EDUARDO C. MONDLANE: HIS POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

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As anti-colonial movements swept across Africa in the 1960s, Eduardo Chivambo Mondlane organized the resistance to Portugal's presence in Mozambique. Mondlane's organizing ability and leadership talent were matched by his distinctive revolutionary thought. From 1962 to 1969, his armed resistance movement proved to be one of the most successful in all of southern Africa, because he provided it with a tough philosophical underpinning based on his experiences as a student on three continents and as research officer for the United Nations, but most importantly because he shaped his revolutionary ideology to conform to the present realities and historical evolution of Mozambique.

Mozambique, a long slender country resembling an inverted lion, is located on the southeastern corner of the African continent. About half the territory is coastal lowlands; interior plateaus appear in the west central and northwestern parts. Although smaller than Angola, Portugal's largest African territory, Mozambique has a larger population. Of the eight million inhabitants, the bulk are native African, illiterate and subsistence farmers. Nearly 200,000 of the total are Europeans who hold dominant positions in the government and economy. A small but important Asian population occupies positions as clerks and petty traders.[1] Eight and a half times the size of metropolitan Portugal, Mozambique is bordered by South Africa and Rhodesia to the south and west, and by Zambia, Malawi and Tanzania to the north. With its eastern edge on the Indian Ocean, Mozambique faces India and the Orient. This geographical position placed Mozambique well within the scheme of the Portuguese eastern empire.

Portuguese seafarers reached Mozambique at the end of the fifteenth century as they searched for a route to the riches of the East. With their eyes fixed on Oriental treasure, the Portuguese at first limited their activities to Mozambique's littoral where they constructed harbo and fortresses as part of a commercial and maritime empire in Asia. B Portuguese preeminence in the East crumbled in the seventeenth century as both the Dutch and English expanded in the Indian Ocean and a resu gence of Arab strength developed along the east African coast.

Rumors of inland gold, fabled to be King Solomon's mines, excited Portugal's original interest in the interior. Later in the sixteenth century, Portuguese and Goan settlers, at first encouraged by the government, seized large tracts of land and people inaugurating t prazo, or plantation, system. Not unlike European feudal lords, the prazeiros exploited their African serfs for wealth and power, determining a pattern of race relations lasting for centuries. The slave trade and "contract" labor were an outgrowth of the prazos.[2]

Interest declined in Mozambique during the eighteenth and nineteen centuries with the passing of the Asian empire into foreign hands and t promised wealth of Brazil.[3] But the European scramble for African land in the last quarter of the nineteenth century rekindled Portuguese interest least their domains fall to alien intruders. To insure c tr of the regions it claimed on the map, Portugal initiated a series of military campaigns and pacification programs to gain "effective occupation" of the interior. There had always been opposition to Portuguese rule, yet the level of resistance markedly increased during this phase of Portuguese activity.[4] The pacification of Mozambique lasted until the third decade of the twentieth century--the decade of Mondlane's birth.

THE MAKING OF A REVOLUTIONARY

Born in 1920 in Gaza, a province in southern Mozambique, Mondlane came from a traditional background. At the insistence of his mother, he attended government and Swiss Presbyterian mission schools before going to Lourenco Marques to enroll in a course in dryland farming. After graduation, he worked for two years as an instructor to his fellow Mozambicans.

The political conditions of Gaza during Mondlane's youth helped to mould his later career. A quarter of a century before his birth, Gazaland had enjoyed autonomy under its last king and chief, Gungunhana. From 1884 to 1895 Gungunhana had been a thorn in the side of Portugal just as Mondlane would be. His opposition in the last years of the nineteenth century proved to be a major obstacle to European military and administrative control in southern Mozambique, and a lasting influence for over a generation.[5] The opposition of Mondlane's father and uncle to the colonial regime also furnished him with examples of resistance.[6]

Mondlane's response to his insurgent heritage first appeared after he secured a scholarship in 1948 that enabled him to register in South Africa's Witwatersrand University. At the end of his second year in 1949, Mondlane was dismissed from the university for being a "foreign native." After this he began to display those qualities that were to shape his life and the future of Mozambique. Back in Lourenco Marques, he helped organize an association of Mozambican students (Núcleo dos Estudantes de Moçambique) that resulted in a confrontation with the authorities. To cure his "embryonic spirit of black nationalism" the

Portuguese colonial government allowed him to continue his education in Portugal.

