration, Basil Davidson Collection: Frelimo.
18. In 1961 Die Zeit (Hamburg, March 24) commented: " In a kind of last minute panic Portugal has in the past few months opened its hitherto almost hermetically closed doors to foreign investments. The reason for this changed course is... the knowledge that Portugal will inevitably lose the struggle now beginning for its colonial empire if it is not able in time to win powerful allies for itself in the struggle.", quoted from First R, Portugal's Wars in Africa, International and Defence Aid Fund, 1972.
19. Dunn D.E, The OAU and the Mozambique Revolution, Issue, spring, 1973.  
Algeria, Egypt and other North African States gave small arms from start.
20. Whitaker P.M, Arms and the Nationalists: Where and on what terms?  
Africa Report, Vol. 15, No.5, 1970.
21. Sechaba, Oct. 1970, p.15-16 (Official Organ of the South African ANC).
22. Paul J, Mozambique: Memoirs of a Revolution, Penguin, 1975, p. 98.
23. quoted in Mondlane, op. cit. p. 13.
24. V. Wentzel, National Geographic Society (Lisbon), Aug, 1964, p. 204.
25. Mondlane, op. cit. p. 130.
26. quoted from Guevara, A. Pinclair, Fontana, 1970, p. 15.
27. Opello W.C, Guerrilla War in Portuguese Africa: an assessment of the balance of forces in Mozambique ( 1964 through April 1974), Issue, summer 1974.
- 27b. Mondlane, op. cit. p. 141.
28. quoted from Opello, Guerrilla War in Portuguese Africa..., op. cit. p 30.
29. quoted from Minter W, Portuguese Africa and the West, Penguin, 1972, p68.
30. Paul, op. cit. p. 120.
31. Mondlane, op. cit. p. 152.
32. In 1966 Samora Machel, director of Frelimo's first politico-military camp, succeeded Filipe Mugaia (killed in action), as Defence Secretary. Alberto Chipande became his deputy.
33. Mondlane, op. cit. p. 155.
34. Opello, Guerrilla War in Portuguese Africa... op. cit. p 31.

35. Paul, op. cit. p. 162.
36. Opello, Guerrilla war in Portuguese Africa., op. cit., p. 32.
37. Ibid, p. 32.
38. Abshire and Samuels (eds), Portuguese Africa: A Handbook, Fall 'all, p. 422.
39. Frelimo: Statutes and Programme, the Basil Davidson Collection.
40. P. Davidson, "Letter to the Guardian April 7, 1969, P. Davidson Collection.
41. ibid.
42. M. dos Santos, interviewed by Joe Solvo, The African Communist, Fourth Quarter, 1973, p. 35, Inkululeko Publications (London).
43. The Second Congress- see Mondlane op. cit.
44. Saul J and Arrighi G (eds), Essays On The Political Economy of Africa, Monthly Review Press, 1973, 393.
45. The Guardian 5/11/69, Basil Davidson Collection: Frelimo.
46. The Nationalist, Nov. 6th, 1969, Basil Davidson Collection: Frelimo.
47. The Nationalist, Nov, 5th, 1969, ibid.
48. P. 4 of "The Economy Situation in Frelimo", quoted from Saul J, op. cit. p.
49. Simango was formerly expelled from Frelimo at the 395.  
next CC meeting and from Tanzania in Feb, 1970. Later, he joined Coremo.
50. Opello W.C, Pluralism and Elite Conflict in the Independence Movement: Frelimo in the 1960s, JSAS, vol. 2, No. 1, 1975, p. 66.
51. ibid, p. 81.
52. With the expulsion of Simango, 500 members resigned, Opello op. cit. p. 78.  
Dr. Miguel Murupa (educated in at Howard), Alex Mango (the two defected to the Portuguese in 1970), Casal Ribeira (deputy Sec. of Defence in 1964 and a Makonde) Lourenco Mutaca and Francis Kufa.
53. For example, Murupa, the ex-Frelimo deputy of external Affairs, was given a top post in the "Psychological War Depart." of the Portuguese Army.
55. Frelimo press statement by CC on April 4th, P. Davidson Collection.
56. Interviews in Depth: Marcellino dos Santos, LMS Information Centre, Richmond, Canada (1971, 1974), p. 8.  
Saul J, op. cit. p. 382, "In fact, once set in motion, the reality of protracted struggle has increasingly imposed its own logic upon the Moz. revolutionary movement" (the need to close the gap between the leadership and the mass of the peasantry).
57. K. de Arriaga, The Portuguese Answer, Tom Stacey, 1973, p. 20.
58. Arriaga, op. cit, p. 48.
59. ibid, p. 57.
60. By early 1970, about 1 million people were in aldeamentos in Niassa, C. Delgado and Tete.
70. Arriaga, op. cit. p. 75.
71. ibid, p. 72.
72. This was Caetano's two-pronged offensive to increase military effectiveness in the colonies, on the one hand, and to promote social and economic development on the other.
73. Middlemas K, Cabora Bassa, Eidenfeld & Nicholson, 1975, p. 143-4.
74. Mozambique Revolution, No. 43, July-Sept. 1971, p. 1.
75. quoted in Minter, op. cit. p. 70. While the charismatic leadership of Mondlane had performed a necessary function in the very difficult early years of Frelimo, Machel stressed collective leadership and collective responsibility.
76. Arriaga, op. cit. p. 72.
77. Wilf Nussey of The Star, back from a visit of Tete with the Portuguese Army, quoted from, Xray, Africa Bureau, Sept. 1972. P. Davidson Collection.
78. A paper renowned for its support of Portuguese colonialism. Xray, op. cit.
79. Financial Times, November 17, 1972. P. Davidson Collection: Frelimo.
80. ibid,
81. see Mao Tse-tung, On Protracted War, May 1938, 88 Vol. II, Peking, 1965.
82. Mondlane op. cit. p. 127 & Machel S, Sowing the Seeds of Revolution, CEMAG, p. 37. Frelimo's education serves were reconstructed after the Gwenjere-inspired student revolt at the Mozambique Institute- when students protested against the CC's 1966 directive that students spent a year working in the liberated areas before going on scholarships abroad. Frelimo adopted Mao's thesis: "Education must save proletarian politics and must be combined with productive labour."
83. Cabral A, quoted from Africa Report, No 5, 1970.
84. Mao has written, "Our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the Party.", Problems of Strategy, Nov, 1938, 88 vol. II, Peking, 1965.

