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# National Security Record

## A Report on the Congress and National Security Affairs

THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION • 214 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE, N.E. • WASHINGTON, D.C. • 20002 • (202) 546-4400

NO. 92

JUNE 1986

### In this issue...

#### The Resistance Can Win in Mozambique, p.1

The U.S. has a rare opportunity to strike a blow against the Brezhnev Doctrine by helping Mozambican patriots replace their Marxist-Leninist rulers with a non-communist alternative.

#### The Restoration of American Integrity, p.6

President Reagan has shown leadership and political courage in getting the U.S. out of SALT. Now he should do the same with the ABM treaty.

#### Insiders Report, p. 4

- Ex-Soviet Scientists Support SDI.
- Selling out the Afghans.
- Constantine Menges to Study State.
- State's pro-PRC Triumvirate.
- Lugar Raps State on IG.
- Common Cause versus Star Wars.
- Struggle for SDI Funding.

## The Resistance Can Win in Mozambique

One of the major foreign policy disappointments of the Reagan Administration has been its failure to wean Marxist regimes in Africa away from Moscow and Havana.

In Angola, after ten years of communist rule sustained by massive military aid from Moscow and manpower from Cuba, the Angolan regime has been unable to defeat the army of 60,000 freedom fighters led by the charismatic Jonas Savimbi. For five years the United States has tried to negotiate a settlement in Angola, without success. Finally recognizing the failure of its Angola policy, the administration now is providing military assistance to Savimbi's forces.

To Ethiopia, the U.S. shipped \$243 million worth of food in 1985 alone, providing relief with American tax dollars for famine caused in part by government policies: Soviet-style collective farming and the forced resettlement of over 600,000 farmers. Yet the State Department's hope that U.S. largesse would lead to improved relations with the Marxist-Leninist regime has proven false. Since last year, Reagan has included Ethiopia in the list of five Marxist-Leninist countries that he says are "at war with their own people." The others are Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia and Nicaragua.

The president's failure to include Mozambique in this list is notable. That country, the People's Republic of Mozambique, is the principal Marxist-Leninist state where the U.S. still is vigorously pursuing a policy of trying to wean the government away from Moscow. That policy is inconsistent with the Reagan Doctrine and has failed in its implementation. The Marxist-Leninist regime continues to function as a totalitarian government, supported by a foreign invasion force from Zimbabwe and thousands of Soviet-bloc advisers. Meanwhile, opposition forces fighting for self-determination for the people of Mozambique continue to win battles and public support, and move closer to victory. It is time for a new U.S. policy toward Mozambique.

### A Marxist-Leninist Dictatorship

Since winning independence from Portugal in 1975, Mozambique has been run as a one-party state by Samora Machel, head of the only permitted political party, the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO). In his eleven years of rule, Machel has turned Mozambique into a Marxist-Leninist dictatorship that is no friend of the United States. A recent State Department report on votes cast in the United Nations General Assembly by the 159 member nations lists Mozambique fourth from the bottom in order of support for positions taken by the United States. Mozambique voted opposite the U.S. position 94.1 percent of the time.

Machel has imposed communist doctrine, purged his party of non-Marxists, killed thousands of political opponents, herded over 200,000 others into reeducation camps, nationalized industry and agriculture, and invited Soviet-bloc advisers to Mozambique. According to State Department reports on human rights violations, prisoners at the remote reeducation camps are brutally bound, beaten and often killed. The one-party regime compels non-party members to attend political indoctrination meetings, and permits are required for citizens to travel outside their city of residence.

Now totally reliant on the Soviet Union for arms and oil, Machel has ruined his country's economy, but he receives virtually no economic help from his Soviet mentors. His solution: turn to the West for economic help, while maintain the all-important Soviet lifeline of arms and advisers enables him to stay in power and fight the resistance.

### International Communist Support

There are an estimated 2,000 Cubans, 1,000 Soviets, East Germans, and thousands of other Soviet-bloc persons in Mozambique. Officials of Machel's government acknowledge the presence of both military and civilian Soviet

advisers, but refuse to confirm or deny the numbers. Moscow has provided Hind helicopter gunships in addition to some 85 MiG-17s and MiG-21s. The Mozambican army of some 25,000 troops is equipped almost entirely with Soviet weapons, including AK-47 rifles, T-55 tanks, armored personnel carriers, helicopters and artillery. The most recent report on international arms transfers issued by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency shows substantial increases in Soviet-bloc shipments to Mozambique, up from \$70 million in 1981 to \$130 million in 1982, to \$260 million in 1983. Military aid from Moscow increased still further last year.

