

A SHORT CHRONOLOGY OF THE NKOMATI ACCORD.

Country	Date	Event
SA/SW	82/02	SWAZILAND SIGNS SECRET NON AGRESSION PACT

The Pact with South Africa was signed at a time when both countries discussed "border adjustments". Pretoria offered to transfer the whole of the Kangwane 'homeland' and a part of Zululand in return for Swazilands cooperation against the ANC; the agreement was made public only in April 1984, but was hinted at earlier; see Star 82/11/02 and ISSUP Bulletin N 5/83.

SA/MZ	82/4	White Paper of Defence, April 1982:
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"In the onslaught against the RSA, the USSR had already planned, that after independence Zimbabwe was to play an important role in supporting the South African ANC. The unfavourable outcome of Zimbabwe's independence for the USSR compelled the latter to make greater demands on Mozambique. Increasing terrorist activities from Mozambique indicate that President Machel is prepared to involve his country more actively in the onslaught against the RSA... In addition to the current Cuban presence, East German and Soviet military personnel are becoming increasingly involved in direct support for the armed forces of Angola and Mozambique, as well as in training SWAPO and SA ANC terrorists and planning terrorist activities. The USSR also supplies armaments, including tanks and fighter aircraft, on a relatively large scale to these countries. The air defence systems of Angola and Mozambique have been and are still being improved by the USSR. These systems include advanced ground to air missiles and the attendant radar equipment."

"The presence of Soviet armaments in the neighbouring countries of the RSA, which include heavy and advanced equipment, increases the possibility of a conventional threat to the RSA and South West Africa, even in the short and medium term... The RSA must be protected and safeguarded with all the force at the disposal... If demanded by circumstances, this will include offensive pro-active action... The tranquillity following across border operations in areas of SWA that had suffered heavy terrorist attacks, is conclusive proof that offensive defence is indispensable for internal stability..."

SA/MZ	82/5/2	SA minister of Foreign Affairs on Non Aggression:
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"On November 1981 I stated 'The simplest and most convincing test of whether a country wishes to engage in subversion and destabilization is its declared willingness to enter into non-aggression agreements with neighbouring states and whether it harbours subversive elements actively engaged against the Governments of neighbouring states. The South African Government has consistently stated its views that it is in the interest of all countries in southern Africa that agreements should be entered into on these issues. Ideological differences should not predominate, but economic and practical considerations should be the determining factor. The need for all states in Southern Africa to act against any form of subversion aimed at neighbouring states is greater than ever."

US/SA/AQ	82/7/28	US intelligence report on expected SA invasion of
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Angola:

"Satellite photography taken yesterday showed an additional 92 tents and 33 armoured vehicles at the South African military base at Operet in Northern Namibia, indicating that as many as 1 200 troops have recently arrived or are expected there. Ten South African helicopters observed on Sunday at the Southern Angola town of Ngiva and as many as 16 Mirage fighters seen at Ondangwa airfield in Northern Namibia are still there."

"Foreign Minister Botha recently warned the US Embassy that Pretoria would feel compelled to launch a large scale attack if its deadline of mid-August for completing negotiations on Namibian independence and withdrawal of Cubans from Angola is not met."

SA/MZ 82/8/21 Malan militarily threatened Mozambique:

SA defence minister M. Malan said at the Natal provincial congress of the ruling NP that Russian made SAM-3 and SAM-6 missiles were being deployed on the borders. When similar weapons were installed on the Israeli border, he said, Israel considered it necessary to invade Lebanon to neutralize them.

