

PRETORIA DECLARATION OF OCTOBER 3rd 1984

Because of the South African government's commitment to peace and stability in Southern Africa, I, as Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of South Africa, approached the government of the Peoples' Republic of Mozambique and informed that government of South Africa's desire to see peace in Mozambique. I was assured that the Mozambique government reciprocated my sentiments. I then approached the Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo), which also expressed interest in peace in Mozambique.

Since then I have conducted negotiations, on the one hand with the government of the Peoples' Republic of Mozambique and on the other with Renamo, in order to work out a basis for peace in Mozambique which comprised the following:

- (i) Samora Moises Machel is acknowledged as the President of the Peoples' Republic of

Mozambique.

- (ii) Armed activity and conflict within Mozambique from whatever quarter or source must stop.
- (iii) The South African Government is requested to consider playing a role in the implementation of this declaration.
- (iv) A commission will be established immediately to work towards an early implementation of this declaration.

We have here today representatives of the government of the Peoples' Republic of Mozambique and of the Mozambican National Resistance. This declaration is made with their approval and their presence here signifies their assent thereto. The South African Government agrees to play a rôle in the implementation of this declaration and to participate in the work of the commission.

SOUTH AFRICA

Mediation in Mozambique

The Mozambique Government and leaders of the rebel Mozambique National Resistance (MNR) movement, also known as **Renamo**, agreed in Pretoria on October 3rd to end eight years of bloody civil war by giving their assent to a joint "declaration on a cessation of armed activity and conflict". They asked South Africa to monitor the ceasefire and help rebuild their country's shattered economy.

At a ceremony in Pretoria, Mr. P.W. Botha, the South African President, praised the agreement as "a signal to the world that we here today are serious in our efforts to achieve peace in our region and do so now".

The path ahead, he said, would be rocky and fraught with danger, and some of the obstacles along it would be placed there "maliciously by those who, for their own selfish reasons, do not want the peoples of Southern Africa to reach their destination".

As he spoke, the President was flanked by the Mozambique Government delegation led by Major-General Jacinto Veloso, Minister of Economic Affairs, and the Renamo representatives led by Mr. Evo Fernandes, the organisation's secretary general.

The delegations made no comments of their own, and no questions to them from the press were permitted.

Earlier, however, Mr. "Pik" Botha, the South African Foreign Minister, said the ceasefire declaration had been "made with their approval and their presence here signifies their assent thereto" (see box).

Negotiations on the ceasefire

agreement, which fills an important gap in the Nkomati Accord signed in March 1984 by South Africa and Mozambique (p. 7165) began in earnest in August and were resumed at the end of September. The South African Foreign Minister shuttled between the two Mozambique factions, who never met directly.

Mr. "Pik" Botha told journalists that South African troops would monitor the ceasefire on the ground and were ready to give immediate assistance by ploughing fields, rebuilding roads and bridges and reopening schools and hospitals.

He jibbed at a description of the South African troops as a peacekeeping force, but said one of their functions would be "to see that the parties do not break the ceasefire and do not take advantage of it".

The exact number of troops involved and their precise role would be decided by a commission on which all parties were represented, and which would also supervise the implementation of the ceasefire, Mr. Botha said. He would be chairman of the commission, but would normally delegate the job to a junior minister.

In addition to the ceasefire, the declaration also acknowledges Mr. Samora Machel as President of Mozambique. According to Mr. Botha the question of conditions for the rebels

to participate in a possible coalition government was never raised during the negotiations.

Mozambique sources suggested that, in addition to an amnesty already offered to guerrillas prepared to hand themselves over to the Maputo authorities, farming land and money might be made available to Renamo leaders wishing to resettle in the country.

Mr. Botha said that South Africa was not in a position to offer much financial aid, but added that Mozambique was now a member of the International Monetary Fund and the **United States** and the **EEC** countries had shown great interest in investing there once peace had been restored.