At the University of Lisbon (1950-51) he began a new phase in his activist career. While concentrating "on talking at closed meetings of students, faculty members, and some more liberal Portuguese, describing Portuguese colonial policies," Mondlane associated with African students from the territories, some of whom became future nationalist leaders.[7]

Subject to official harassment for his activities, Mondlane decided to continue his studies in the United States, graduating from Oberlin in 1953 with a B.A. and earning a Ph.D. at Northwestern University. After an academic year (1956-57) spent in research at Harvard, he accepted a position at the United Nations.

Mondlane entered a second phase of activity by serving as a research officer from May 1957 to September 1961. The heady air of nationalism that swept Africa during the fifties and early sixties proved infectious to Mondlane, who had long realized the part he should play in the independence of Mozambique. A return to Mozambique with his American wife, Janet, in 1961 with U.N. passports convinced Mondlane that the colonial policies could only be ended with total independence and that he must play a predominant role in the drive for self-rule.[8]

His visit to Mozambique caused a significant change in Mondlane's judgment. He now believed that the time was at hand for an independence movement in Mozambique. The successes of national struggles elsewhere in Africa and the popular reception he received in his own country strengthened this resolution.[9] To disengage himself from U.N. commitments, Mondlane took an assistant professorship at Syracuse University. It became apparent at this point that a single, unified party was the first step toward independence.[10]

By the 1960s Mozambican nationalists, long retarded by colonial rule, organized a number of small, often exiled, groups. The evolution of Mozambican national parties, though meager by comparison with many African states, represented a growing national consciousness. Resistance to Portuguese conquest existed almost from the beginning, and characterized an early form of nationalism. In the twentieth century nationalism became rooted in the pattern of continued Mozambican resistance by African newspaper writers, striking dockers, and angry laborers who, as recorded by African nationalists, on some occasions paid for their opposition with their lives.[11] The 1920s saw politically interested Mozambicans form regional, linguistic, civic and mutual aid organizations, which among others included Centro Associativo dos Negros de Moçambique, Associação Africana, and Instituto Negrófilo. Even though the concept of nationalism evolved from several sources, none of these groups developed into a national party. Rather Mozambican nationalists established a number of organizations in neighboring countries beyond Portuguese control.

The first party was the União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique (UDENAMO) formed by Mozambican workers in Southern Rhodesia on October 2, 1960. A combination of several small groups organized the second nationalist movement, the Moçambique African National Union (MANU), in Mombasa, Kenya in February 1961. It received support from similar African unions in Tanganyika (TANU) and Kenya (KANU). A third party, União Africana de Moçambique Independente (UNAMI), was established in Nyasaland (Malawi). During 1961, all three parties moved to Dar es Salaam where they received strong pressure to merge from other Mozambican refugees, and from such African state leaders as Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania.

Meanwhile, Mondlane watched excitedly the developments in Dar es Salaam. Realizing that the newly granted Tanganyikan independence would provide him with a base for future operations, he entered the most active phase of his revolutionary career. He flew to Dar es Salaam to assist in the formation of a united front. On June 25, 1961 UDENAMO, MANU and UNAMI merged forming the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) with Mondlane as president. A party congress drafted a program in September. Then two years of political organizing and military preparation preceded guerrilla warfare.

From the beginning, personal and ideological rivalries burgeoned and led to the establishment of competing movements. By 1965 several of these groups formed the Comité Revolucionário de Moçambique (COREMO) under the leadership of Paulo José Gumane. Despite the formation of rival groups, Mondlane's FRELIMO not only continued its preparation for guerrilla war but its growth and success surpassed other resistance movements south of the equator.[12]

On September 25, 1964, FRELIMO launched its attack against military posts in the Cabo Delgado district of Mozambique. Later the struggle was extended to Zambézia and Niassa, and finally to the Tete region in 1968 to disrupt the Cabora Bassa Dam project along the Zambezi River. Before the death of its first leader, FRELIMO laid claim to substantial chunks of Mozambique territory and its population.[13] So striking was its progress that FRELIMO held, with advanced publicity, its second party Congress within Niassa province of northern Mozambique in July 1968.

MONDLANE'S REVOLUTIONARY THOUGHT

What was the revolutionary thought behind this transformative achievement? What, indeed, enabled Mondlane's FRELIMO not only to capture wide swaths of territory but also to win the allegiance and support of large numbers of Mozambicans within and without their homeland?