SA/MZ 82/8/22 Samora Machel's reaction to Malan speech:

"A few days ago the South African regime alleged that Mozambique is threatening it by concentrating 'sophisticated weapons' on its border. What are these weapons that the regime is referring to? We do not represent a threat to anyone, either militarily or economically.... The sophisticated weapons are men and women of all races who do not see colours, regions or tribes and who identify with the same ideals of equality, fraternity, harmony and progress. We say in all sincerity, that the white South Africans, the Boers, are not our enemy. They are not foreigners in their country, nor in our continent. They are African people like us. It was racism and fascism that deformed the mentality of South African whites... Our enemy is apartheid, our enemy is Fascism. Our enemy is a small handful of interests hiding behind a barbaric ideology and philosophy in order to safeguard their privileges. The destruction of the stronghold of Apartheid will come from inside South African society. This destruction is spurred on by the blood of white martyrs like Neil Aggett and Ruth First..."

SA/AA 82/10/10 South Africa stakes its sphere of interest

Prime Minister P.W. Botha declared that SA's "sphere of interest" included all its neighbours. A government spokesman explained that this meant that SA would take military action if it felt that its interests were threatened. He further stated that 'if neighbouring states continue to harbour anti-South African forces they should not be surprised if South Africa considers doing the same for them.'

SA/NAM 82/10/25 SA DEFENCE MINISTER MALAN ON NAMIBIA OCCUPATION

South Africa could not withdraw from 'South West Africa' as the operational area would then be transferred to the northern Cape and South Africa would lose the initiative, Malan said at the weekend in George; the USSR's

success in Southern Africa should not be underestimated and with the deployment of military equipment in Angola and Mozambique, South Africa would have to prepare for conventional war. Four days later Malan had to interpret his George speech and said: "Any interpretation that I announced a new policy concerning a South African withdrawal from SWA would be incorrect...It certainly does not mean that South Africa has changed its attitude with regard to its negotiations on SWA/Namibia."

"South Africa is in the territory because withdrawal without a settlement there would open the operational area southward to the Orange River. Any report which gave another impression would not be reflecting the context of my speech, because I said in the course of the same speech that South Africa could not withdraw from SWA/Namibia without a withdrawal of the Cubans from Angola."

SA/NAM 82/10/29 Colonel Snowball, SADF-Military Intelligence Unit
in Namibia in interview to the FM:

"No problem. At the moment we are containing them (= SWAPO incursions) very well bar the rainy season incursions once a year when they try to infiltrate the white areas...Generally we'll be able to maintain the status quo for a long time...Any war's is a drain on the economy, obviously. But if one looks how we've developed since the weapons boycott - the only way you can develop arms is by physical testing. And, of course, we are testing in the operational area all the time...I have heard people quote the sum of a Rand One million per day, but if we pull out of SWA we are not going to demobilize...We'd have to develop new bases on the Orange River. So I think the economic side is overplayed; whether we are defending on the Cunene or on the Orange river makes no difference to us except, of course, you lose defensive depth that way. You'd have far more troops to be able to use in the Republic if we pulled back, but you'd have lost depth... We have everything militarily in our favour now. It's up to the politicians to use this power base that we've given them."

SA/AA 82/11/02 SA Strategy according to the Star International
Weekly (author: Josef Lelyveld):

"...The first black nation to fall into line was the independent kingdom of Swaziland. South Africa, it was revealed, signed a secret "anti-terrorist subversion agreement". It provided for active co-operation between the security forces of the two countries."

SA/MZ/LE 82/12 SA commandos kill 42 people in Maseru and destroy
oil tanks in Beira.

SA/MZ 82/12 Meeting in Komatipoort

The meeting between SA Foreign minister Pik Botha and the Mozambican Security minister, Jacinto Veloso and the security head of FRELIMO, Sergio Vieira came just one day after Swaziland succumbed to South African pressure and rounded up 25 ANC leaders, and after a week after the Maseru-Beira attacks. In the meeting Mr. Botha made it clear, that he wants the ANC out of Maputo.

SA/NAM 82/12/28 General C. Viljoen, chief of SADF on Namibia:

Constand Viljoen said, that he did not expect his troops in SWA to be withdrawn from the disputed territory during 1983: "I would hate ourselves to rush into a solution within the next year only to find ourselves going back in after two years, when SWA is again burning...We in South Africa must grasp the importance of reaching a lasting solution in SWA...We are capable of maintaining the situation for a long time to come."

