

Eduardo Mondlane and the Mozambique Struggle

Mr. Eduardo C. Mondlane, President of Frelimo (Frente de Libertação de Mocambique), the Mozambican Liberation Front, was born in 1920 in the Gaza district of southern Mozambique, and attended English-language schools in South Africa. In 1950 he was the first African Mozambican to enter the University of Lisbon. He received his BA from Oberlin College in the United States in 1953 and his MA and PhD in sociology at Northwestern University. In 1957 he joined the Trusteeship Department of the United Nations; from 1961 to 1963 he was a professor at Syracuse University. After the independence of Tanganyika he went to Dar es Salaam to work for Mozambique's liberation.

The following excerpts are from an interview in Dar es Salaam in early August 1965:

an interview by Ronald H. Chilcote

QUESTION: *How did you first become active in the resistance movement against the Portuguese in Mozambique?*

Answer: I was interested in the nationalist struggle against the Portuguese for many, many years back. I could trace it to my own childhood when my mother, who was a traditional woman, insisted that I go to school in order to equip myself to be able to face the Portuguese, because my father had died trying to recover the power of the traditional people in Mozambique. My uncle, a paramount chief in the South, died after serving 25 years in a Portuguese prison because he opposed the Portuguese system. And so she insisted that I go to school. In school I saw in my own personal experience how difficult it was to try to make a go out of a system that discriminated against black people. And my expulsion by the South African Government as a "foreign native" student was another crowning point. When I returned to Mozambique I insisted that my people be free. My going to Portugal and to the United States was, in a way, a means of preparing myself to oppose the Portuguese.

In 1961 I left the United Nations purposely in order to prepare myself to come here, so my teaching at Syracuse for two years was a waiting period until Tanganyika was completely independent; in 1963, when the situation was good, I came here.

Q.: *Can you recall your experience at the University of Lisbon? At the time there were a number of other very important Africans in the University, and since that time they have become important activists in the struggles in Angola and in Portuguese Guinea.*

A.: Yes, I had a number of colleagues at the University, some of whom are now in the leadership of nationalist movements in Africa. One of them was Agostinho Neto of Angola, who was a student in medi-

cine in Lisbon, now president of MPLA. Another was Amilcar Cabral, who is now secretary-general of PAIGC, the nationalist movement of the islands of Cape Verde and the mainland of Guinea. Another was Mário de Andrade, who is now in Rabat, writing, but who was very active in the formation of MPLA in Angola. And of course I have known other Angolans and Guineans in the nationalist movement, who were also students in Lisbon. And then there was Marcelino dos Santos, who is our secretary for foreign affairs, and he is also secretary for the CONCP, the coordinating committee of the various colonies fighting against the Portuguese. He was a student in engineering in Lisbon.

All of us except Neto had to leave because of the very difficult situation there in the late 1940's and early 1950's. The Portuguese were very much against independence, as they are today. It was at the time that Nkrumah and his colleagues in West Africa were stirring for independence. The Portuguese were very much against our having that kind of idea. So we were harassed by the police and often detained. I remember being arrested several times and questioned by the police for hours or for a couple of days. Neto was frequently in prison, often for months. Finally I went to the United States, and Mário de Andrade and Marcelino dos Santos went to France, but Cabral finished his studies early and so he came back to Angola to

RONALD H. CHILCOTE, *Asst. Prof. of Political Science at the Univ. of Calif. at Riverside, recently returned from Africa where he undertook field research for two books on Portuguese Africa to be published in 1966. In July he flew to Angola with an official visa and the assurance of Portuguese diplomats that he would encounter no problems; on arriving in Luanda, he was immediately arrested by PIDE, interrogated and held incommunicado in prison from July 16 to 22.*

work for the agricultural civil service; later he decided to join the nationalist movement, of which he is now the leader in Guinea.

Q.: At the time did you form any sort of African association which manifested its protest against colonial policy?

