
COLIN LEGUM'S

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THE COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARIES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

1. THE CHALLENGE OF THE MOZAMBIQUE NATIONAL RESISTANCE

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Note to Editors

This six-part survey of the Mozambique resistance movement and of its international connections is written in such a way that each of its separate parts is complete in itself, thus allowing for flexibility in presenting the material at any required length.

In under two years the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR) has spread itself across one-third of the country ruled by President Samora Machel's Frelimo government. It now sits astride all of Mozambique's main road and rail communications, as well as its oil and electric power lines.

Among the MNR's more spectacular successes to date are:

- Closing down the railway line between the capital's port, Maputo and Zimbabwe;
- Harassing trains running down another railway from Zimbabwe to the port of Beira, necessitating the employment of army convoys;
- Closing down for a time the railway from Malawi to the sea 'to teach President Banda a lesson'.

- Cutting off the water supply to the major port of Beira;
- Holding up the flow of oil to Zimbabwe, and forcing its army and the Mozambicans to patrol every ten metres of its 500 miles stretch to prevent further sabotage.

Many of the paved roads in the centre of the country are hazardous to travel along because of landmines and ambushes. The important coastal road from the capital to the port of Beira, through the fruit-rich province of Inhambane, has been closed to all traffic for some time now.

Mozambique's Government is avowedly Marxist, and has a friendship treaty with the USSR; but it also has close ties with many Western countries, including the former colonial power, Portugal.

South Africa's defence leaders have described the border with Mozambique as its 'second front against communism' - while the MRN describes itself as 'the spearhead against communism'.

Its 'first front against communism' is the border of the contested territory of Namibia and Angola - another Marxist regime linked by a special treaty to the USSR and Cuba.

However, the Pretoria regime manages to keep a straight face when it solemnly and repeatedly denies giving military backing to either of the counter-revolutionary forces - the MNR in Mozambique or Jonas Savimbi's UNITA movement in Angola - just as it denies any links with the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA), or the dissident movement in Matabeleland in the south of Zimbabwe.

These South African denials make little sense in the light of easily established facts about the closeness of its links with both the MNR and UNITA.

It would be much more understandable if the Pretoria regime were to admit their connections openly - just as the Israelis do in their dealings with the Falangists in Lebanon. That they don't do so - but still merely hint that, one day, they might be pushed into intervening in hostile neighbouring territories - is because any admission on their part of having any role in destabilizing their neighbours would further complicate their already uneasy relations with the Western powers.

None of the Western governments - and this includes the Reagan Administration - favours South Africa's clandestine support for rebel movements in the Republic's neighbouring countries because they fear that this would contribute only to increasing violent disorder and instability in the region, and provide further opportunities for the Soviet bloc and Cuba to become more militarily involved in the area.

However, since the major Western intelligence services all closely monitor military and political developments in the area, South African denials don't cut much ice. On several recent occasions the Americans, in particular, have leaned on Pretoria to try and dissuade them from applying pressures on their neighbours.

Apart from its general concern about what it sees as 'the spread of communism' in the African sub-continent, the Pretoria regime has particular reasons for the support it gives to rebel movements in neighbouring countries.

In Mozambique, its aim is not to bring down President Samora Machel's regime but, primarily, to pressurize it into limiting its support for the armed struggle by the African National Congress (ANC), which enjoys facilities in that country. Mozambique also serves as a useful area through which pressures can be applied on Prime Minister Mugabe's government since Zimbabwe's main lifeline to the sea runs through Mozambique.

In Angola, its aim is to buttress Savimbi's UNITA as an ally in the fight against the guerilla forces of SWAPO, which is the major threat to South Africa's position in Namibia.

In Lesotho, support for Ntsu Mokhehle's Liberation Army (LLA) is a means of applying pressures on Prime Minister Jonathan Leabua's government to stop it from developing effective ties with the Soviet bloc and to discourage it from allowing Lesotho to be used as a base of operations for ANC guerillas.

In Zimbabwe, its policies are, as yet, less clearcut. But there, too, Pretoria is determined to prevent, at all costs, armed incursions across its borders.

Essentially, therefore, the South African concern is with the external security threat which it sees building up all around its borders. At a time of perilous difficulty when Prime Minister Botha is strenuously engaged in trying to achieve reforms which he believes will halt the growing political violence and insecurity inside his Republic, he is more determined than ever to take any military or other action that he thinks essential to ensure the success of his proposed reforms. He is the Ariel Sharon of Southern Africa.