Mozambique's continued close relations with Moscow were reaffirmed during a three day visit by Samora Machel to the Soviet Union in late March. In a joint communique issued by Machel and Mikhail Gorbachev, the two leaders presented a detailed picture of coinciding views on world affairs. Both attacked not only "the aggression of the South African racists" but also "their imperialist allies," presumably the United States. They "expressed satisfaction with the development of Soviet-Mozambique relations . . . and of the fraternal ties between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Frelimo." They lauded "the presence of Cuban internationalists in Angola" and "expressed their solidarity with the Libyan people" against the United States.

After Soviet arms and moral support, the most important foreign assistance Machel receives is the direct military intervention of neighboring Zimbabwe (formerly Rhodesia). Fellow Marxist ruler Robert Mugabe sent over ten thousand troops into Mozambique last year in the hope of quickly crushing the resistance against Machel. Instead, he now finds his forces bogged down and losing a war of attrition.

### The Non-Communist Alternative

The opposition to this alliance of African Marxist regimes is RENAMO, the Mozambique National Resistance. RENAMO is led by Afonso Dhlakama, the son of a paramount tribal chief who attended a Christian seminary before joining the resistance to Portuguese rule. RENAMO was founded in April 1977 by Andre Matsangaisse, who fought under Machel during the resistance to the Portuguese. Matsangaisse later was interned in a concentration camp by Machel, but he escaped and established RENAMO to oppose Machel's regime, and Dhlakama became his chief lieutenant. When Matsangaisse was killed in 1979, Dhlakama succeeded him as head of the guerrilla movement, which now numbers 22,000 active guerrillas and 10,000 reservists, operating throughout Mozambique.

Opponents of RENAMO charge that it was established by the colonial administration in Rhodesia and supplied by South Africa. But RENAMO actually was created by Mozambican patriots who had fought the Portuguese only to become disaffected by Samora Machel's brutal repression. Their acceptance of some assistance from Rhodesia and South Africa does not alter the nature of their nationalist movement. About one-third of RENAMO's guerrillas are defectors from the Mozambican armed forces, now fighting to overthrow Machel. They have won growing popular support as the economy has deteriorated and political oppression continued.

### Economic Problems

Mozambique is facing major economic difficulties: a balance of payments deficit over \$400 million, a foreign debt of \$2.3 billion (more than the annual gross domestic product), a serious shortage of consumer goods, drought, famine, and a drastic fall in both agricultural and manufacturing produc-

tion. Roads, rail lines and bridges are deteriorating due to a combination of guerrilla attacks, lack of funds for repairs, and shortages of skilled personnel to maintain them. The socialist economic policies practiced since 1975, including the creation of large collective farms and the nationalization of most businesses, have been disastrous. The regime has lost effective control over some 80 percent of the country, which is twice the size of California.

A Soviet client state, Mozambique depends on Soviet-bloc personnel for its military leadership, state security, information control and technical and engineering expertise. It is also dependent on low cost oil from the Soviet Union. In exchange, the Machel government has given the Soviets use of the port of Maputo to service its Indian Ocean fleet, and concessions for the exploitation of Mozambique's mineral resources.

Moscow treats Mozambique as it does most of its proxy states. Soviet support includes very little economic assistance, but plenty of weapons and Soviet-bloc advisers, both assuring Moscow's control and helping the Marxist-Leninist regime stay in power through the systematic control of the population and the suppression of any opposition. Machel periodically restates his commitment to Mozambique's 1977 treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union (most recently in Moscow in March), even while asking the West for economic help.

Moscow has rejected Machel's request for membership in COMECON, the communist economic and trade organization, presumably on the grounds that the economic basket case that Mozambique has become would merely be a drain on the Soviet economy. The Soviets probably figure they can have it both ways — maintain control through military and technical assistance, while letting Mozambique draw economic and food aid from South Africa, Western countries and international lending institutions.

### U.S. Aid

Facing a ruined economy and with no prospect of economic help from the Soviet Union, Machel turned to the West for economic aid in 1983, hinting at a retreat from some of his government's socialist practices. Machel turned to the U.S. only after Moscow denied his request for economic assistance, but the State Department responded promptly with \$16 million in economic and food aid, and in 1984 sponsored Mozambique's membership in the International Monetary Fund. As a result, Machel quickly received a \$45 million World Bank loan and large amounts of U.S. food aid. U.S. assistance increased to \$55 million in 1985, bringing total U.S. aid to Mozambique for the ten year period from 1976 through the first half of 1986 to \$230.7 million.

The American embassy in Maputo, pleased about "increased Mozambican support for its private sector," has been pressing Washington to increase U.S. aid. Last year, the State Department asked Congress to approve \$1 million in non-lethal *military* aid to Machel's regime, despite the large number of Soviet-bloc military advisers in the country. Congress torpedoed the State Department request by conditioning any military aid on economic and political reforms, the restoration of free enterprise, a reduction in foreign military personnel to 55, and a commitment to hold free elections. None of these requirements have been met.