An explanation lies in the historical context of Mozambique, especially in relation to other Portuguese and non-Portuguese territories in Africa, and the revolutionary thought of Mondlane. Exploitation, racial discrimination and intolerance of indigenous customs characterized Portuguese rule of Mozambique since the beginning of the sixteenth century. For Africans, internal and international opposition brought paper reforms with little alleviation of their plight. While other African colonies moved toward political independence, Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea-Bissau were considered integral parts of metropolitan Portugal after 1951. The African response to increased Portuguese control alternated between smoldering resentment and open warfare, though apathy and outright accommodation for survival were not unknown.

Revolutionary leader, political activist, guerrilla organizer, Eduardo Mondlane was also a man of significant revolutionary ideas. Because of the historical experience of Mozambique, Mondlane's political thought was channeled toward four goals: formation of a political movement capable of military conflict; independence from Portugal; fostering national consciousness among Mozambicans; and the restructuring of society to insure true equality with an end to exploitation.[14]

He defined the "first condition for success" to be the building of a political and military movement capable of regaining power for the Mozambican people. With this in mind Mondlane, who had been associated with UDENAMO, worked for unification of the three principle groups in Dar es Salaam.[15] Once attained in the formation of FRELIMO, the party concluded that an armed struggle would be necessary to obtain independence from Portugal. The conflicts raging in Angola and Guinea-Bissau and the savage treatment reportedly meted out to Mozambican demonstrators, such as those at Mueda in 1960, convinced FRELIMO's first president c. the futility of peaceful means. In fact, early attempts at negotiations with Portugal through the United Nations failed to receive a response.[16]

As a consequence, FRELIMO felt itself forced to engage in guerrilla warfare for the Mozambican people. Mondlane believed that the reason for the "racial socio-economic structure typifying the Portuguese colonial society of today" resulted from the "fact that African people have lost their political power from the very beginning of their relations with the Portuguese."[17] Without political power they lost control of "their land . . . [and] natural resources, the means of production, and the right to buy and sell the fruits of their labour."[18] Like Mao Tse-tung's dictum that power comes from the barrel of a gun, FRELIMO's revolutionary leader advocated "armed struggle against the whole political, economic-social structure upon which the colonial system is built."[19] Mondlane put little hope in a clear-cut military victory, but held that the military costs to Portugal would force her to negotiate with FRELIMO.

Negotiations entailed the recognition of Mozambique's independence--his second goal. Before many of his plans for restructuring society could be fully implemented, self-determination for Mozambique had to be attained. He promised no quick victory: "liberation from Portuguese rule may take many years and many lives."[20] Despite the obstacles, Mondlane remained confident that "the populations are mobilised. And where there lies a popular war, peoples victory is certain. History testifies it."[21] Foreign support to Portugal, itself an underdeveloped nation, increased the odds against which FRELIMO fought. This collusion of nations, mainly South Africa and Western powers, that aided the Portuguese war efforts in Mozambique either unilaterally or through NATO, helped radicalize Mondlane's ideas toward imperialism and made him identify his cause with independence movements around the world. By fighting against Portuguese colonialism "the Mozambican people will be giving a great historical contribution to the total liberty of our continent and to the progress of Africa and of the world."[22]

As a third goal for FRELIMO Mondlane stressed its role in fusing the various ethnic and regional elements of Mozambique into a unified and politically conscious nation able to determine its own fate. Although seldom mentioning ethnic divisions in his speeches or writings, he judged the colonial authorities responsible for promoting these splits to fracture the resistance movement. He maintained that ethnic divisions were often the result of the Portuguese whose "colonialism, moreover, was to pervert all traditional power structures, encouraging or creating authoritarian and elitist elements."[23] These "elitist elements" in order to maintain their privileged position in the colonial hierarchy have a vested interest in perpetuating colonial rule and furthering divisions between members of their own ethnic group and FRELIMO.

Aware of the danger of ethnic divisions during the struggle and after independence, Mondlane aspired to make FRELIMO a truly national party, and used it and the guerrilla force to weld the disparate peoples together. Mondlane came from the Tsonga people of southern Mozambique, but the recruitment of guerrillas took place by necessity in the north among the Makonde and Nyanja. The reliance on these peoples, who straddle the borders of Mozambique and her northern neighbors, sparked hostility with groups to the south, particularly the Makua, who have been longtime enemies of the Makonde. The dependence on certain ethnic groups for the bulk of guerrillas did not impede the universality of the leadership, which remained ethnically balanced. Through the example set by the party and army, as well as political education, Mondlane envisioned a united Mozambique.[24]

The fourth and perhaps most sweeping goal Mondlane charged FRELIMO with concerned the political, social and economic reconstruction of Mozambique. "The struggle for independence constitutes only one phase of our revolution."[25] To Mondlane liberation consisted of more than "merely driving out the Portuguese authority;" true liberation required "constructing a new country."[26] The president of FRELIMO envisioned a "society directed toward economic progress, where all Mozambicans will have the same rights, where the power will belong to the people."[27] In the era of post-independence Mondlane advocated strong central planning to develop Mozambique and to prevent the concentration of wealth by privileged groups. FRELIMO's role, as planned by Mondlane, was to act as a "guide to the people to end the exploitation of man by man."[28] Therefore, he proposed a radical departure from those traditional political structures based on the absolute power of a few, and from the colonial structure based on the power and privilege of Europeans.

