

Mozambique

# The MNR: Opponents or Bandits?

Documents captured at the MNR's base in Gorongosa last year have provided some startling insights into the clandestine relationship between the armed movement and South African military intelligence. This *Africa Report* exclusive examines the background and objectives of the newest form of external aggression in southern Africa.

BY MOTA LOPES

Last August in Lisbon, a Portuguese spokesman for the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR), which claims to be fighting to overthrow the government of President Samora Machel, declared that by December his group would gain control of Maputo, the country's capital. "That's where we're going to celebrate Christmas," he said.

Normally such a peremptory statement might have caused a great commotion. Instead, it prompted a feeling of déjà-vu, for every year, from 1982 through 1985, the same words are used to make the same promise to whoever wants to listen. Nearly every year, the international mass media hasn't hesitated to carry the news. Nevertheless, many Christmases have come and gone without any substantial change in the situation.

A war with extremely serious implications continues to be waged in Mozambique. Principally confined to the rural areas, the war has had a disastrous effect on the country's economic output, wreaking destruction on its main transportation routes both within the

*Mota Lopes, a Mozambican journalist, is a researcher and deputy director of the African Studies Center at Eduardo Mondlane University in Maputo.*

country and to its neighbors. Along with the droughts and massive floods which have hit large parts of the country over the past years, the war is the main cause of the extreme poverty and famine which has afflicted thousands of Mozambicans.

The presence of armed aggressors in the country can be traced back to 1976. Until the end of 1979, their activities paralleled direct armed aggressions by the military forces of the rebel colony of Southern Rhodesia and later by South Africa. From 1981, the conflict spread to almost all of the country's provinces, and in early 1984, the MNR reached Maputo province in the south.

As a result, the already frail and highly dependent economy which was inherited from centuries of Portuguese colonialism came close to total collapse. During 1982 and 1983—the peak years of its activities—the MNR caused damages officially estimated at \$3.8 billion. If the extensive indirect losses are added, this figure climbs to nearly \$4.5 billion, equalling the estimated amount of Mozambique's debt to Western countries. This calculation includes the systematic destruction of the agricultural, industrial, and transportation infrastructure, but omits the heavy social costs stemming from disrupted educational,

health, and welfare projects. The statistics of destruction—over 1,000 schools and health centers, 140 villages, and 900 stores, most of which were privately owned, either burned down or brought to ruin by the armed groups during that period—can only faintly express those social consequences and their future impact.

The war in Mozambique has also caused the death of thousands of children, women, and elderly people in the rural areas—through acts of intimidation which include destruction and plundering of a particularly brutal and terrifying nature. According to several impartial observers, massacres, abductions, rape, and brutal and arbitrary murders of Mozambicans and foreigners alike have become the painful routine. Although Portuguese colonialism came to an end in June 1975 after a long liberation struggle led by Frelimo, Mozambicans have been unable to celebrate their 10 years of independence in peace.

In its assessment of the conflict which continues within its borders despite the non-aggression pact signed with South Africa in March 1984, the Mozambican government perceives the MNR as a terrorist organization which takes orders from the South African Defense Force (SADF), whose well-known goal

is to destabilize southern Africa, especially Zimbabwe and Mozambique. Though for many years it denied any involvement, the Pretoria government has recently publicly admitted its direct involvement in the expansion, training, and financing of the MNR.

This essay about the modus operandi, sources of support, and history of the MNR summarizes some of the preliminary conclusions of a longer study on the war in Mozambique and its effects. There is evidence to support the view that throughout its 12-year history, the MNR has never been a true movement of political opposition to the Mozambican government. Contrary to what is often said, the situation in Mozambique is far from a civil war in which legitimate national forces are fighting to topple a regime altogether or to gain a share of power for some oppressed social strata that is not represented in the government.

Above all, the MNR's operations in Mozambique represent a new type of foreign aggression in Africa. The instrument is a military unit created in Southern Rhodesia in 1972 to carry out acts of counter-insurgency and the gathering of strategic and operational information in other countries. Following Zimbabwe's independence in 1980, the unit was transferred to South Africa. There, South African military and intelligence services have transformed it into a powerful war machine whose present objectives are all too clear—to defend and maintain apartheid and South Africa's political and economic dominance in the region.