Congress also restricted U.S. economic aid, limiting it to the private sector rather than the Machel regime; but with virtually no private sector left, most aid funds are being used either for humanitarian assistance or to pay American firms to provide services. Sources in Congress are looking into the possible circumvention of the intent of Congress by some

State or AID officials, who may have increased humanitarian aid to Mozambique as a way of offsetting the congressional restriction on economic aid.

One U.S. AID contract, for \$695,000 to develop a computer-assisted debt management system for the Bank of Mozambique, has been let with the New York investment banking firm of Lehman Brothers. A question being asked in the Senate is whether Richard Moose, assistant secretary of state for African affairs in the Carter Administration and now an executive of Lehman Brothers, may have arranged this contract with former colleagues at AID.

### The Civil War

The military operations occurring in remote areas of a remote country often have not been reported accurately by much of the Western media. Last September a combined FRELIMO/Zimbabwe offensive was launched, with the support of Soviet and Cuban advisers, against RENAMO's military headquarters at Gorongosa in central Mozambique. The assault was widely publicized in the West as a major defeat for RENAMO. In fact, Dhlakama, who has excellent intelligence on the plans of the Zimbabwean and Mozambican armies, was warned days in advance and had time to evacuate his whole force from the Gorongosa complex.

RENAMO struck back in January, launching attacks in seven provinces that destroyed several railroad trains, dozens of military vehicles and an Alouette III helicopter. In February, RENAMO recaptured the Gorongosa base and seized large quantities of supplies abandoned by the fleeing Zimbabwean and FRELIMO troops. RENAMO forces destroyed the last operating sugar mill in the country. Major power lines have been cut several times, interrupting the supply of electricity to large parts of the country. RENAMO guerrillas operate freely in most of the country and recently have been conducting raids in the suburbs of the capital city of Maputo, which is virtually cut off from the rest of the country, except by air.

On May 19, RENAMO cut the railroad line between Swaziland and Maputo, one of Machel's last land routes to the outside world. On May 21, RENAMO raided FRELIMO party headquarters, destroyed the building and seized documents revealing that FRELIMO considers the resistance the major stumbling block to the full implementation of the Marxist-Leninist program of the Machel regime.

### Zimbabwe's Vietnam

Mugabe is anxious to keep open Zimbabwe's access to the sea via the Mozambique port of Beira. Another road from Zimbabwe to the sea, via the port of Maputo, has been closed by RENAMO since last August. Thus, one of Mugabe's main objectives is to keep open the Beira-Mutare road, and the adjoining railroad and oil pipeline.

Trying again with the help of Cuban troops, Mugabe launched a new attack on the Gorongosa base on April 12. The assault force consisted of 7,000 Zimbabwean troops, including 3,000 airborne, and was supported by 17 helicopters, Canberra bombers, MiG-17s and MiG-21s. But again Dhlakama had advance warning. This time, instead of abandoning the base, the RENAMO forces were waiting, fought off the assault, and killed a reported 300 of the attackers.

Mugabe owes a debt to Machel for helping him win power in Zimbabwe and now is repaying his debt. Both are Marxist rulers, and Mugabe's support for Machel has elements of "socialist solidarity." But now Mugabe is said to be disillusioned by the reverses his army has suffered. His officers

blame the Mozambican army for not holding territory, and the Machel regime for not providing adequate supplies and effectively supporting the military operations.

The Zimbabwean army, equipped in part with Soviet weapons and supplies, reportedly has lost half its helicopters, more than 1,000 men and large quantities of supplies in the Mozambique fighting. Critics inside Zimbabwe are calling the adventure "Zimbabwe's Vietnam."

### The Nkomati Accord

While the Mozambicans of RENAMO engage in major fighting against foreign troops, the U.S. continues to support Samora Machel and his Marxist-Leninist regime. The U.S. embassy in Maputo claims that Machel is increasing support to the private sector, abolishing bureaucratic obstacles, denationalizing industry, discouraging large scale government projects, and encouraging Western investment. The embassy is trying to encourage these economic reforms, which it complains are being hindered by "the insurgency."

The U.S. decision to support an oppressive Marxist-Leninist dictatorship against a popular anti-communist rebellion is based partly on the hope of moderating the regime over time and gradually converting it from socialism to some form of free enterprise. But U.S. policy toward Mozambique also has been governed by policy toward South Africa. The keystone of this approach is the Nkomati Agreement, signed on March 16, 1984 by Prime Minister P.W. Botha of South Africa and Samora Machel of Mozambique.