A.: Not officially. We could not afford to do that—at that time it was very difficult—so we were working within the student opposition movement in Portugal. In Portugal you can't express yourself openly, and we were detained or arrested or put in prison for being known to have participated in these groups. They could see that whatever we published in the student magazine or expressed in poetry and literary work concerned Africa and was a form of cultural protest against the Portuguese in Africa. There were no formal organizations of Mozambiquan, Angolan, or Guinean students against the Portuguese. This developed later.

Q.: Was there any support or sympathy from the Portuguese opposition itself inside Portugal while you were there?

A.: Not much, really, to be frank, because the Portuguese at that time, including the opposition, had the hope that the peoples of the colonies would be part of a cultural force that would develop Mozambique into another Brazil. The opposition never quite conceived the idea of an independent colony in Africa, and even now I insist that they are not very pro-independence. I remember that the leader of the opposition in Portugal at that time was General Norton de Matos. He was a liberal in Portuguese politics but a conservative in my kind of politics. When Nkrumah was released from prison to become head of Ghana, General Norton de Matos criticized the British very sternly, saying that African peoples were not developed enough for independence, and, therefore, the British were either joking or committing a crime in trying to encourage Africans to take over government. So there wasn't really much sympathy. I think the only sympathy was among the left-wing socialists who understood the nationalism of the Africans.

Q.: Do you still maintain your contacts with the other nationalist groups operating outside Guinea, Angola, Sao Tomé, and Príncipe?

A.: Constantly. So much so that we have an association, the Conference of Nationalist Organizations against Portuguese Colonialism (CONCP), with headquarters in Rabat. We are now planning a conference in Dar es Salaam. Delegates from Portuguese Guinea, Angola, Mozambique, and the islands of Sao Tomé and Príncipe will meet here to discuss the main lines of action and the main ideological approaches of our struggle.

Q.: This will be the second conference of CONCP. Was the first conference of any significance to your activities?

A.: Well, it was, but it was before Frelimo was established, in 1961; it set some guide lines for our struggle, but the divisions that occurred in Angola in

1961 to 1963, and which are still felt in the struggle there, greatly weakened the work of the interterritorial committee.

Q.: When you returned to Dar es Salaam, what were the problems that you encountered in trying to coalesce the other nationalist groups that had been in existence before your arrival?

A.: The groundwork had already been prepared by the Tanganyikan and Ghanaian political leaders, who had encouraged unity among these groups. But after that, a number of people who were not elected to top positions in Frelimo, who were leaders of the other organizations, did not wish to cooperate. Some went to Europe, others to Asia and from there to some of the African countries. Within six months, they announced the reestablishment of regional groups, but since they were alone in those countries, they were not in direct contact with the people of Mozambique, so that the reestablishment of the original parties had no meaning. In contrast, Frelimo's main task in Dar es Salaam was to establish a bureaucratic structure, to set up a program of action within the country, and to carry out a program to train soldiers for the struggle within Mozambique—also a whole program of seeking aid from African and other countries.

Q.: Frelimo was in its beginnings the coalition of three small and relatively unorganized movements. Would you care to comment on these movements?

A.: They were really "office" organizations with no strength within Mozambique. Probably an exception might be made for the Mozambiquan African National Union, which was shaped after and named after both KANU of Kenya and TANU of Tanganyika. The leadership of MANU was composed of people who had been active in KANU or TANU in East Africa. The Uniao Democrata Nacional de Moçambique was formed of people who had in some way or other been involved in the Rhodesian liberation struggle. The Uniao Nacional Africana de Moçambique Independente was a small group composed of people who had been in Malawi. So among these "office" movements we established Frelimo and immediately set out a program that was confirmed by our first and only congress.

Q.: When was that?

A.: December 1962. We brought most of the delegates from Mozambique, and with them we planned a national program and established a political organization program throughout the country, which was preparatory to the military phase now being undertaken.

Q.: There is still another group, located in Lusaka, Zambia, and called the Comité Revolucionário de Moçambique (COREMO), which I understand is a small group of those who could not go along with the coalition movement that you are now leading. Is COREMO of any significance?