THE APPLICATION OF THEORY

When the Portuguese evacuated large areas in northern Mozambique, Mondlane partially carried out his political, administrative, and social goals. FRELIMO filled the void left by Portugal's retreating military and administrative forces. Mondlane stressed, however, that FRELIMO's political structure was not a "dictatorship of the party," because "there is no deep distinction between party and population: the party is the population engaged in political action."[29] To him a one party democracy, particularly one resembling Tanzania's TANU, was the political system that best suited the needs and aspirations of the people. Both in theory and practice the party remained open to the whole population, "with the majority being, as is the majority of the population, peasants."[30]

The organizational pattern of FRELIMO resembled other single party structures. At the lowest level the local committee, or cell, executed the tasks of the party. Next up the organizational ladder, the District Committee comprised several cells, and these district units in turn were incorporated into the Provincial Committees, which were directly below the Central Committee. The second party Congress in July 1968 expanded the membership of the Central Committee from twenty-four to about forty to provide positions of responsibility for younger members and particularly for those within Mozambique, but the Congress restricted its function to the legislative. The Executive Committee--a type of politburo--composed of the President, Vice-President and secretaries of departments performed executive duties.

This body, along with the political and military committees, dealt with urgent problems between meetings of the Central Committee. The Central Committee also included departments of administration, external affairs, finance, social affairs, education, and information and propaganda.[31]

The organization of cells varied from region to region to allow for maximum adaptability to local conditions. To insure positive and unchecked participation by the people, the Central Committee provided that "people's management committees" should whenever possible supervise the "general tasks" of life in FRELIMO zones. In actuality FRELIMO leadership exercised tight control during the periods of stress.[32] Fearing the development of an "internal-external" feud like that which hampered the Algerian Revolution, the Central Committee required party leaders outside Mozambique to make frequent visits into FRELIMO controlled territory. Mondlane theorized that only by insuring close contact between leaders and people and their active participation in leadership could a people's revolution succeed. The party was to structure the people's actions, not to dictate them.[33]

Mondlane exerted his authority as president of FRELIMO, but the party reflected his belief in "collective leadership." Delegation of authority was as much a part of Mondlane's revolutionary methods as the necessity imposed by guerrilla warfare. The assassination of FRELIMO leaders, such as the July 1966 murder of Jaime Siguake in Zambia, impressed party officials with the danger of a small hierarchy.[34] Within the Central Committee the procedure of democratic centralism was used to decide policy. This allowed every member of the Central Committee to express his viewpoint before a vote, after which members steadfastly adhered to the decision of the majority as party policy. Department heads and provincial secretaries shared in making decisions and in publicizing FRELIMO's cause around the world. Notices, resolutions, articles and editorials in various FRELIMO publications were almost always signed by the Central Committee, not Mondlane. He entrusted Samora Machel with the discharge of military matters, and often Vice-President Uria Simango represented FRELIMO abroad. Efforts to extend participation in policy making to lower levels of the party often foundered on the lack of sufficient trained members.[35] The concept of collective leadership, however restricted by circumstances, enabled FRELIMO to persevere even after Mondlane's death.

In the economic sphere, Mondlane envisioned a society without exploitation where all Mozambicans would share equally. Within insurgent zones, FRELIMO began to implement its plans by providing for the inhabitants. This new responsibility demanded the increase and diversification of agriculture to supply food, raw materials for soap and fabrics, and items for trade. To accomplish this both during the struggle and after independence, Mondlane not only advocated the organization of cooperatives, but also encouraged the working of individual <u>shambas</u>, or plots, for profit of the farmer. Cooperatives directed by local party leaders replaced the chief as the organizer of economic life and "at the same time puts an end to the exploitation of the peasantry by any privileged group."[36] In addition, the party supplied essential tools like hoes, pangas, and technical advice whenever available. Mondlane pushed to increase production of basic foodstuffs for home consumption, and to export such products as groundnuts, cashews, seasame and castor oil seeds to earn funds to buy items unobtainable in Mozambique. FRELIMO backed cottage industries and traditional crafts such as wood carving as another source of export profit and for household needs.[37] For the future Mondlane planned technical studies that would improve yields and introduce new products such as rubber. Setbacks and slow progress resulted from the lack of technical expertise and material aid, including basic tools. Nevertheless, FRELIMO managed to export large quantities of nuts and seeds enabling it to finance, without a total reliance on outside aid, guerrilla operations while furthering educational and social programs.[38]