2. THE MNR THREAT TO MOZAMBIQUE

In Maputo, the capital of Mozambique, I found no attempt to disguise the threat posed by the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR). Indeed, it would be difficult to deny its seriousness in the light of all the visible evidence of the expanding activities of the rebels., who are now reckoned to have 5000-6000 armed men inside the country.

The MNR has, so far, succeeded in establishing a network of several hundred camps across the country - from the western borders of Zimbabwe and Malawi, the southern borders of South Africa and Swaziland, right across ^{one} third of the country to Nampula, just south of the Makonde territory which abuts on Tanzania. But ^{it} has nowhere succeeded in establishing 'liberated areas' as Frelimo did in its successful struggle against Portuguese colonialism.

Thus, the real nature of the MNR threat is not the likelihood of its overthrowing the Frelimo government, but its capability of disrupting the country's vital communications, and of promoting a widespread sense of insecurity. This is particularly worrying to the authorities at a time of serious economic hardship, worsened by a severe drought in much of the country.

Moreover, the success of the MNR in establishing a 'no-go' area in the dissident Inhambane province is unquestionably a serious blow to Frelimo's authority.

What has brought about this remarkable change in the fortunes of the Frelimo regime since its triumphant victory over the Portuguese just eight years ago?

President Machel singles out two main factors in his speeches: the efforts of South Africa in seeking ^{to} destabilise Mozambique, and the failures and mistakes of his own ruling party, Frelimo, especially in the rural areas.

If it were not for rural discontent with local Frelimo leaders and policies, the MNR would not have found a welcome among a sufficient number of dissidents to enable its cadres to survive hundreds of miles from their original base in the Sitatonga Mountains on the Zimbabwe border.

Writing in AIM, the official Mozambique news agency, Paul Fauvel and Alves Gomes give a forthright answer to the question: Does the MNR enjoy local support?

'The answer must be a qualified yes. Those who lost their old privileges when Frelimo came to power were quite prepared to throw in their lot with the MNR. Apart from the feiticeros (those who served the colonial authorities) including regulos (tribal chiefs), there are those who failed to succeed in the Frelimo elections for the People's Assemblies, etc.; and those who failed to get Frelimo party membership after liberation, especially in Ihambane province.'

There are also those who fell out with Frelimo's leaders after independence, especially in the army - some for ideological and others reasons/because of abuse of power. It is this group that has, in the main, provided the militant leadership of the MNR; while the dissident middle-class and intellectual elements (black Mozambicans and Portuguese settlers) have supplied the personnel for the MNR's extensive propaganda machine.

President Machel himself has laid particular blame on the arrogance, insensitivity, corruption and inefficiency of prominent party leaders in the provinces, whom he has publicly disciplined.

The challenge offered by the MNR has had, at least, one beneficial result: it has led to a serious re-evaluation by Frelimo's leadership of its policies, the party organisation ^{the serious} and/weaknesses shown up in its army's failure to put down the insurrection.

Complaints by peasants of the behaviour of some leading party cadres - arrogance, corruption, indolence and abuse of power - are being seriously addressed, and there has already been a shake-up of the party's rural leadership.

Winning back the confidence of the peasants - the backbone of Frelimo's successful liberation struggle - is therefore a top priority.

There is also the problem of training the national army ^{operations.} in counter-insurgency/ After independence, Frelimo's own insurgency forces were either disbanded or integrated into a more disciplined, modern army, trained to use tanks, heavy artillery, sophisticated missiles and to fly modern warplanes. The task of training such an army was initially entrusted to the Soviet Union, which has a large team of military instructors at the main training camp at Nampula.

While these modern weapons and conventional battle tactics might be useful if it were ever to come to confronting a direct attack by the South African army, they are of little use in fighting a bush war against guerillas. As an interim measure, the peasant militias are being re-established and old Frelimo fighters are being recalled for service.

But Frelimo needs to relearn the lessons it taught the Portuguese when its ^{own} forces were fighting a bush warfare. - the ^{should} first of which, of course, is that the peasants/see the army and the authorities as their friends and protectors.