Mozambican government spokesmen have stated recently that the current military situation in the country can be characterized as an attempt by the army to consolidate and continue the important operations conducted during the second half of last year. At that time, with the support of the Zimbabwean army, the government launched a major offensive on the country's central region. Conducted simultaneously with other operations in the south and north, the aim of the offensive was to occupy and destroy the MNR's complex system of operational camps and bases in the Gorongosa region. Here, the presence of both forest and savannah as well as abundant sources of water and high

mountains offered excellent conditions for guerrilla tactics. It is also in this region that the MNR's headquarters were located; from the so-called *Casa Branca* (White House), its military chiefs coordinated and launched operations against seven of Mozambique's 10 provinces.

The government's occupation of the area was an important tactical success as it secured and reactivated the international roads and the pipeline between the city of Beira and Zimbabwe. Also, and perhaps as important, the Mozambican army was able to gather large quantities of MNR documents and reports which the rebels had left behind in the *Casa Branca* in their hasty flight.

Part of these documents, known as the Gorongosa Documents, have already been made public and provide proof of the permanent contacts between the MNR's central base in the region and the military intelligence headquarters in Pretoria, as well as the frequent visits to the region by high officials and advisers of the South African government. The captured documents also show how Pretoria continued to direct and supply the armed groups while it was engaged in the peace negotiations before the signing of the Nkomati Accord and how it designed alternative strategies for pursuit of the war after the accord was reached.

In August and September of last year, the Mozambican army also staged an offensive in the southern part of the country, occupying Malungane, the rebels' main base in the region, 50 kilometers from Maputo. Though the MNR's main strongholds in the south were destroyed in the operation, sporadic attacks against civilians as well as against agricultural, industrial, and commercial centers, and transport continue to occur. These missions are made possible by South Africa's direct supply of the MNR and by the existence of sanctuaries across the border. In some areas of the northern provinces of Zambia and Tete and along the Malawi border, there is a similar situation. Many believe that here the MNR's supply lines come from Malawi, where they are also believed to find protection.

Although the effects of the war are still felt, the overall picture at the beginning of this year points to a recovery by the Mozambican army. As a result of

the "mopping up" of more and more regions, new programs to improve living conditions and provide assistance to the most affected areas are being conducted. Yet the prevailing view among government officials is that the victory over "banditry" is still far from complete and will demand renewed and even more intensive neutralizing operations.

The relief programs launched to assist the populations most affected by the conflict—especially the 70,000 people who live in the Gorongosa region—have brought to light valuable information about how the MNR relates to the population. The MNR's spokesmen never tire of boasting about the positive reception the guerrilla movement receives throughout the country. They often point to the rebel government network they have established in the past years in the so-called liberated zones, especially Gorongosa, and their words echo those of modern guerrilla movements. Yet if the population of Gorongosa is to be believed, words are the only similarity between the MNR and a genuine guerrilla operation.

It is clear that the armed groups have never been able to fulfill the basic requirements for a sound relationship between the guerrilla and its social support structure—an effective link with the people, the predominance of political factors over purely military aspects, and formation of provisional administrative structures and alternatives to the established power. To the contrary, apart from destruction, MNR contacts with the population are characterized by authoritarianism and repression. Instead of providing a political platform and some form of social organization, the power of their weapons speaks the loudest, perhaps explaining the disoriented flight of the people whenever the MNR is said to be approaching.

This has two consequences. First, the MNR must use brutality, kidnappings, armed coercion, and blackmailing as its recruitment methods. Secondly, villages that are situated within their zones of operation and influence are surrounded by their camps and heavily armed check points. These networks of control aim at concentrating the people in small areas; circulation within them is restricted and access is permitted only to food production centers. Usually, the

MNR's operational centers are located within these restricted areas; their lines of huts are surrounded by people often living under open sky or in tents. The armed groups' leaders rely on the people living around their bases as sources of food and water for their troops and women. Also, the people living near their bases act as a shield against surprise attacks and bombings by government forces.

Daily life in these areas revolves around satisfying two criteria—security and food. Here no form of administration or organization exists that could be the seed of a rebel government. Authoritarianism, repression, and militarism are its key features. Frequent punishment, mutilations, and arbitrary executions are the means used to avoid any rebellion or opposition to the burdensome daily obligations imposed by the armed groups' commanders.

Obliged to provide a large part of their food production to the MNR, the villagers suffer from inadequate nutrition, which primarily affects the elderly, women, and children. However, this problem would be much more serious if the peasants did not hide part of the food they produce. After the government operations in August, many of the families in the Gorongosa region showed government soldiers and officials stationed there how they concealed food. Under such conditions, the mortality rate from malnutrition, sickness, and war casualties rises rapidly.