Education occupied a high position on Mondlane's list of priorities. In fact, the first party Congress in September 1962 planned an education program, while at the same time considering military preparation. Because the Portuguese educational system for Africans was woefully unsatisfactory, Mondlane gave immediate attention to it. He stressed the need of education for two reasons: the development of political awareness among African people to gain their support; and the preparation of qualified Mozambicans to lead the way in economic and social development.[39] Education for a national liberation struggle and an accompanying social revolution required more than a straight combination of the colonial curricula with traditional teachings. Mondlane offered no magical solution, although he thought some of the traditional moral values would aid in building a new social order. He planned primary schools, literacy campaigns, facilities for technical and advanced education, and the attendance of women at schools to educate for a revolution.

As with its other goals, FRELIMO began its educational programs early in the struggle. Founded in 1963, the Mozambique Institute in Tanzania prepared Mozambican students for higher education abroad and taught badly needed skills such as nursing and primary school teaching.

Along with literacy campaigns and primary schooling in Niassa and Cabo Delgado, Mondlane began a program of political education.[40] As a matter of necessity he approved Portuguese language instruction to provide a common medium among Mozambicans, yet urged his followers to learn more than one African language to facilitate understanding among ethnic groups.

FRELIMO also pioneered social and cultural changes soon after seizing Mozambique soil. Mondlane envisaged a "new society where all Mozambicans will have the same rights;" a multiracial state to include Europeans who renounced war against FRELIMO.[41] Mondlane repeatedly stated that war was directed toward Portuguese colonialism and not Portuguese settlers.[42] FRELIMO resolutions also provided for religious freedom and equality of women. The party intended to promote medical and health centers in territory that fell under its control and provide rehabilitation of war disabled, care for orphans, and aid to widows and the aged.[43] Soon after occupation, FRELIMO moved toward fulfillment of its goals with the establishment of medical and social services.[44]

In cultural matters, Mondlane encouraged the traditional African arts of dance, music, and crafts. The magazine <u>25 de setembro</u> published poems, stories, and political essays by Mozambicans involved in the war. He aspired to widen the political horizons of those in FRELIMO areas by distribution of films, pictures, and publications from North Vietnam, Cuba, and Russia. FRELIMO sent students to countries which provided scholarships, among them the People's Republic of China and the United States. Mondlane argued that cultural enrichment and social progress were related to the economic and political changes inherent in the revolution and would increase with its intensification.[45]

Mondlane carried his struggle with Portuguese colonialism into the sphere of diplomacy. Under his leadership, FRELIMO attached importance to diplomatic relations with organizations and independent states. After the formation of FRELIMO, he established relations with nationalist organizations in other Portuguese territories and African countries not yet independent. With nations outside of Africa, he sought relations with "all socialist countries and with progressive countries of the West."[46] Believing that FRELIMO's efforts were part of "the world's movement for the emancipation of the peoples, which aims at the total liquidation of colonialism and imperialism,"[47] he obtained membership in international organizations of the Third World.[48]

Mondlane, though a former research officer of the United Nations, expressed doubt as to the efficacy of appeals to that organization.[49] Yet he appeared a number of times before its committees and commissions. As part of his political philosophy he believed that the United Nations was a useful assembly to inform world opinion about Portuguese colonial practices, about aid given to Portugal by Western powers, and about the social programs and military advances of FRELIMO.[50] Through all thes international avenues, FRELIMO's first president sought not only to rally opinion and support for the Mozambican nationalist movement but to express solidarity with similar movements elsewhere, as when he warmly endorsed Hanoi in the Vietnam war.[51] For aid to FRELIMO, he especially depended on Tanzania, Zambia, Cuba, Algeria, and the United Arab Republic.[52] But shrewd revolutionary thinker that he was, Mondlane knew that "the main source of support for our struggle is our own people."[53]