Guerilla tactics are not exactly the strongest point in Russian military expertise - as^{has} been shown by the difficulties they are experiencing in Afghanistan, and the repeated failures of the Warsaw generals advising the Ethiopians in their struggle against the guerillas of the Eritrean liberation movement.

The Frelimo government has recently begun to develop military ties with nations other than those of the Soviet bloc. It has entered into a military training agreement with its former colonial ruler, the Portuguese, and is currently seeking additional military assistance from the British. More important, it has enlisted the help of the North Koreans.

Meanwhile, military assistance is coming from its neighbours, Zimbabwe has taken over responsibility for patrolling two-thirds of the 500-miles oil pipeline, and there are unconfirmed reports of the arrival of small military units from Tanzania and Zambia.

Prime Minister Mugabe has launched the idea of creating a joint military force for Southern Africa to which all the governments in the region would be asked to contribute in order to confront what he described as a common struggle against South Africa.

This proposal by the Prime Minister of Zimbabwe, is still in an exploratory stage; but it could lead to the creation of a regional army - strengthened perhaps, by forces from African countries lying outside the region. Instead of Cubans, there might be Russian-trained Ethiopians and Libyans; the Sudanese and Egyptians are usually ready to prove their solidarity with Black Africa; and Nigeria is always looked up to as the country with the largest army in sub-Saharan Africa.

3. THE ORIGINS AND AIMS OF THE MNR: THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES....
AGAINST COMMUNISM.

The Mozambique National Resistance (MNR) claims to be the true heirs of the martyred creator of Frelimo, Eduardo Mondlane, who was killed by a parcel bomb in Tanzania in 1969. Borrowing Frelimo's slogan, A Luta Continua (The Struggle Continues), it identifies the new struggle, as being against communism.

This makes it an ideal ally of South Africa, providing a coincidence of interests between dissident Mozambicans opposed to their own Marxist regime, and a Pretoria regime concerned about the external threat to its security, which they believe is communist (i.e. Soviet) inspired.

The MNR was set up in 1976 by the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization of Ian Smith's regime. Its two purposes were to utilize Portuguese-speaking Mozambicans (Black and White) to gather intelligence about Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA); and to harass the newly-established Frelimo Government of President Samora Machel which was backing Mugabe's guerillas.

Although the initiative for establishing the MNR came from the Rhodesians, the South African military showed a close interest in its activities from the start, as will presently emerge.

A great deal is now known about the beginnings of the MNR from four reliable sources:

1. A book about the controversial Selous Scouts recently published in South Africa by its former commander, Col. ^{Ron} Reid-Daly, who writes with pride about their role in training the MNR.

2. Documents captured by the Mozambique army when they overran an MNR base at Garagua in December 1981.

3. Volunteered information by Major Ken Flower, former chief of Rhodesia's Special Branch.

4. Reports by former members of the CIO who now work for Zimbabwe intelligence.

The MNR first announced itself in June 1976 through Voz da Africa Libre (Voice of Free Africa), which began to broadcast from three stations at Gwelo, Umtali and Fort Victoria.

The broadcasts declared war against Frelimo's 'communism', and praised the Smith regime. One of its themes was: 'Rhodesia stands for tranquillity and respect among all its citizens.'

The first MNR recruits included Portuguese unwilling to stay on in Mozambique after independence, and black Mozambicans, who included former soldiers in the Portuguese colonial army; dissidents from Frelimo; middle-class businessmen; some intellectuals; and regulos (traditional chiefs). Their first commander was Andre Matade Matzangaiza, a former Frelimo fighter and Quartermaster in the new Mozambique army.

According to Ken Flower, Smith's former top security official, the first MNR training group was set up at Bindura in Rhodesia in/ ^{September 1976} Another training camp was established later at Mutare (Umtali), and a headquarters was set up at Gorongosa, near the capital Harare (Salisbury).

At about the same time a more efficient wing of the MNR was created in Malawi by Jorge Jardim, the controversial Portuguese millionaire who acted as Dr. Salazar's personal representative in Mozambique. Jardim had also served as honorary Portuguese consul in Malawi, and had frequent access to President Banda.

Jardim's principal collaborator was Orlando Christina, an officer in the Portuguese intelligence service (PIDE). They had money to pay their recruits more than the going rate in the colonial army, and were able to attract enough men to establish three separate units: the Special Groups (GE's); the Very Special Groups (GME's), who were used for special assignments in Tanzania and Zambia; and the Special Paratroops Groups (GEP's).