A.: I don't believe so. These are the same people who were not elected to the main leadership positions of Frelimo in 1962 plus a few of those who were on

the central committee of Frelimo and who tried to take over the organization and control it, and were consequently expelled even before I returned from the United States in 1963. These and others joined together in Cairo, Accra, or wherever they could find a place to meet and decided to establish an opposition organization. Each year they formed a new front. They never worked together. So each year they formed a new front, sometimes using the same name. For instance in 1963, in Uganda, they formed what they called the Frente Unida Anti-Imperialista Popular Africana de Moçambique. Toward the end of the same year they formed a movement with the same name here in Dar es Salaam. Then the following year they formed here in Dar es Salaam what they called MORECO, which is English for COREMO. The last president of COREMO each year since 1960 has been elected to the presidency of a new united front. This is a joke. We don't want to waste time with him. We are interested in people who are working inside the country. In the muddied waters of politics in Africa today you find a lot of fishermen who are trying to make a living out of these confusions. In Mozambique we are insisting that any persons who want to fight with us must get involved directly. The door is open for any Mozambiquan.

These splinter groups kept claiming that we were imperialists, that we were taking orders from the United States or some such nonsense; they were trying by that means to gain support from the Communists and the socialist countries of Eastern Europe and Asia. But as time went on they began to see that most of our support comes from socialist countries in Africa and Asia and Europe. Now if they are in Moscow they call us Chinese-controlled Communists; if they are in Peking they call us Revisionists, and if they are at conferences combining both, they still try to call us imperialists.

Q.: What would you call your movement?

A.: We are Mozambiquan nationalists of the same kind that Tanganyikans and most East Africans are and most Africans are trying to be. We don't really think that the cold war ideological struggle is relevant to us. We want to free Mozambique and our policies are going to be Mozambiquan policies. And we will develop policies that will be useful to Mozambique. At the same time we hold opinions on moral issues in the world. For instance, we completely condemn the American war in Vietnam; we condemn the intervention and presence of the US military in Santo Domingo. We want no interference in the affairs of any African country by any foreign power. In the Congo we question the involvement of foreign powers in trying to control and direct the affairs of the people of the Congo. We stand with Africa in all matters concerning the freedom of Africa.

Q.: Getting back to the program of Frelimo, could you emphasize some of the main points that came out of your congress a couple of years ago?

A.: Yes. First, we cannot hope to gain independence through the normal means that other African peoples were able to use. We have a unique situation in the Portuguese colonies. Therefore, no democratic electioneering can be expected to be the preliminary step toward independence. We then decided to prepare ourselves for war. And we are in it now because we were aware that this was the only course of action. Second, in our policies we adhere to the principle that characterizes development in all Africa. Until independence we will not be able to take a strong position on exactly how to develop, but we are for national unity. Future Mozambiquan policy will completely change the racist policies that Portugal follows now. We will be for democracy instead of an oligarchic government of colonial settlers. We will be for equality of all races and all religions in the country instead of for the racial-religious kind of rule that the Portuguese have imposed. We will be for an economic policy that will favor the majority of the people instead of an élite group. We will be for mass education for all Mozambiquans. These are the main policies that were approved by the congress of Frelimo.

Q.: If the Portuguese were to change their intransigent position, would you be willing to negotiate for independence rather than continuing this war?

A.: Of course. All wars are aimed at finally negotiating for some settlement. We are ready to talk as soon as Portugal indicates that she is ready to talk. We're not fighting just for the sake of killing people. We are fighting for a purpose, that purpose being independence and complete independence. When Portugal is ready to discuss independence, we will begin negotiations.

Q.: In any event, you have not had any such response and your war began on September 25, 1964. I read today a report taken from one of your communiqués, which summarized some of the recent developments. On June 16, for instance, Frelimo fighters attacked Portuguese troops in Nyassa province, and on June 21 there was another ambush and several Portuguese soldiers were killed. On July 12 Frelimo soldiers attacked the Portuguese, and so on. What is the significance of these recent developments and what has Frelimo accomplished since September 25 of last year?