In their contacts with the population, the leaders of the armed groups frequently argue the importance of regional and ethnic factors to the detriment of the concept of nationhood, providing public and formal recognition of the traditional local chiefs and their families as partners in the exercise of power.

Nevertheless, given their daily acts of repression and their exercise of strict military control, this recognition often transforms itself into serious contradictions over the exercise of power between the bearers of arms—the MNR—and the traditional chiefs, invariably resulting in the summary execution of one of the armed leaders. André Matade Machangaíssa, the first leader of the MNR, was killed in 1979 when a group of traditional chiefs in the



Mozambique Information Agency

Peasant woman from Manica province whose ear was cut off by MNR forces: "MNR contacts with the population are characterized by authoritarianism and repression"

southern region of Gorongosa, feeling deceived and offended by the methods of force used against the population by Machangaíssa and his men, revealed his whereabouts to the Mozambican armed forces.

The execution of terrorist acts is another one of the principal characteristics of the MNR's mode of operations. According to various observers, the use of terrorism as a means of assuming power constitutes an integral part of the exclusively military training of the armed groups provided at bases in South Africa and the interior of the country. Acts of terrorism are undertaken for their publicity value and to guarantee the docility of the population.

However, these terrorist acts also derive from the apolitical nature of the group—the absence of cadres and an ideology or program minimally relevant

to the needs of Mozambique—and constitute an instrument of military aggression serving interests and objectives antithetical to the national interest. Since at least 1981, some of the MNR's leadership abroad became aware of this reality, announcing the need for the politicization of the MNR.

Efforts to this end, which were referred to publicly in an interview in a weekly Portuguese newspaper in 1981 with the MNR's then-secretary-general, Orlando Cristina, and on the program, *Voz da Africa Livre*, in August 1983, produced no results. The politicization efforts undertaken in 1983 resulted in serious internal contradictions and in a power struggle which ended with the assassination of Cristina in Pretoria and in the summary execution or expulsion of his supporters. Evo Fernandes, of Portuguese nationality,



Mozambique Information Agency

President Samora Machel inspecting captured weaponry at Gorongosa

became the MNR's new secretary-general.

Thus, the philosophy of the group is based on the systematic negation of Mozambican politics and of all the accomplishments and projects of its government. Its anti-Marxist line, which aims to attract sympathy and support from the West, reflects a glaring absence of serious analysis of the national reality and the problems which affect Mozambique today. At times, full of contradictions and of positive references to the system of colonial exploitation, the MNR's philosophy provides no alternatives or effective solutions for the country's current problems. It is not coincidental or for lack of effort in this sense that the group has never succeeded in attracting to its ranks intellectuals or other segments of the Mozambican population who emigrated or exchanged their difficult situation in the country for a better life abroad. The history and conditions which spawned the MNR's creation afford an understanding of the reasons for this situation.

In effect, the group—which after Mozambique's independence was first known as the Resistance, then as the Movement of National Resistance, and

finally as the Mozambique National Resistance or Renamo—was initially created by the Central Intelligence Office (CIO) of Southern Rhodesia in 1968. The CIO's model derived from the counter-insurgency methods applied by the British in defense of its empire in Malaysia, Aden, Cyprus, and Kenya. Secondly, PIDE's (the Portuguese secret police) formation of the *Flechas* during the colonial war in Angola, and later in Mozambique, also served as a model.

Kenneth Flower, director of the Rhodesian security forces at that time, recently revealed this for the first time during a long interview. He affirmed, "I had made frequent visits to Angola during this period and knew that the Portuguese had created a movement via PIDE called *Flechas*. It was a sort of pseudo-guerrilla group whose principal objective was to obtain intelligence. I thought that it was the type of thing we could promote in Tete. And I managed to obtain agreement at least in the beginning that we could start to operate on a small scale in the Tete district in 1968."

For the Rhodesians, it meant creating an instrument which, composed of Mo-

zambicans, would be the eyes and ears of the CIO in Mozambique at a time when Zimbabwean liberation forces, benefitting from the advance of Frelimo guerrillas from the south and their activities along the Tete and Manica border, had become a growing threat to the rebel Rhodesian regime in a region previously considered secure. It would also allow for the defense of Southern Rhodesia beyond its borders and would permit the Rhodesians to overcome their lack of trust in the information that was transmitted to them by the Portuguese. Given the difficulties that the CIO would encounter in the formation of these groups, they only started operating in 1972. Composed of deserters and Frelimo prisoners captured by PIDE, they were trained by an official of PIDE who was transferred from Angola for this purpose.