An analysis of Mondlane's political ideas suggests that varied influences shaped them. Indeed he was something of an eclectic in drawing ideas from various contemporary doctrines and thinkers. His ideas of Portugal's relationship with Africa were usually expressed in economic phrases that manifested an unmistakable, though not exclusive, Marxist approach. His understanding of Portugal's conquest and retention of African lands was normally couched in terms of economic exploitation, even though he was aware of other reasons for Portugal's continued presence in Africa. He wrote that the colonies "add to Portugal's consequence in the world," and also "since the fascist government has eliminated democracy within Portugal itself, it can scarcely allow a greater measure of freedom to the supposedly more backward people of its colonies."[54] Nor did Mondlane define exploitation solely in economic terms. Cultural imperialism, the denigrating or suppression of indigenous customs and cultures, was to Mondlane a part of Portugal's legacy in Mozambique.[55]

His ideas of revolution showed less reliance on Marxist-Leninist doctrine than his interpretation of imperialism. Marx preached revolution by an urban proletariat; Lenin viewed the peasantry as only a useful ally to his cause.[56] Mondlane, however, based the success of armed struggle and revolution on an African peasantry. This was, of course, dictated by the situation in Mozambique where the vast majority of Africans are peasants, and by Mondlane's admiration of the Chinese Revolution. His visit to China in 1963 deeply impressed him. The giant strides made by the Chinese and their widespread use of manpower as a way to industrial and agricultural development undoubtedly

...ired FRELIMO's head. The December 1963 issue of Mozambique ...ation recorded that: "He [Mondlane] left China convinced that the ...torical struggle of the Chinese peoples has relevance to the presen[t] struggle of the peoples of Africa."[57]

It would be incorrect, nevertheless, to emphasize only non-Africa[n] influences on Mondlane's political thought. He advocated that a singl[e] party state, like Tanzania, furnished the mode of government with the most sanguine possibilities for Mozambicans and indeed all Africans south of Sahara. When asked once to visualize what form of government an independent Mozambique would take under FRELIMO's leadership, he replied, "Our model is the neighboring state of Tanzania."[58] Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere's emphasis on cooperatives to increase agricultural production as a means of national development also provided an attractive experiment. Mondlane first proposed and then tried out the establishment of agricultural cooperatives to sustain the guerrilla army and civilian population in FRELIMO controlled zones. But after independence he resolved not to neglect mineral extraction or heavy industry in the rapid development of Mozambique for "any theory about the primacy of agricultural development."[59]

In this as in everything, Mondlane was very much his own man, with his own theories. He followed closely the successes and failures of resistance movements in other Portuguese territories, not with an eye toward mechanical imitation but to avoid their pitfalls and adapt their strengths, when possible, to the Mozambique situation.[60] In the months preceding FRELIMO's assault in Mozambique, Mondlane stated that the war would follow the pattern set in Algeria.[61] In 1967, three years after the war began, he reported that FRELIMO had derived its own conception of the struggle.[62] This same independence of thought characterized Mondlane's ideas of Mozambique when the conflict with Portugal was ended. Whereas some African leaders worried about neo-colonialism and its African agents weakening the economic independence of a new state, Mondlane reasoned that this was unlikely in the case of Mozambique.[63] He doubted that Portugal would grant nominal independence in return for profitable economic leverage. Rather than Lisbon creating a privileged African middle class with which to collaborate, Mondlane feared a growing South African shadow across Mozambique.[64]

Just as his political thought developed in its understanding of the peculiarities in Mozambique's situation, so also it evolved along a more radical path. The commitment to revolutionary and military means to achieve Mozambique's freedom from Portugal radicalized his political ideas. Mondlane did not content himself with saying that justice would reign when the colonial abuses disappeared. His goal went beyond a colonial war for political independence to a significant transformation of colonial and traditional society. At the root of his revolutionary philosophy lay the goal of restructuring Mozambican society, using the revolutionary struggle to obtain economic and political democracy.

Despite the vigor with which he pursued this far-reaching goal, Mondlane was considered moderate and pro-American by some journalists and a few Mozambicans.[65] Mondlane's policy of multiracialism and connections with the United States through his American education and wife contributed to this faulty belief. By outward appearances--a soft-spoken manner, amiable smile, and academic air--Mondlane misled many as to his radical approach. His chrismatic appeal and belief in a multiracial society gained him support from all races before a violent death by an assassin's bomb on February 3, 1969. Beneath this moderate exterior was a man of iron will who welded the divergent Mozambique splinter groups into a national movement and who provided it with a revolutionary ideology for success. Against heavy odds he not only led an insurgency that captured territory in northern Mozambique but operated it as an independent state with external trade, diplomatic relations, and services to the inhabitants.