SA/AA 83/1/1 SA Prime Minister warns of further military action and 'offers' non aggression pacts.

US 83/2/15 REGIONAL SECURITY US POLICY OBJECTIVE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA.
Chester Crocker before the subcommittee on Foreign Affairs:

"The United States seeks to help strengthen communication between the countries of southern Africa in order to ease tensions, bolster regional security, and encourage negotiated solutions and peaceful change...We seek constructive engagement with all the states of the region which wish the same with us. We do not approach the region with the belief that our task is to choose sides; on the contrary...This administration took office just as US relations with Mozambique reached a low-water mark. Communication with the Mozambican Government was practically non-existent; that country's policies seemed unalterably aligned with those of the Soviet Union and its satrapies, its perceptions warped by hostile information. But the utter incapacity of Marxist economics to cope with the problems of a developing country, and the conspicuous inability of the Soviet Union to assist Mozambique with security and political problems stemming from its isolation, led to indications that the Mozambican Government wished to re-establish communication with the United States...We believe that a solid basis now exists for a meaningful improvement in relations between us."

"Similarly, in our contacts with South Africa we quickly moved beyond discussion of the Namibian issue and bilateral questions to the overarching question of regional security...Regional security runs in both directions across international borders, and in southern Africa each side in every dispute claims grievances against the other...We recognize no state's right to harbour plotters or perpetrators of violence across borders and against other lands..."

"The Cuban troop issue is not an issue we made up; it is an objective reality at the core of the question of regional security. The South Africans...regard the Cuban troop issue as fundamental to their security concerns. Quite apart from that, the United States, as Vice President Bush said on November 19, 1982 in Nairobi, "is not ashamed to state the US interest in seeing an end to the presence of Cuban forces in Angola", just as we seek internationally recognized independence for Namibia..."

SA/MZ 83/5/5 Second Mozambique-South Africa ministerial meeting at Komatipoort.

SA/MZ 83/5/23 SADF raid on Matola in retaliation for the ANC bomb which exploded outside the Airforce Headquarters in

Pretoria

US 83/6/23 America's Responsibility for Peace and Change
Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Under Secretary for
Political Affairs, US State Department:

"To succeed in southern Africa, we must define a coherent regional strategy. Apart from Namibia, we are talking about a community of sovereign states. Southern Africa is interdependent economically in its infrastructure, its populations, markets, its natural links, and to an important degree in its external orientation...the states of southern Africa have to involve explicit or tacit ground rules for cooperation and coexistence, for the alternatives are all too obvious...A cycle of violence has begun: unless it is reversed the interests of the region and the West will be severely damaged."

"We have pressed for dialogue between South Africa and Mozambique and an end to cross border violence. Our efforts have been rewarded with two rounds of talks at ministerial level between the governments and a commitment to a continued search for understanding despite the pressures of recurring violence."

"This concept of regional security in southern Africa rests on several key premises. First, (the obligation) to recognize the rights and obligations of statehood. Respect for international boundaries and renunciation of the use of violence across them. Second, nized activities within their territory by guerrillas or dissidents planning acts of violence in the territory of another state....Third...Our task is not to impose a structure of security. The structure must rest on regional realities, mutual interests, and direct channels of communication...Fourthly...peaceful change in southern Africa and regional security are both urgently needed if the risks of growing international strife are to be avoided. In South Africa... a structure of regional stability in Southern Africa is unlikely to take root in the absence of a basic movement away from a system of legally entrenched rule by the white minority in South Africa..."