In the period following the April 25, 1974 coup d'état in Portugal and the coming to power of Frelimo in Mozambique, hundreds of Portuguese and Mozambicans who during the colonial war were part of the repressive forces flocked to Southern Rhodesia. Contrary to what is generally believed, they did not belong to the CIO groups, for the CIO distrusted the soldiers who had lost the war and wanted to maintain the operational secrecy of their pseudo-guerrillas. In the meantime, in 1976, a group of PIDE agents, the majority ex-*Flechas* who fled across border with their white officers, were integrated.

The new Mozambican government's condemnation of the rebel colony of Southern Rhodesia, its closure of their common border, and its application of sanctions as decreed by the United Nations were the main reasons behind the expansion of the initial group of pseudo-guerrillas. This group needed a larger base closer to the border with Mozambique and named Machangaíssa, an ex-Frelimo fighter, as their first leader. He had escaped from a Mozambican prison where he was serving a sentence for petty crime. Also at this time, the CIO named the group "the Resistance." Kenneth Flower affirms: "We had to give them a name, and therefore we came to call them the Resistance, later the National Resistance Movement."

The intensification of Rhodesian military aggressions against Mozambique

led the rebel colony to view the Resistance as a potential instrument of sabotage and intimidation to be used against the Mozambican government in the interior of the country. However, the CIO categorically opposed this. Said Flower: "This was not the purpose. In other words, the group would lose its original mission as strictly an instrument of intelligence gathering and we did not want that." In order to overcome this divergence, new groups of Mozambicans were created and trained within the Rhodesian special forces which although independent from the CIO, were also designated as the Resistance. On the outskirts of Salisbury, the propagandist radio station known as the Voice of Free Africa was created.

Operationally, these groups, as well as the pseudo-guerrillas of the CIO, were used in the two main provinces of the center of the country, Manica and Sofala, as well as in Tete and Gaza. The use of Gorongosa as a broadcast station and base dates back to this period. The brutality of their methods—the indiscriminate assassinations, sabotage,

massacres of entire villages, and plundering and destruction—led to their being known as "hyenas" or armed bandits—titles which remain until today.


In March and April of 1980, with the imminent independence of the Republic of Zimbabwe, both the groups who worked for the CIO and those who were used by the special forces were transferred to South Africa, accompanied by several of their Rhodesian and Portuguese officials. Rejected by the civil security forces of South Africa, they were received by the military and immediately taken to a base in northern Transvaal. Although their exact numbers are not known, diverse estimates put their total at between 2,000 and 4,000 men. Approximately 1,000 men divided into various groups remained in the interior of Mozambique. The first effective gesture of support from the South Africans was the supply of arms, ammunition, and combat rations to these groups via secret night airlifts beginning the week after Zimbabwe attained independence.

In South Africa, the MNR and its leadership, recruitment, training, sup-

ply of ammunition, integration, and operations began to be coordinated by the Directorate of Special Operations of the Military Intelligence Section (MIS) of the South African armed forces, representing a total redefinition not only of its objectives, but also in part of its characteristics. Three fundamental aspects define this change.

In the first place, the group came to be considered as the principal instrument for the destruction of the Mozambican government and the seizure of power. The then-prevalent view among Pretoria's strategists was that the Mozambican government, seriously debilitated by Rhodesian aggressions, would be unable to endure organized armed destabilization for more than two or three years. Therefore, this would be the ideal period in which to demonstrate the efficiency and efficacy of South Africa's new and more aggressive regional policy in the defense of apartheid. At the same time, in April 1980, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference was founded, uniting all independent countries of the region that

## OVER 100,000 READERS EVERY WEEK...



...rely on **WEST AFRICA** magazine to bring them the news and information that matters – quickly and accurately.

Since 3 February 1917 **WEST AFRICA** has been the leading authority on West African affairs.

**WEST AFRICA** reports on events and supplies weekly valuable background information in all 25 West African nations. Coverage includes:

- ★ West African current affairs
- ★ political and economic commentaries
- ★ news and views on markets and investment opportunities
- ★ industrial and commercial information
- ★ art and culture

### ADVERTISERS

who would like details of Rates and Special Features, plus an Information leaflet and specimen copy, should contact

**STRUBE COUGHLIN ASSOCIATES,**

112 Laurel Avenue, Larchmont, New York 10538.  
Telephone (914) 834 0228. Telex 66340.

## Subscribe TODAY to **WEST AFRICA**

Complete the Coupon on the next page to receive a **FREE** copy or to take out a Subscription.

consider Pretoria as a threat. In the U.S., a new administration which by all indications would be more friendly than its predecessor toward South African designs was to take power within a few months. Thus, the timing was considered opportune.