Rebel Forces

Renamo was set up in 1976, the year after Mozambique's independence from **Portugal**, by the Rhodesian Intelligence Service. In 1980 it was taken over by the South Africans after the fall of Mr. Ian Smith. At one time it had a training base in the Transvaal, and the South Africans supplied arms to the rebels by air and sea, sometimes sending in their own sabotage experts.

Renamo's troops, who are estimated at anywhere between 8,000 and 14,000 were initially recruited from members of the Portuguese colonial armed forces



(Financial Times)

and later from disaffected or purged members of President Machel's army. Their main targets have been roads, railway lines, bridges, saw mills, tea factories, cotton gins.

Under the Nkomati Accord, South Africa agree to cease supporting Renamo in return for Maputo's pledge not to provide sanctuary for guerrillas of the banned African National Congress (ANC). It is believed, however, that several thousand Renamo reinforcements were allowed to cross into the Maputo region from South Africa just before the accord was signed on March 16th. Certainly, rebel activity around Maputo has sharply increased over the past six months.

Conflicting Interpretations

The *Times* (UK) makes the point that a great deal of hard negotiation still needs to be done before a ceasefire can be put into effect in Mozambique, and the South African-sponsored agreement between the Mozambique Government and rebel forces to end their eight-year civil war could still come unstuck.

This was the conclusion drawn in Pretoria from the conflicting interpretations of the agreement being offered by the three parties to it. Merely to have secured an agreement in principle, and to have persuaded the two factions to negotiate, was in itself viewed as an astonishing diplomatic coup, but one which still left many questions unanswered.

No date was set for a ceasefire, and it is unclear how soon one is likely to be fixed. There is confusion over what role South Africa will play in its enforcement, and doubt as to whether the MNR has abandoned its demand for a share of political power.

According to Mr. Pik Botha, the South African Foreign Minister, South African troops will definitely be involved on the ground in the monitoring of the ceasefire, and will also, if required, help to rebuild roads, railways and bridges and repair other damage caused by the war.

All that remains to be decided, he said, is the number of troops involved

and the precise tasks they will be assigned. These are among matters to be determined by the joint Mozambique-Renamo commission which has been set up under South African chairmanship to implement the ceasefire. It has already met once.

Mozambique's chief negotiator Major-General Jacinto Veloso maintained on his return to Maputo that South Africa military involvement had not been discussed but he raised no objection to the idea.

However, the Renamo representative Mr. Evo Fernandes, was quoted as saying that it "will not accept the presence of South African troops, on Mozambican territory".

He was also quoted as saying that Renamo's acknowledgement of Mr. Samora Machel as President of Mozambique was merely "recognition of a current fact" and does not limit its future political demands.

Both Mozambique and South Africa insist that the ceasefire agreement is unconditional. The Mozambicans have said they will not allow the tripartite commission to be used by Renamo as a forum to pursue its demands for participation in a coalition government, and Mr. Botha seems to support that position.

On October 4th he dismissed Mr. Fernandes' remarks as "emotional sentiments" which he had not expected to be cut off overnight. (TT 4/10, 5/10, FM 5/10)

Regional Reactions

The Mozambique News Agency (AIM) felt that the Pretoria meeting was an important step towards creating peace in Mozambique.

"First, representatives of organised banditry accepted the authority of the Mozambican state. This was done implicitly in the acknowledgement of Samora Machel as President of the People's Republic of Mozambique. With that recognition, the bandits have recognised all the institutions of the state.

"Second, the South African Government has publicly agreed to play an active role in obtaining peace in Mozambique. This corresponds to the spirit of the Nkomati accord and the simple obvious fact that banditry has become harmful to the interests of South Africa. Only with the termination of

banditry in Mozambique will the Nkomati accord be of some use.

"Third, the representatives of the armed gangs recognised that they had no way out and that acts of violence were leading them nowhere.