UNSC/NA 83/10 Security Council Resolution 539 (1983) on Namibia:

Paragraph 8 calls on SA to present "its choice of the electoral system" to the Secretary General to facilitate the immediate and unconditional implementation of UN Resolution 435. Res. 539 condemns SA for its "continued illegal occupation of Namibia in flagrant defiance of resolutions" and "rejects SA's insistence on linking the independence of Namibia to irrelevant issues" such as the presence of Cuban forces in Angola. Res. 539 also "affirms that the electoral system to be used for the elections should be determined prior to the adoption by the Security Council of the enabling resolution for the implementation of the UN plan". Further, "in the event of continued obstruction by South Africa", the Security Council would "consider the adoption of appropriate measures under the Charter of the United Nations"

SA/MZ 83/10/19 South African bomb explodes at ANC office in
Maputo. General Malan's comment:
So far, South Africa had conducted operations such as this one "clinically"

with only small task forces involved. He said, it would not be necessary for South Africa to show its full military might. "I hope that in the interest of peace and stability countries such as Mozambique will take note and act accordingly. This is in the interest of the whole subcontinent. Limpet mines and other bombs which explode inside South Africa do not just fall from the sky. They come here with the knowledge and cooperation of some of our neighbouring states."

The US State Department recated by saying: "This event and others in recent weeks underscore the continuing necessity to reduce tensions in the region and to halt the cycle of violence. These attacks resolve nothing."

SA/NA 83/11/12 Multi-Party Conference launched in Namibia.

Initial participants: SWANU, Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, SWAPO Democrats, Rehoboth Liberation Front, Damara Council and the Namibia Christian Democratic Party. (The last two parties were later to leave the conference). The Nationalist Party participates as observer.

UK/AA 83/11/16 British Policy towards Southern Africa: encouragement of "cross border talks".

Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe: "The black guerrillas should understand that attacks on South Africa merely strengthen (its) intransigence. They will make the whites even more fearful of making concessions. And the South Africans, for their part, have to see that destabilization of their neighbours risks precipitating the situation they fear most - making the Russians and their surrogates a more powerful factor in the equation." Howe said, a peaceful future for Southern Africa required the recognition of the responsibilities of statehood and of the meaning of sovereignty. "Those concepts are incompatible with support for, or toleration of, the work of organizations using violence in the name of politics. Those concepts must be recognized and acted upon on both sides of South Africa's borders. If they are not, the slide to military confrontation, to violence and instability, from which there can be no real winners will continue."

SA 83/11/16 ISSUP Bulletin 5/83 on Non Aggression Pacts:

"In addition to offering economic cooperation with, and assistance to, neighbouring states, South African politicians have frequently offered to conclude non-aggression treaties with the country's neighbours...At present South Africa has non aggression pacts with Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei, while some observers also refer to a "tacit" non aggression pact between South Africa and Swaziland. The non aggression agreements stipulate that the parties shall never...use armed force against one another's political independence or territorial sovereignty, but shall strive to resolve their disputes by means of negotiation or other peaceful means. The agreements stipulate further that neither of the parties shall allow its territory or territorial airspace to be used as a base, thoroughfare or in any other way by any state, government or person for military, subversive, or any other hostile actions or activity against the other party...."

"Although the insurgency threat is defined by implication in the abovementioned agreements, the right of hot pursuit is not acknowledged in these agreements. Such a development would be a positive contribution."

Non aggression pacts between South Africa and its neighbours would, therefore, be based on the foregoing model, centre mainly on the insurgency problem and would imply that a country such as Lesotho would formally undertake not to allow the African National Congress to use Lesotho as a springboard for acts of terror carried out against the Republic of South Africa. It would obviously not necessarily imply that in such case Lesotho would not still allow ANC representation in the country, or accept political refugees. But it would certainly imply stricter control over the activities of the ANC and of refugees. As far as South Africa is concerned, non aggression pacts with hostile neighbours would imply that the South African denial of alleged support to dissident movements such as the Lesotho Liberation Army and the Mozambique National Resistance, would be formalized. Furthermore, alleged South African "attacks" on infrastructural and other governmental targets in neighbouring countries would also be denounced in the pacts as being hostile and therefore an illegal act. By implication, cross-border operations would be ruled out...The inclusion of hot pursuit agreements in non aggression pacts...will obviously not be agreed on readily...Even if the alleged support for (internal dissident) groups is formally denounced through a non aggression pact, their activities will obviously continue..."