Under this non-aggression agreement, Machel promised not to permit the terrorists of the African National Congress to operate against South Africa from Mozambican territory, while Botha agreed to neither support RENAMO nor permit it to have bases in South Africa. The U.S. has considered the Nkomati accord helpful to the administration's policy of constructive engagement toward South Africa. But in this case, U.S. and South African interests diverge rather than converge. An agreement helpful to South Africa that also helps a Marxist-Leninist regime survive in Africa is not in the global strategic interest of the U.S., nor is it compatible with the Reagan Doctrine concept of self-determination and freedom from totalitarian rule.

### A Failed Policy

In the two years since the Nkomati agreement was signed, RENAMO has become stronger, not weaker. As a result, the United States finds itself with a policy that seems calculated to undermine the efforts of an anti-communist, popularly supported resistance struggling to rid itself of a repressive Marxist-Leninist dictatorship.

U.S. Ambassador to Mozambique Peter De Vos, a Princeton-educated foreign service officer (FSO) who has been described as an apologist for the Machel regime, is due for reassignment this year. His planned replacement is Melissa Wells, a retired career FSO, who during the Carter administration was an alternate U.S. representative to the United Nations under Ambassador Andrew Young. De Vos and officials of the Bureau of African Affairs at the State Department seem convinced that Marxism in Africa is different than elsewhere and that with time and patience African Marxists, including Samora Machel, can be weaned away from socialism and toward some new African economic system that will tolerate private enterprise and economic ties to the West.

The Marxist regime in Mozambique fosters that belief. In

(continued on page 6)

May, Abdul Magid Osman, the Mozambique Minister of Mineral Resources, visited Washington and called at State, AID and The Heritage Foundation. At Heritage, he was told frankly that FRELIMO must moderate its rule and get rid of its Soviet-bloc advisers. On his return to Mozambique, Osman was named Minister of Finance, and the Machel regime ordered the transfer of twenty companies to the private sector and announced the breakup of one of the largest collective farms. These are steps in the right direction, but they must be followed by the departure of the Soviet and Cuban advisers, and a genuine move toward political pluralism.

The prospects are not good. Thus far, it has been impossible to convert any regime that is propped up by Soviet, Cuban or other Soviet-bloc troops or advisers away from the methods of Leninism, by which it retains power. Some deviation from the economic principles of Marxism may be possible, but never from the political control methods of Leninism.

Machel retains power through a one-party, totalitarian political system. He has flatly rejected free elections or any discussion of a political compromise with RENAMO. FRELIMO foreign minister Joaquim Chissano has said it clearly: The only possible dialogue with RENAMO is "through the barrel of a gun."

#### The Provisional Government

RENAMO is establishing a provisional government in the large area of Mozambique in which the resistance movement operates freely. Run by a National Council headed by President Dhlakama, the provisional government considers victory in the military struggle a foregone conclusion and is now planning reconstruction and the restoration of basic freedoms.

Dhlakama repeatedly has stated his willingness to negotiate with FRELIMO, with the following three conditions that Machel has categorically rejected:

1. FRELIMO must recognize RENAMO as a legitimate political force (Machel calls the guerrillas bandits).

2. Machel must agree to hold free elections.
3. All foreign troops must be withdrawn.

Dhlakama has promised to hold free elections to establish a national assembly, and to have the assembly write a democratic constitution. Revolutionaries do not always keep such promises, but one thing is certain: Soviet-bloc troops and advisers will no longer be welcome in Mozambique. Also, it is reasonable to assume that a government led by a Christian president who promises religious, economic and political freedom would be considerably better than an oppressive totalitarian regime supported by Moscow and Havana.

#### Conclusion

Of all the insurgencies against pro-Soviet regimes anywhere in the world, RENAMO's is closest to victory. It would be a logical next step for the administration, in making the Reagan Doctrine a reality, to change its policy toward Mozambique and bring it in line with U.S. policy toward other Marxist-Leninist governments that are being challenged by their own people. The administration should:

- Downgrade relations with the Marxist-Leninist regime of Samora Machel by withdrawing Ambassador De Vos without a replacement.
- Stop all U.S. aid to the Machel government and end Mozambique's most favored nation trading status. A bill proposed by Senator Paul Trible (R-Va) would do so.
- Provide moral support and humanitarian assistance (medicine, shoes and clothing) to the anti-communist forces of RENAMO. A bill proposed by Senator Malcolm Wallop (R-Wyo) and Rep. Dan Burton (R-Ind) would provide an initial \$5 million in aid to RENAMO.

The United States has a rare opportunity to strike a blow against the Brezhnev doctrine (once a communist state, always a communist state) by helping the Mozambican patriots replace their Marxist-Leninist rulers with a non-communist alternative. This opportunity should be seized without delay.

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