"Fourth, the ceremony in Pretoria put an end to each and every speculation about any possible political accommodation of the armed bandits. What was achieved in Pretoria today could therefore contribute greatly to a declaration of banditry. The intention of the two governments is clear in this. However, in the coming weeks, difficulties may emerge. There could be obstacles to the process which aims at reintegrating thousands of Mozambicans into Mozambican society. These are Mozambicans who, as a result of their own violence, have been horribly depraved. Let us suppose for example that in the phase of the proceedings of the implementation commission there is an attempt to transform this essentially technical commission into a platform of political discussion. If we go by recent statements by Mozambican officials, such an attempt would jeopardise the whole exercise and eventually the Nkomati accord itself.

"Meanwhile, however important today's events in Pretoria may be, the fundamental element of the struggle against armed banditry remains on the ground. The fundamental role belongs to the Mozambique armed forces, FPLM, and other defence and security forces which in conjunction with the people are carrying out successive offensives against the armed gangs. If there is anything to be added to this, it is simply to say that now more than ever, such offensives must be escalated as a form of ensuring an end to the acts of violence in our country.

"If it was the political and military offensives on the ground which weakened the external support bases for banditry, today the external forces fully acknowledge the political uselessness of banditry. Thus, it becomes imperative to weaken banditry even further on the ground." (R. Maputo 4/10)

Swaziland lauded the Governments of Mozambique and South Africa, and the MNR, for the ceasefire agreement. A member of the Supreme Council of State, Dr. George Msibi, said the people of Swaziland welcomed any step that was designed to bring about peace and

stability in the region. He said Swaziland highly commended and acknowledged the role played by the South African Government in bringing the warring parties to the negotiating table. He said Swaziland also congratulated the President of the People's Republic of Mozambique, Samora Machel, for his maturity and statesmanship by negotiating with the MNR.

He expressed the hope that the parties involved in the Pretoria accord would appreciate that whatever they did affected the well-being of the peoples of the region, especially those of the Third World, who, he said, had a duty to conquer poverty, hunger, disease and ignorance. Dr. Msibi said the fact that the Government of Mozambique and the MNR realised and acknowledged the desirability of a ceasefire was particularly laudable in the light of the insane war they were fighting among themselves as a nation. He added that it was the sincere hope of the Swazi nation that Mozambique and the MNR would not be provoked by foreign elements to prolong the suffering caused by the war.

(R. Mbabane 4/10)

The Pretoria Declaration was "a spectacle played out by South Africa in order to make people forget the troubles which are sweeping through the country", according to the *Zimbabwe Herald*.

The Harare newspaper said the South African regime was attempting to put itself forward as an international mediator, but that Zimbabweans, "unfortunately neighbours of South Africa", were not fooled by this image.

(WA 22/10)

Pretoria's Dream Revitalised

The *Financial Mail* (Johannesburg) thinks that the rapid events of the past eight months have revitalised Pretoria's old dream of a constellation of southern African states. Not that any term adequately describes what is happening—not *outward policy* nor *detente* nor even the two-edged *destabilisation*. But regional foreign policy has undergone one of those rare but highly significant shifts in emphasis.

It was PM John Vorster who—somewhat reluctantly, it seems—reached out to Africa in the late Sixties. After initial failures, he began his travels in earnest: 1974 saw him laying the basis for trips to the Ivory Coast, Senegal and Liberia. But "detente" died

with the collapse of the joint Vorster-Kaunda settlement initiative for Rhodesia; and South Africa's intervention in the Angolan civil war in 1975-1976.

So by the second half of the Seventies, there was little left of the initial optimism. Marxist governments had taken power in Angola and Mozambique and both actively supported SWAPO and the ANC. There was countryside black unrest in 1976: the Rhodesian and Namibian wars escalated sharply; diplomatic pressure for Namibian independence escalated; and the UN imposed an arms embargo on South Africa.