Secondly, according to the military intelligence section of the South African armed forces, the number of MNR contingents needed to be multiplied several times to allow them to operate in all of Mozambique's provinces. Thousands of Mozambican workers in South Africa and those in hiding there were easily blackmailed in a vast recruitment initiative. Later on, armed coercion was used when necessary in order to spread this recruitment effort throughout Mozambique's interior. The new contingents then began to train in special bases in South Africa—particularly in Phalaborwa. Up until 1984, approximately 2,000 men per year were enlisted in South Africa. In addition, from 1981 on,

elements inside Mozambique were also trained by South African officers who went to Mozambique for that purpose.


Thirdly, South African military intelligence attempted to establish the MNR—primarily in Mozambique, but also in Western Europe and the United States—as a legitimate movement of anti-Marxist opposition to the Mozambique government. To this end, a political section was created composed of Portuguese ex-residents of Mozambique living either in Pretoria or in Lisbon. This political section supplied the propaganda, reinitiating the broadcasts of the Voice of Free Africa, and from 1983 on, provided the new name of the Mozambique National Resistance or Renamo.

Simultaneously, what later came to be known as the Portuguese component of the MNR was revived. It consisted of former colonialists with economic or political interests in Mozambique—businessmen and Portuguese capitalists still

living out the neo-colonialist dreams which had been destroyed by the coup in Portugal. Political forces in Portugal looking to recuperate their lost positions were led to believe that a recolonization of the country would be made possible through the MNR. A vast and complex system of political and financial assistance involving diverse transportation and import-export companies was expressly created for this purpose, launched with South African and other financing.

In 1981, the armed groups reinitiated their action in Mozambique, following direct interventions by the South African armed forces in the beginning of the year in Manica against the roads and railway installations to Zimbabwe, and in Tete, against the energy lines of Cahora Bassa. These were the first attacks in a long series which from the middle of the year and after a brief phase of economic recuperation found the country once again in a large-scale military aggres-

## The ONLY magazine that gives you first-hand news and analysis of West African affairs EVERY WEEK



### SUBSCRIPTION RATES

		£35 00 £17 50	
		AIRMAIL *	AIRSPEEDED *
UNITED KINGDOM & IRISH REPUBLIC	52 weeks		
	26 weeks		
EUROPE	52 weeks	£45 00	£40 00
	26 weeks	£22 50	£20 00
NORTH AFRICA & MIDDLE EAST	52 weeks	£50 00	£45 00
	26 weeks	£25 00	£22 50
AFRICA other than above	52 weeks	£55 00	£50 00
	26 weeks	£27 50	£25 00
U.S.A., CANADA, S.AMERICA & THE CARIBBEAN	52 weeks	US\$95 00	US\$75 00
	26 weeks	US\$50 00	US\$40 00
AUSTRALASIA, FAR EAST & OTHERS	52 weeks	£60 00	£55 00
	26 weeks	£30 00	£27 50

\* AIR MAIL direct posting from London to subscriber's address.

\* AIR SPEEDED by air to country of subscriber and thence by internal mail.

Complete this coupon and mail it to: **West Africa, Graybourne House, 52-54 Gray's Inn Road, London WC1X 8LT**  
Tel: 01-831 7654 Telex: 892420

- Send me a FREE COPY of West Africa.  
 I enclose US\$ ..... cheque/International Money Postal Order\* for 6 months/12 months\* subscription.  
 Air speeded\*     Air mail\*    \* Please check or delete

Name .....

Occupation .....

Address .....

City ..... Code .....

Country .....

Signature ..... Date .....

sion, causing a new decline in its economic conditions and capacity for production.

It was also at the end of 1981 that Gorongosa became the MNR's main base. In addition to their operations in the provinces of Manica, Sofala, and Tete, it was from Gorongosa that they advanced to the provinces of Niassa and Zambezia in the north and toward Gaza and Inhambane in the south. When operationally necessary, the special forces of the SADF intervened directly in the territory in order to permit this advance, while the land and air infiltration and resupply routes were augmented by the use of the sea and the Mozambican coast via ships and submarines. Documents collected in Gorongosa in September 1985 confirm these facts.