The Jardim-Christina force was later moved to Rhodesia to join up with the group established by the CIO, and took over responsibility for running the Voice of ^{Free}Africa radio station. MNR groups began to make some tentative military attacks in late 1976/early 1977 against targets along the border zones of Manica and Tete and, to a lesser extent, Gaza. They attacked villages, abducted peasants and burnt shops. Their activities were primarily disruptive, and they did not seek to engage the Mozambican army. Their main value to the Rhodesian forces lay in their intelligence-gathering and in accompanying the Selous Scouts and others to attack ZANLA camps, acting as guides and interpreters. It was not until early 1981 that the MNR was used as a proper attacking force.

The Selous Scouts helped to establish the first MNR base inside Mozambique high up on the Sibatonga mountains. After coming under heavy attack by the Mozambican army in June 1980, they moved their base 300 km. to the south at Garagua, near the Save river, the border between the Manica and Gaza provinces.

The MNR's first commander-in-chief, Andre Matade Matzangiaza, was a Frelimo veteran who, at independence, was promoted to the rank of Quartermaster in the new Mozambican army. But he was soon charged and convicted of stealing army funds and was sent to a Re-education Centre, from which he managed to escape in 1976. He was a dynamic leader, but a controversial one, and soon came in into bitter conflict with Afonso Dhlakama (Jacom).

Dhlakama, a former officer in the Portuguese army, opted to join the Mozambican army in 1974. But, like his rival Andre, he too was convicted of theft, cashiered from the army and succeeded in escaping to Rhodesia.

It is not known what role, if any, was played by the Rhodesians or South Africans in the power struggle between Andre and Dhlakama which finally erupted into open fighting between their supporters in the Gorongosa region. Andre was killed in October 1979. In a second stage of the power struggle Andre's deputy, Lucas M'lhangu, was shot in a gunbattle at Chisumbanji (in the south of Zimbabwe). Dhlakama became the new undisputed commander-in-chief.

Andre's former supporters fled back into Mozambique and handed themselves over to the army. At the same time, the MNR's Political Commissar, Henrique Siteo, was ousted and fled with the others.

By November 1980, as Dhlakama later admitted, the outlook for the MNR was bleak. But with Mugabe's victory and the defeat of Smith's Rhodesia, a new chapter opened up for the MNR, with the South African army replacing the defeated Rhodesians.

4. THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONNECTION WITH THE MNR

South African military personnel were present at the MNR camp in Gorongosa, Zimbabwe, from 1979, according to reports by former Rhodesian CIO officers. When the MNR established its forward headquarters at Garagua in Mozambique, at least one South African military liaison officer served in the camp. Documents captured when Garagua was overrun in June 1981 refer to him as 'Colonel Charlie'; but, on one occasion, he is identified as Col. van Niekerk.

After Mugabe's election victory, and a few days before Zimbabwe's independence in April 1980, two South African army Dakotas flew the MNR headquarters' staff from their camp at Gorongosa, while the Voice of Free Africa radio equipment and staff were picked up by a South African C-130 transport plane at Mutare. Both these operations were witnessed and reported at the time by the British military team, under Lt. Gen. ^{Sir}John Acland, who were supervising Rhodesia's transition to independence. American military intelligence sources later confirmed that the MNR headquarters was established at Phalaborwa in the Northern Transvaal, near the Mozambique border. It was later moved to a nearby camp at Zoabastad.

The MNR commander, Afonso Dhlakama, has boasted that when he was made a Colonel in 1981, Gen. Magnus Malan, now South Africa Defence Minister, said: 'Your army is part of the South African Defence Force.' Dhlakama's incautious boast to a Portuguese radio interviewer could not have pleased his paymasters.

In early 1981, the MNR's fighters were transported into Mozambique in what Zimbabwe military observers describe as 'an armada' of South African army helicopters, which overflew Zimbabwe airspace. This infringement was officially protested at the time by Mugabe's Government.

The base camp at Garagua, near the Save river - the boundary between the Manica and Gaza provinces - was two kilometers in diameter and had a helicopter strip. By the time it was finally overrun by the Mozambican army in December 1981, the MNR had succeeded in establishing itself in camps over a large part of the country.