"As the "destabilization" accusations against South Africa mount, and South African cross border operations become more frequent, non-aggression pacts seem at least a logical approach..."

SA/AO . . . 83/12/16 South Africa offers a disengagement of its troops in Angola and, at the same time starts its military offensive "operation ASKARI" attacking Angolan towns to the north of the zone occupied by SA.

SA/MZ 83/12/20 Security talks between Mozambique and South Africa.

The SA delegation is headed by Pik Botha, FO, Magnus Malan, Defence, Louis le Grange, Law & Order, and Dr. Neil Barnard, National Intelligence Service. The Mozambican Delegation is headed by Veloso, Presidencia, O. Monteiro, Justice, S. Viera, Gov. of Niassa, and J. Moiane, Gov. of Maputo.

Colonel Oscar Monteiro presented a list of SA military actions and economic sabotage against Mozambique. This the SA delegation resented.

SA/AO 83/12/29 Dawn bombardment of SA Air Force against strategic airfield of Lubango, as well as against anti-aircraft batteries based at Cahana (250 km from the border). The chief of the SADF, Gen Constand Viljoen, argued:

"The anti-aircraft batteries were positioned at SWAPO bases and were manned by SWAPO members, but it was also possible, - that they were operated by Cubans and MPLA forces... We have dropped leaflets informing them that we are seeking SWAPO and do not wish to get into

a confrontation with the Angolans. But if they get involved, we have no other choice but to attack SWAPO inside their lair. This is also the reason why we have bombed and shelled with artillery several of their anti-aircraft missile batteries."

SA/AO 84/01/04 Statement of SA Ambassador von Schirnding in UN Security Council:

"In requesting this meeting of the Security Council the permanent representative of Angola in his letter dated 1.1.84 ...transmitted a message from the president of Angola to the Secretary General in which reference is made to..."the worsening military situation in Southern Angola created by the progressive moves by the South African military units further north into Angolan territory" and expressed a wish to avoid "a situation that would lead to disastrous consequences, which would in turn threaten peace and security in the region."

"South African Security Operations in Southern Angola have but a single objective and that is the protection of the inhabitants of SWA/Namibia from SWAPO terrorist attacks which are launched from Angolan territory."

"The presence in Angola of the Cuban and other surrogates representing ideologies completely foreign to Africa...is indeed a threat to peace and security in the region, and is leading Angola to disastrous consequences because the people of Angola refuse to succumb to the tyranny which has been imposed on them with the direct assistance of the Cuban forces."

"The government of South Africa indicated on 16.12.83 that it was prepared to begin a disengagement on 31 January 1984 of forces which from time to time conduct military operations against SWAPO in Angola on the understanding that this gesture would be reciprocated by the Angolan government which would assure that its own forces, SWAPO and the Cubans would not exploit the resulting situation, in particular with regard to actions which might threaten the security of the inhabitants of SWA/Namibia...The SA government's offer still stands. Its language is clear: if Angola desires peace it can have peace by not allowing SWAPO to operate from its territory and by not exploiting any arrangement for the cessation of hostilities. As regards the implementation of Security Council Res.435 (1978), SA has stated that it remains prepared to begin the process of implementation, upon resolution of the problem of the Cuban forces in Angola..."

SA/LES 84/01/05 Dissidents of Lesotho National Party form UDA

As a reaction of Jonathan Leabuas tour of communist countries and of his establishing diplomatic relations with the USSR, China and North Korea, several members of the Lesotho NP resigned; together with some other opposition politicians they went to Pretoria in January 5. Phako Chaolane and Thomas Mofolo, two members of the dissident group of six told, how they met the SA Foreign Minister Pik Botha, his deputy, Louis Nel, and the chief of the SA Security Police, General Francois Steenkamp, and at Botha's urging formed the UNITED DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE. Chaolane was elected leader of the alliance. Botha promised that SA would help finance its campaign when elections are held in Lesotho in November or December 1984.