In this new offensive, the main targets of attack—the civilian population, infrastructure, routes of commerce and production—explain the objectives that they set out to achieve—the paralysis of the economy and the fall of the Mozambican government. The infrastructure and the communications system in the country are crucial to the economies of the neighboring countries, especially Zimbabwe, and for the development of SADCC.

The response of the Mozambican armed forces against this generalized aggression began to make itself felt in the middle of 1983. In August the year before, an important meeting of Frelimo's central committee concluded that it was necessary to intensify the struggle against the MNR in all of the affected provinces. In order to do so, the distribution of arms to the people in the rural areas and in the cities would be necessary. Simultaneously, the central committee placed the economy on war-time footing and intensified its diplomatic efforts on an international scale in denouncing South Africa's role in the destabilization of the region.

These measures were immediately applied and in the process of destroying the MNR's offensive apparatus, the Mozambican armed forces were able to count on an unexpected ally—the drought and floods which affected regions of Mozambique where the armed groups were stationed. According to Mozambican sources, by December 1983, the MNR's offensive had been

broken and ceased to constitute a danger to the government and the state. Pretoria's predictions of a rapid seizure of power in Maputo and of the Mozambican government's vulnerability proved to be wrong.

The about-face in the security situation in Mozambique was reflected in its conversations with South Africa leading up to the signing of the Nkomati Accord. By December, South Africa had changed its firm opposition to Mozambique's conditions and demands. The victorious manner in which Mozambique viewed the accord—which surprised many people—is directly related to this; hence, Nkomati was considered a success both in the diplomatic and military arenas.

However, neither the military operations nor South Africa's acceptance of Mozambique's conditions, which ended in the signing of the Nkomati Accord in March 1984, put an end to the MNR's activities in the country. In January last year, they initiated attacks in the province of Maputo for the first time, following what Mozambican sources described as a massive infiltration of men and arms in the region. As of last May, new infiltrations by land, sea, and air, aimed at the urban center, provoked a renewed aggravation of the war. An attempt at infiltration with the support of a large group of mercenaries was blocked in the north.

Mozambican analysts concluded at that time that a new phase of aggression had begun, with the armed groups continuing to be supplied by sectors of the South African military apparatus—particularly their intelligence services. The documents recovered at Gorongosa confirm this analysis. Citing excerpts of some of these documents at a press conference, Minister of Security Sergio Vieira affirmed: "This phase shows how the South African military prepared for the transition of the bandits from an organic extension of the SADF to a force ostensibly independent of South Africa. And it showed how they organized the transition from direct and open support to a more clandestine means of support."

The documents, which consist fundamentally of three diaries written over a period of three years by one of the secretaries of the MNR leadership, showed

that in the phase immediately preceding the signing of the Nkomati Accord, the South African military had reorganized the armed groups for the period which would follow the signature, rearming and resupplying them for at least another six months. They had additionally infiltrated and trained new contingents in "massive numbers." Finally, they had organized clandestine links between the armed groups and South Africa and through the latter, with other foreign countries. According to the documents, the objective was to force the Mozambican government to share power with the MNR, as distinct from the phase initiated in 1981 which sought to overthrow the government.

The diaries lead one to believe that the new phase coincided with worsening divisions within the Pretoria regime, with high-level military leaders not sparing insults nor accusations of treason against the top politicians who were considered responsible for the signing of the Nkomati Accord and were apparently more inclined to abide by it.

The intensification of reconnaissance operations and the neutralization of the armed groups in the center, south, and north of the country were the main Mozambican response to this new phase, while relations between South Africa and Mozambique declined to their lowest point ever. Due to incapacity or the bad faith of its government, as President Samora Machel asserted, South Africa did not fulfill the Nkomati Accord. Ultimately both the Pretoria government and the military once again began insisting on the necessity of putting an end to what they considered to be a civil war in Mozambique, again emphasizing the necessity of a "political accommodation" between the MNR and Frelimo—in other words, power-sharing.

This is seen by Mozambicans as a flagrant infringement on their independence and sovereignty and therefore it is considered unacceptable. While the army is being reorganized and supplied with the most advanced weaponry possible to prepare for what could be a new escalation of violence, the Mozambican people's unanimity on this issue is indisputable. "We have already spoken with the true leaders of the MNR—the South Africans—at Nkomati," it is said. "There is no one else to talk to." □