In this climate, P.W. Botha assumed the prime ministership. He was seen as a hawk, and the power of the military was perceived as being on the rise. Within a year, however, the phrase "constellation of states" was all the rage. Foreign Minister Pik Botha expanded on the matter in a speech to the South African-Swiss Association in Zurich when he spoke of a regional "common approach in the security field, the economic field and even the political field."

But 1980 saw the accession to power of Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe. So instead of becoming the key state in the constellation under the leadership of Bishop Abel Muzorewa, Zimbabwe became the leading light of the Southern Africa Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC). The movement was the so-called 'frontline states' response to economic dependence of South Africa.

As if that kind of shunning of South African overtures was not enough, internal terrorism reached new heights with the ANC's sabotage of Sasol in June, 1980. A new, aggressive strategy was launched by Pretoria, and while some ultra-cautious South African academics named it "forward strategy", the world was blunter. "Destabilisation" was the charge.

Certainly, South Africa's new "forward policy" did not exclude direct military action. In 1981 South Africa began launching strikes at alleged ANC and SWAPO bases in Angola, Mozambique and Lesotho. And underpinning the entire strategy was a tightening of the economic screws. South Africa's *de facto* position as the economic powerhouse in southern Africa was unchallenged. Although the

country's GNP growth *per capita*—2.3% between 1961 and 1980—was low compared with industrial and upper middle-income developing countries such as **Brazil** and **Korea**, few African economies could hope to match this.

In a regional context, South Africa's economic dominance was unquestionable. Producing 77% of the total GNP (south of Zaire-Tanzania) and at least three-quarters of the output of coal, iron, wheat, maize, electrical power and rail transport, the patterns of dependency were clear. South African exports to Africa more than doubled between 1970 and 1980, with most for southern Africa.

On the other hand, few essential imports came from these countries. Although unskilled migrant labour from surrounding states certainly played a significant role in South Africa's past development, its importance in overall labour supply had diminished considerably in recent years.

Economic destabilisation did not, therefore, cost much. In the case of Mozambique it was hardly necessary. Hardline Marxist policies, an exodus of white skills, a severe drought and serious floods after cyclone Domoina devastated the economy. Zimbabwe and Lesotho got the message too; there were persistent border bottlenecks and locomotive shortages.

"Destabilisation" Pays Off

December, 1983, saw *Operation Askari* into **Angola** (p. 7072). And then, like a sudden Transvaal thunderstorm, it was all over. In January, 1984, top-level meetings started between South Africa and Angola, and South Africa and **Mozambique**. In February, South Africa and Angola agreed in Lusaka on a *de facto* ceasefire and a Joint Monitoring Commission (JMC) that would mean the gradual withdrawal of South African troops from Angolan soil (p. 7150).

In March South Africa and Mozambique signed the historic Nkomati Accord. It was not a flash in the pan. Despite setbacks and delays, the JMC is still operating smoothly in southern **Angola**. Pik Botha had several meetings with Angolan Interior Minister Kito Rodrigues; SWAPO's "father of the liberation" Herman (now Andimba) Toivo ja Toivo and many other detainees were released (p. 7193); and Sam Nujoma met with Namibian administrator-general Willie van

Niekerk. Regular contact was established with **Zambian** president Kenneth Kaunda who hosted a conference where the Namibian internal parties faced **SWAPO** in Lusaka (p. 7252).

The anti South Africa (p. 7193) rhetoric from Gaborone and Harare has subsided to a token trickle with persistent rumours of behind-the-scenes meetings with Pretoria. Relations with Maseru have thawed to such an extent that a **Lesotho**-South African non-aggression pact is expected in some circles. And, just as it seemed as if Nkomati was going to run onto the rocks, Pik Botha pulled off the joint Maputo-MNR Pretoria Declaration and a trilateral peace commission. (South Africa seems to be quietly preparing themselves to do the same in Angola; to act as "honest broker" between Luanda and **Unita**.)