Contrary to some opinion and the detriment of a myth, Mondlane was not pro-American nor moderate when it came to independence or social justice for Mozambicans. Whereas he was the antithesis of a epithet-hurling demagogue, Mondlane demonstrated his radicalism when it was especially dangerous to do so--in southern Africa as a youth, in Lisbon as a student, and in the final plunge to form a resistance movement which still fights in Mozambique with the revolutionary philosophy of its principal founder.

FOOTNOTES

1. Irene S. van Dongen, "Physical, Human, and Economic Setting," Portuguese Africa: A Handbook, ed. David M. Abshire and Michael A. Samuels (New York: Praeger, 1969), Part I, 12.

2. M. D. D. Newitt, "The Portuguese on the Zambezi: An Historical Interpretation of the Prazo System," Journal of African History, X, 1 (1969), pp. 67, 83.

3. James Duffy, Portuguese Africa (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), pp. 47-8.

4. David M. Abshire, "From the Scramble for Africa to the 'New State'," Portuguese Africa: A Handbook, Part I, 76.

5. Douglas L. Wheeler, "Gungunhana," Leadership in Eastern Africa: Six Political Biographies, ed. Norman R. Bennett (Boston: Boston University Press, 1968), pp. 168, 219.

6. Ronald H. Chilcote, "Eduardo Mondlane and the Mozambique Struggle," Africa Today, XII (November, 1965), p. 4. Interview

7. Eduardo C. Mondlane, "The Struggle for Independence in Mozambique," Southern Africa in Transition, ed. John A. Davis and James K. Baker (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 205.

8. Interview with the Director of the Program of Eastern African Studies, Marshall Segall, July 29, 1971; Chilcote, "Eduardo Mondlane and the Mozambique Struggle," p. 4.

9. John A. Marcum, "A Martyr for Mozambique," Africa Report, (March-April, 1969), p. 7; One of the people with whom Mondlane spoke while in Mozambique in 1961 was Samora Machel, the present leader of FRELIMO, see The Nationalist (Tanzania), June 25, 1971, p. 5.

10. Eduardo Mondlane, "Our Chances," The New African, IV (July, 1965), p. 105. An interview with the Swiss journalist, Hans Dahlberg.

11. Ronald H. Chilcote, "Les Mouvements de Liberation au Mozambique," Le Mois en Afrique, No. 7 (July 1966), pp. 31-9.

12. Ronald H. Chilcote, Portuguese Africa (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), pp. 119-120; Eduardo Mondlane, "La Lutte pour L'Independance au Mozambique," Presence Africaine XX (1963), pp. 14-20.

13. Estimates vary widely concerning the land and people wrested from Portuguese control. Depending on the source of information, claims of territory range from one-fifth to only eight per cent of Mozambique under FRELIMO control. The population within this zone was reckoned between 200,000 to nearly a million. For easily obtainable records showing the various estimates, see Africa Report, specifically January, 1969, p. 29; and March-April, 1969, p. 40.

NOTES Cont'd.

14. Mondlane, "The Struggle for Independence in Mozambique," p. 206.

15. Helen Kitchen, "Conversations with Eduardo Mondlane," Africa Report (November, 1967), p. 31.

16. United Nations General Assembly, 20th Session, Addendum to Agenda Item 23, A/600/Rev. 1 (1965), p. 181.

17. Eduardo C. Mondlane, "Race Relations and Portuguese Colonial Policy with Special Reference to Mozambique;" a paper given at the United Nations International Seminar on Apartheid, Racial Discrimination and Colonialism in Southern Africa (Lusaka, Zambia, 24 July-4 August 1967), p. 10.

18. Ibid., p. 12.

19. Ibid., p. 13.

20. Boletim Nacional (Dar es Salaam), XIII (October, 1964), p. 3.

21. Eduardo C. Mondlane, Press Conference in Dar es Salaam, March 25, 1968, p. 2. A copy can be found in the Mozambique file at the American Committee on Africa in New York, New York.