Until its fall, the Garagua base was regularly supplied by regular air drops staged by the South African Air Force. Reports that there are up to 20 South African military instructors in the main MNR camp have not been substantiated, other than the definite identification of Col. van Niekerk. No South Africans were found in the Garagua camp when it was captured.

The South African navy is also reported to have dropped off MNR men and supplied through sealandings at camps in the Inhlabane area between Maputo and Beira. This was obviously an easier way of establishing them along the coast than crossing the entire breadth of the country.

Daily contact is maintained between the MNR base camps in Mozambique and their headquarters in South Africa through two mobile radio stations. Messages are uncoded and can be picked up fairly easily by interceptors. Messages are exchanged at almost hourly intervals throughout daylight hours. There were over 370 such messages last December. They contain news of the day's activities and requests for medical and military supplies.

5. REASONS FOR THE SUCCESSES OF THE MOZAMBICAN REBELS

The relative ease with which the MNR had spread across the country during 1981 was, according to one Mozambican official, due to 'our army having gone to sleep' after Zimbabwe's independence. When they woke up to what was happening, they tried to rely on conventional arms and tactics, including the use of tanks. These methods, reflecting the training of the new army by the Russians, were useless against cadres trained to fight as guerillas.

MNR tactics changed flexibly during 1981, reflecting not only the need to apply pressures on Mozambique but, increasingly, on Zimbabwe as well and, for a time, on Malawi. The disruption of the latter's rail and road communications to the sea - which at one point led to a critical shortage of petrol - came at a time when President Banda was engaged in establishing friendlier relations with President Machel's Government to which he had previously been opposed.

The MNR concentrated on three target areas in 1981:

- The railway lines from Maputo and Beira to Zimbabwe.
- The strategic oil pipeline from Beira to Mutare in Zimbabwe.
- The main paved roads in the centre of the country and along the coastal route.

Significantly, the easiest target of all - the Cahora-Bassa power line - has not been touched since November 1980 when some minor damage was done to it. The line supplies South Africa with 7 percent of its electric power. It is believed that the single attack was meant to disguise MNR's connections with South Africa.

The power line is at least as vulnerable as the frequently disrupted oil pipeline to Zimbabwe. It is also notable that there has been no disruption of the railway line which carries South African goods for export through Maputo.

The MNR has run up a creditable tally of successes in the past 18 months - successes which have seriously harmed the economies of Mozambique and Zimbabwe and, to a lesser extent those of Zambia and Malawi. How much of the credit belongs to the MNR and how much to clandestine South African military forces is a moot point; but some of the operations are clearly so sophisticated as to be beyond the capacity of the MNR.

For example, a high degree of expertise in the use of explosives was needed to blow up the strategic bridge across the Pungue river which, for a time, cut off road communications to Beira. A month later, in November 1981, the marker buoys at the entrance of the Beira harbour were destroyed.

This sophisticated sea operation was obviously well beyond the capacities of the MNR. Moreover, it is known that the idea of taking out the buoys was seriously considered by Smith's security forces and was repeatedly advanced by a Rhodesian officer, who later went to South Africa. He argued that destroying the markers would cripple sea traffic into the harbour for a long time. In fact, this proved not to be the case.

The major blow struck at the oil tank installations in Beira in December 1982 - at the precise hour when the South African army was engaged in carrying out its heavy punitive attack against suspected ANC guerillas in Lesotho - has resulted in the conviction of eight Portuguese and one South African, all residents of Beira. What was not cleared up at their trial was who the accused were working for. The saboteurs showed great skill in blowing up 14 tanks, placing their explosives in such a way as not to cause maximum damage by taking out the pumping station as well. On this occasion, too, the Mozambican army guards had 'gone to sleep'.

On the other hand, the MNR has shown itself capable of the easier job of planting land mines to impede and make travel unsafe along main roads; to sabotage the oil pipeline almost at will; to ambush trucks and even trains. But the MNR engages only in hit-and-run attacks and in laying ambushes: typically guerilla tactics.

The MNR has also engaged in kidnapping foreigners as hostages in order to gain international attention and to seek rewards for their release. They captured British headlines by taking as a hostage/^a British ecologist, John Burlison, and demanding as a condition for his release that he should publish a letter sympathetic to the MNR cause in the British press.

They later captured six Bulgarians working on a technical project, and killed two Portuguese technicians.

