

Mozambique: Frelimo Official on S African Destabilisation

Maputo in English for abroad 1100 gmt 2 Mar 87

Text of recorded statement by Jose Luis Cabaco, Deputy Secretary for external relations of the Frelimo Party Central Committee:

South Africa, because it was feeling extremely isolated and extremely embarrassed by the continued evidences that they were not fulfilling their part on the Nkomati Accord, and they were not present themselves as a responsible government which could respect the international commitments, agreements, is operating an attempt to involve Malawi. First, they have tried to use Comoros as a base for the destabilisation of Mozambique, but Comoros was another problem. Comoros was not, at the moment was not mainly a strategic issue. It was mainly a point where they could receive some support that was not supposed to go directly to South Africa. This is what we call here the Arab connection, the Arab-Israeli connection, more or less, was coming through Comoros.

But in the strategy of destabilisation, Malawi was the key country, and they organised Malawi as the base. They moved the destabilisation from the south, around Maputo, mainly to the centre and the north of Mozambique, because Malawi borders both the centre and north of Mozambique, exactly to be able to explain to the world from the border of South Africa nothing happens in Mozambique. It's from the border of Malawi, it has to deal with the Malawians.

President Samora [Machel] made a statement on that direction in [words indistinct]. On his speech on Harare [as heard] President Samora denounced this, but the key point was (?what) President Samora always said: Look, we must not fall in the trap that South Africa is preparing to lead us to a conflict with Malawi, and we must be prepared to accept even very high prices not to go into this trap, because the day we start a conflict with Malawi the problem of southern Africa is not any more the problem of the bandits, of destabilisation of southern Africa, is not any more a problem between Africa, the freedom of Africa and apartheid, and racism and apartheid. The problem is going to be a problem between two African countries, and we will come from the United Nations into the OAU, and all those who at this stage are not able to support South Africa, but are eager to support South Africa will (?jump) on the support of this move.

And for you, I mean, for those who are [changes thought] for the anti-apartheid movement, it would have been a big pity because you would be left with half of the struggle to fight which is the internal struggle. All the external, I mean, all the struggle outside the borders of South Africa which are one of the important (?faces) of apartheid and one of the important elements of apartheid for its own survival. This would become an OAU problem, a problem between African countries in war, a problem of struggle for power, East-West conflict; I don't know what else could (?just) come from there and South Africa would have washed its hands from destabilisation, leaving destabilisation, leaving this part of the job to some of its partners. That is why we have been making intensive diplomatic efforts with Malawi, avoiding confrontation with Malawi and creating alternatives for an agreement with Malawi and that is why we are very [changes thought] and President Samora himself was very much engaged on preventing this at any or by any other circumstances.

Zaire could be a second stage of this strategy of South Africa, that's why President Samora was there (?with) Dos Santos; yes, you could understand he is a neighbour. Kaunda is [a] neighbour, but we are not neighbours of Zaire; but President Samora was there because he was pushing very hard this policy of avoiding [changes thought] make any effort to avoid that South Africa is able to create conflicts between African countries.