22. Boletim Nacional (Dar es Salaam), XIII (October, 1964), p. 3.

23. Information Bulletin (Cairo), II (June-July 1966), p. 8.

24. Eduardo Mondlane, The Struggle for Mozambique (Baltimore: Penquin, 1969), pp. 147-165.

25. Mozambique Revolution (Dar es Salaam), IV (March, 1964), p. 8.

26. Mondlane, The Struggle for Mozambique, p. 163.

27. Mozambique Revolution (Dar es Salaam), XXIII (December, 1965-January, February, 1966), pp. 2-3.

28. Boletim Nacional (Dar es Salaam), XX (May, 1955), p. 20.

29. Mondlane, The Struggle for Mozambique, p. 166.

30. Kitchen, p. 51.

31. Africa Report, October, 1968, p. 42; Anti-Apartheid News (London), October, 1968, p. 2.

32. Mondlane, The Struggle for Mozambique, pp. 166-67.

33. Eduardo Mondlane, "Mozambique War," Venture, XX, 7 (July-August, 1968), p. 10.

34. Paul M. Whitaker, "The Revolutions of 'Portuguese' Africa," Journal of Modern African Studies, VIII, 1 (1970), p. 29; The Observer (London) quoted in Maroum, p. 6.

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35. Anti-Apartheid News, p. 2.

36. Mondlane, The Struggle for Mozambique, p. 166.

37. United Nations General Assembly, 22nd Session, Addendum to Agenda Item 23 (Part II), A/6700/Rev. 1 (1967), p. 101.

38. In the World Council of Churches' information bulletin on FRELIMO (November, 1970, p. 14), the 1969 export figures in kilograms of main products for Cabo Delgado District alone are recorded as: cashew nuts, 53,041; sesame seeds, 414,782; groundnuts, 530,159; see also United Nations General Assembly, 22nd Session, Addendum to Agenda Item 23 (Part II), A/6700/Rev. 1 (1967), pp. 101-2.

39. United Nations General Assembly, 22nd Session, Addendum to Agenda Item 23 (Part II), A/6700/Rev. 1 (1967), p. 103.

40. Mozambique Institute 1965. Dar es Salaam, 1965, p. 1.

41. Mozambique Revolution (Dar es Salaam), XXIII (December, 1965-January, February, 1966), p. 3.

42. Frente de Libertação de Moçambique, Resolutions on the Armed Struggle reprinted in Mondlane's The Struggle for Mozambique, p. 189.

43. Frente de Libertação de Moçambique, Resolutions on Social Affairs reprinted in Mondlane's book, p. 194.

44. United Nations General Assembly, 22nd Session, Addendum to Agenda Item 23 (Part II), A/6700/Rev. 1 (1967), pp. 102-3.

45. Mondlane, The Struggle for Mozambique, pp. 185, 219-20.

46. Frente de Libertação de Moçambique, Resolutions on Foreign Policy. Reprinted in The Struggle for Mozambique, p. 195.

47. Ibid.

48. Under Mondlane's leadership FRELIMO belonged to the following organizations: Conference of Nationalist Organizations of the Portuguese colonies (CONCP); Organization of African Unity (OAU); Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization (OSPAA); Afro-Asian Latin American Peoples' Solidarity Organization (OSPAAAL); and World Council of Peace (WCP).

49. Mondlane, "The Struggle for Independence in Mozambique," p. 209.

50. United Nations General Assembly, 20th Session, Addendum to Agenda Item 23, A/600/Rev. 1 (1965), p. 180.

51. Mozambique Revolution (Dar es Salaam), XXVII (October, November, December 1966), p. 4.

52. Africa Report, May, 1967, pp. 29-30.

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53. Boletim Nacional (Dar es Salaam), XV (December, 1964), p. 12.

54. Mondlane, The Struggle for Mozambique, p. 124.

55. Ibid., p. 183.

56. Alfred G. Meyer, Leninism (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 126-29.

57. Mozambique Revolution (Dar es Salaam), I (December, 1963), p. 9.

58. Kitchen, p. 51.

59. Mondlane, The Struggle for Mozambique, p. 222.

60. Chilcote, "Eduardo Mondlane and the Mozambique Struggle," p. 6.

61. Christian Science Monitor, March 16, 1964, p. 11.

62. Kitchen, p. 32.

63. Many African leaders talked of the dangers of neo-colonialism, see for instance: Kwame Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism (New York: International Publishers, 1965), ix-xii; Amilcar Cabral, Revolution in Guinea (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969), p. 73; Julius Nyerere, The Arusha Declaratio (February 5, 1967), pp. 6-8.

64. Mondlane, The Struggle for Mozambique, p. 218.

65. The reference is to the incident of Father Mateus Gwenjere and the closing of the Mozambique Institute, see Africa Report, October, 1968, p. 41; Marcum, p. 8.

I wish to thank Professor Ronald H. Chilcote for allowing me to see of his documents deposited at the Hoover Institution in Stanford, California. Among the documents, to be published later, are the FR papers--Mozambique Revolution (Dar es Salaam), Boletim Nacional (Dar es Salaam), Information Bulletin (Cairo).