A.: Well, September 25 was of course a pre-arranged date for beginning the hostilities against Portugal. Pre-arranged because we had learned a lesson from Angola, where a local unorganized uprising started, and the leaders were not prepared enough to control the struggle. In Mozambique we wanted to avoid pointless massacres of innocent men, women, and children, African or European. We set everything ahead of time so that we could know exactly whom we wanted to attack and for what purpose. So it started. Our aim is to cripple the Portuguese army in Mozambique and to make it ineffective. We have achieved our objectives in three of the four provinces where we're fighting. The people more and more depend upon us for law and order in the ordinary activities of life. The

Portuguese in each area, whenever they are attacked by our forces, withdraw all services; they bring in the army and control the people through the armed forces. The people don't like this and run to the forests where they are in contact with us. We work with them and maintain as much of a normal life as possible. We will continue the struggle until we cover the whole country, and we are sure that sooner or later the Portuguese army will be incapable of handling us.

Confirmations of the War

In September of this year the conservative Evening Standard of London sent Lord Kilbracken to Mozambique to report on the conduct of the war there. Following are excerpts from four articles that appeared in Rhodesian papers at the end of September and the beginning of October:

By military airplane, army lorry, and gunboat I have traversed in ten hard days the whole active battle zone along Lake Malawi, where Portuguese troops are locked in combat with Frelimo guerrillas.

The Frelimo have infiltrated in strength from Tanzania, next door, where they are equipped and trained. The scale of fighting in this bitter, unsung war has steadily increased since the first minor incidents just a year ago—especially in recent weeks when there has been a strong Frelimo build-up. Today the battle zone stretches some 20 to 40 miles inland along almost all Mozambique's lake shore from the Tanzanian to the Malawi border. In 3,000 terrorized square miles the Portuguese, both civil and military, are now confined to five small isolated garrisons: Metangula, Maniamba, Cobue, Olivenca, and Nova Coimbra.

Not one white settler dares stay in all the area. Their once-neat holdings are today silent and abandoned. And most of the Africans—they belong to the Nyanja tribe—have fled to the mountains and islands or to Tanzania or Malawi. In 80 miles of lake shore from Metangula to the Tanzanian border only two African villages are still inhabited.

Of the five garrisons, I contrived to visit all but Olivenca—a surrounded outpost supplied by airdrops and held by a mere 40 men. I also made it to the Anglican mission at Messumba, where two British clergy—Archdeacon John Paul and the Rev. Charles Wright—and a British nursing sister, Miss Irene Wheeler, tend an anxious African community of more than 1,000.

The Frelimo, a Viet Cong in miniature, are a tough and elusive enemy. They generally operate in very small units, often of only half a dozen men. I could obtain no estimate of their total strength in Mozambique. They are at home in the jungle and bush, where they live off the country, striking silently by night, withdrawing swiftly into the dense cover if the Portuguese reply in strength. . . .

Throughout the battle zone all main roads have been mined by the Frelimo and are subject to ambush. And

they have recently surged south to cut the vital supply routes to Meponda and Nova Freixo from Vila Cabral. It is now possible to reach Vila Cabral by road only by the circuitous route via Marrups. All surface supplies from Nampula and the sea must make this detour. . . .

Throughout the troubled north the Portuguese are now desperately short of equipment as well as men. They have no tanks in the Nyanja country and only five aircraft, based on Vila Cabral. Four of these are single-engined Harvards. The Harvard was in RAF service a quarter of a century ago, but only as a trainer even then. It carries four light machine-guns and a maximum bomb load of about 2,000 pounds. It can also carry rockets. The fifth aircraft at Vila Cabral is a Dornier spotter airplane of doubtful vintage, also single-engined. . . .

We flew at dusk to the naval base at Metangula, a fine natural harbor on the rugged mountainous coast of Lake Malawi. Brilliantly warm spring weather, limpid water, a golden beach—and black plastic mines in all the roads. Here I was to be the guest of the commander, Lt. Sergio Zilhao.