The MNR make use of all the familiar bush methods in forcing the cooperation of peasants in those areas where they are least welcome. They employ witchcraft and practice considerable brutality, mutilating lips, ears, arms and breasts. Supporters of Frelimo, after having had their lips sliced off, have been sent away with the admonition: 'Now you can go and smile at Samora' (i.e. President Machel). Reports of this kind of brutality are consistent from many of the areas in which the MNR operate.

Apart from press-ganging young peasants into anti-government actions and so making it necessary for them to stay with the rebels, the MNR have also been able to recruit supporters from among people disgruntled with Frelimo's rule and by making an ethnic appeal. Both Afonso Dhlakama and the man he replaced, Andre Matzangiasa, came from the Manica province, where they seem to have had some success in recruiting on an ethnic appeal.

Frelimo leaders frankly acknowledge that MNR - even with South Africa's help - could not have made the progress they have made were it not for the mistakes of the government - especially in the rural areas, and because of the slackness of the army at the beginning of the insurgency.

6. THE LEADERSHIP OF THE MOZAMBICAN REBELS

No dissident movement can become a serious threat to an established government, even if it has powerful foreign backing unless it has an element of popular support. This thesis has been proved over and over again - not least by the attempts to overthrow governments in Latin America and South-East Asia.

While the MNR can count on the support of the Pretoria regime, of important right-wing forces in Portugal and white Rhodesians who supported the Smith regime, it has succeeded in becoming formidable enemy to President Samora Machel's regime only because it enjoys a measure of support inside the country.

It is impossible to know just how extensive that support is, although its failure to establish any 'liberated zones' would point to its having only limited support in any single province, and none at all in two-thirds of the country.

There is no evidence to suggest that any Portuguese are fighting with the MNR in Mozambique; however there are a number of them in its leadership and more engaged in its international relations operations. The known leadership of the MNR is as follows :

Afonso Dhlakama (known as Jacoma). Commander-in-Chief of MNR. Fought in the Portuguese army until the collapse in 1974; made Quarter-master in 1975. Convicted of theft and discharged. Went to Rhodesia, and took over when the first military commander, Andre Matade Matzangaiza, was killed in a power struggle in October 1979.

Orlando Christina Secretary-general. Former officer in Portuguese intelligence (PIDE). Helped establish MNR with the millionaire Portuguese businessman, Jorge Jardim. Moving spirit behind the Voice of Free Africa, and chief propagandist in South Africa and Portugal, where he runs an office.

Samuel Guideon Mahluza. Chief of Department of Politics and Foreign Relations. Former deputy-president of UDENAMO, one of the opposition groups to Frelimo during the liberation struggle.

Adriana Bomba. Head of Information and in charge of Juventude Mocambicana (JUNO), the MNC youth wing. Former Mozambican air force pilot who defected in a Mig 21 to South Africa in 1982. Employed for a time by SA army intelligence and translation work.

Raul Domingos. Chief of Defence and Security. Also Dhlakama's chief secretary, and in charge of finance.

Commandant Antonio Juliane. Chief of Education and Social Affairs.

Commandant Marques. Chief of the Department of Operations.

Commandant Zeco. Chief of the Seguranca sector.

Vincente Zacharias Ululu. Adjutant to the Chief of the Department of Politics, responsible for International Political Affairs.

Armande Khemba dos Santos. Adjutant for External Relations.

B. Bemba. Commissioner for National Politics.

Dr. Eve Fernandes. Coordinator of the Department of Politics and External Relations.

Among Portuguese playing an active role in the work of the MNR are:

Casimir Moteiro, who was tried and sentenced to 18 years in prison in absentia for his part in assassinating Salazar's chief rival, Gen. Delgado, in 1965. He is also suspected of having been involved in the assassination of Eduardo Mondlane, Frelimo's creator. He is believed to be living and working in Johannesburg.

Evo Fernandes. Editor of the MNR publication A Luta Continua (Lisbon)
Former PIDE agent.

Worked for Jorge Jardim; acted as his business manager for Noticias da Beira. Describes himself as European representative of MNR. Lives in Cascais, Portugal.

Joao Maria Tudela and Antonio Pires de Carvalho. Both work for Voice of Free Africa. The latter was involved in the abortive counter-coup in Mozambique in September 1974, when he helped to take over Lourenco Marques' radio station.

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