Many explanations have been offered for South Africa suddenly and unexpectedly turning regional peacemaker. They include a weakening economy and the high cost of war, Western pressures, and so on. But according to the *Financial Mail*, Pretoria insiders give a different explanation—that what is happening now is proof that destabilisation *worked*; that it had a constructive component. According to one source: "Detente failed because the black states were not well enough motivated to talk to 'racist' South Africa openly. Destabilisation helped provide the motivation."

One indication that South Africa never saw destabilisation as an open-ended strategy with no real political objectives is the secret Nkomati-type accord signed with **Swaziland** in 1982—when destabilisation was at its height. Only after the accord with Mozambique was the earlier deal made public (p. 7201). It is clear that South Africa never, as was feared at the time, seriously considered toppling and replacing regimes. That would have been highly dangerous.

The main aims of South Africa's regional strategies seem to be twofold: to prevent neighbouring states acting as hosts for ANC and SWAPO guerrillas; and to make regional economic links tight enough to eliminate the spectre of sanctions and disinvestment.

No Illusions

But what then of South Africa's

ambitious plans for a constellation of states? asks the *Financial Mail*. The initial idea of an extended customs union, with a common development fund administered by the Development Bank of Southern Africa, together with an extension of the industrialisation programme, was quietly shelved. But this didn't prevent the consolidation and expansion of covert economic links. As Development Bank chief executive, Mr. Simon Brand says: "Southern Africa is not completely unfamiliar with finding ways to overcome political inhibitions to make sound economic arrangements work."

Meanwhile, the SADCC countries saw their dependency on South Africa increasing. A combination of effective destabilisation tactics, world economic recession, inappropriate economic policy measures and debilitating drought forced them to look to South Africa for food and essential supplies.

Despite SADCC's failure, the constellation remains an elusive ideal. But some realists in Pretoria are beginning to redefine its terms. Says RAU political scientist Deon Geldenhuys: "South Africa...was compelled to scale down its plans for regional co-operation; it was a case of reconciling the desirable with the possible. This has resulted in a much more modest and indeed more realistic conception of a favourable regional environment. The grandiose scheme for a regional constellation of states has given way to an overriding concern with security."

But Africa has no illusions about the process. As **Zambia's** Kaunda said in a recent interview: "Yes, humble Swaziland agrees, humble Mozambique accepts, humble Zambia hosts meetings of unequal neighbours like South Africa and Angola. What else can we do? But we are not doing it with happy hearts. We do it out of fear, but that fear will end one day. It is bound to."

Dr. Kaunda's comment implies an awareness that South Africa has bent its neighbours to its will through its military and economic supremacy. Given the *realpolitik* of the region, it was, in retrospect, unlikely to have occurred otherwise. But any inching towards peace—at Pretoria's pace and according to Pretoria's timetable—is refreshing and cause for moderate optimism. The conflicts of the past few years are abating, and, simply put, that is good news. (FM 19/10)

October 1-31 1984

Further Talks

Mr. Pik Botha, the South African Foreign Minister, concluded talks in Pretoria on October 30th with delegations from the **Mozambique** Government and the **MNR** before flying to **Cape Verde** for talks on **Namibia** and **Angola** with a **US** delegation led by Mr. Chester Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs.

The Mozambican talks "led to a better understanding of the positions of the respective parties", according to a Foreign Ministry statement.

But the difficult and delicate nature of the discussions, which were designed to bring about a ceasefire in the eight-year Mozambican civil war, was underlined by their bilateral nature. Mr. Botha, aided by Gen. Magnus Malan, Minister of Defence, and Deputy Foreign Minister Mr. Louis Nel, shuttled between the two delegations.

In Cape Verde, Mr. Botha was expected to discuss the signs of a greater Angolan flexibility towards the possible withdrawal of **Cuban** troops and the prospects for a withdrawal of South African troops from southern Angola and an end to the conflict in Namibia between South Africa and the South West Africa Peoples Organisation (**SWAPO**). (FT 31/10)

(See p. 7420B)

Last reference p. 7363BC