His fleet comprises a 28-ton radar-equipped gunboat and three landing craft. The gunboat, Castor, mounts a 20 mm Oerlikon and patrols the hostile shore. With the landing craft, it brings men and supplies from Meponda, the nearest port to Vila Cabral. However, the recent mining of the only road to Me-



Mozambique: The black areas indicate the provinces largely under Frelimo control.

ponda has made the supplying of Metangula problematical.

Sergio told me that he hopes to have three more gunboats—and he needs them. But they must come overland the whole way from the Indian Ocean to Meponda, a long and hazardous journey. A fifth is being constructed on the Metangula slipway.

Here I was at the heart of things. Well-armed Frelimo with heavy machine-guns and bazookas were operating within three miles north and south of the base. The only road—from Maniamba—was heavily mined and impassible. The Frelimo set up an armed road block while I was there, between Metangula and the Anglican mission at Messumba, only six miles away. . .

During my days at Metangula, I was seeking a way of making it to the Anglican mission at Messumba, only eight miles distant. . . . They have no contact with either Portuguese or Frelimo if they can help it, and virtually none with the outside world. . . .

The fact that I did get to Messumba was due solely to Sergio. He lent me the gunboat. In this I would be deposited at the nearest point on the beach. I would then have to walk two and a half miles through the

bush—and hope fervently that I would not be mistaken for an errant Portuguese by any lurking Frelimo. Short of a helicopter, there was no other way of doing it. . . .

“How could I [close the mission]?” Father Paul said. “What would happen to my people? Many would certainly die. It is true that we are very short of a few basic commodities—especially salt, soap, and sugar—but we have just got the harvest in and are certainly safe till Christmas.”. . .

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And from the Church Times, London, September 17:

. . . The censorship imposed by the Portuguese in Mozambique is so complete that little is known in the outside world. . . . Methods of unsurpassed brutality are being employed. . . . In some places the executions have been completely indiscriminate, and some of the Church's own teachers have been shot. Whole villages have been completely indiscriminate, and some of the and burned to the ground. Infringement of the night curfew results in instant death. . . .

RHODESIA

Behind the Smith Curtain

Nathan M. Shamuyarira

THE LONGER IT TAKES Britain and the international community to end the rebellion of Ian Douglas Smith in Rhodesia, the greater will be the physical suffering of the African people. The 8,000 African nationalists in the hands of Smith's regime—6,000 in prison for political offenses of various kinds, and about 2,000 in restriction—and their families are subjected to ill-treatment at different levels by white police officers.

On July 30 of this year, Patrick Jacques Keyser, a white police officer (of the Sabotage Section) was acquitted in the Salisbury Magistrate's Court of the murder of an African, Alexander Mashawira, after a special five-man (all-white) jury had found him not guilty. Mr. Mashawira had been found dead in a Salisbury police station cell on January 25. At the inquest in April two white doctors told the court that it seemed the deceased, who had been a healthy man, had died within a few hours of being beaten across the back with an instrument that left no marks on the skin. They said the beating had been systematic, and the injuries were not the sort one would expect in an ordinary fight or attack. An African photographer, Mr. Hassan Philby Mwenya, who tried outside the

Court to photograph Keyser, was arrested, his camera was confiscated, his house was searched; he was beaten in a police cell, sternly warned by a Senior Police Officer, and finally released.

Another young political organizer was found dead in a police station in Salisbury, his hands handcuffed and tied to a cross-bar above his head, with his feet several feet above the ground. The wall was covered with foot-marks indicating his last battle (and the battles of others before him) to relieve the pain from swollen hands.

Such cases can be duplicated many times in present-day Rhodesia. And more is still to come.

For many years the Southern Rhodesian police was an efficient, non-political, civilian force, which tried to live up to the standards of the British police force. In recent years, however, it has followed the path of its racially-minded masters, the white settler politicians. It has 5,000 men, recruited from the UK, South

NATHAN M. SHAMUYARIRA, now in graduate school at Princeton, is the former Editor of the African Daily News.