SU/AO 84/01/05 TASS statement demands withdrawal of SA troops and an immediate halt to all SA acts of aggressions,

US/AO 84/01/06 both direct and indirect, against Angola.
Ambassador Charles M. Lichenstein at UN Security Council of UN:

"...Cross border violence cannot be condoned, whether it be in the form of terrorist attacks by externally based organizations or a violation of the territorial integrity of Angola by South African Forces. Neither contributes to the process of building a structure of peace...in the region...There are no military solutions to the problems of the region. Negotiated solutions are both possible and essential...The SA offer and the Angolan acceptance together provide a hopeful basis for moving toward a disengagement of forces and a cease fire... We deplore the South African military activity in Angola this day. Such action and any escalation of hostilities not only endanger the prospects of a settlement, but also poison South Africa's relations with it's neighbours and, indeed, with the international community. We have urged restraint on South Africa. We expect them to respond."

UNSC/AO 84/01/06 Security Council resolution demands immediate withdrawal of SADF from Angola.

Britain explained why it abstained from voting on the resolution by saying, through Martin Rifkind, Minister of State in the Foreign office: "When we came to decide whether we should vote or abstain, we had to look very carefully at the resolution. One important part of it seemed to be encouraging further foreign intervention to help the Angolan government to counteract the South African invasion. We don't believe that the South African incursions should be to encourage any further foreign involvement in that country." The call for sanctions against SA was also a reason for the UK to abstain from voting.

SA/AO 84/01/08 Magnus Malan announces withdrawal of SADF from AO

He warns that the SADF would, if necessary strike again, "regardless of the consequences". The chief of staff operations, Lieutenant-General Ian Gleeson denies that the "scaling down" of defence force operations in Angola was connected with the december offer to disengage; but Malan identified himself with the view that the dispute over SWA should be solved by negotiation rather than by military force.

Foreign minister Pik Botha criticizes the UN Security Council Resolution: "The SA government rejects that decision and reaffirms its standpoint. The SAG accepts that its standpoint may lead to confrontation with the world...As far as the Security Council is concerned the SAG gives notice to that council that it can do whatever it pleases and take any decision that it may choose."

NA 84/01/06 SPLIT WITHIN SWANU PUBLIC

SWANU's chief representative in Botswana, Mr. Ngaijakae Tjijuzu, and SWANU's mission abroad, represented by K. Haakuria, I. Neroro, N. Keeja, J. Maamerua and U. Kohore, called in a public statement for an extraordinary congress of SWANU to elect a new SWANU president in order to replace the present one, Mr. Katjiuogua. The statement described the Multi-Party Conference as a South African puppet show. It is understood that the former SWANU president sides with the present SWANU dissidents.

SA/NAM 84/01/09 RDM Editorial titled: "Lets get out of SWA"

SA/MO 84/01/09 Pik Botha announces that SA and Moz delegations will meet simultaneously in Pretoria and Maputo on 16.01.84 as a sequel to the talks in Swaziland on Dec 20th.

SA/AO 84/01/09 An SADF spokesman says, that withdrawal order has been given, but that it was difficult to say how far the withdrawal had progressed. The Cape Times Defence Reporter, Willem Steenkamp, points out that the Dec 83 to Jan.84 invasion into Angola (Operation Askari) was the most costly SADF operation since 1975.

MZ 84/01 Mozambique's External debts.

The National Planning Commission in its economic report estimates the country's external debt at US \$ 1.35 billion. Almost half is bank loans, and about 40% is bilateral government to government credit. Mozambique access to multilateral credits has been restricted to funds from the African Development Bank and OPEC. Debt service payments totalled \$ 200 million last year - almost double Mozambique's exports, excluding sales worth 30 million to the centrally planned economies. If invisible exports are taken into account, the debt service ratio exceeds 65%. Debt service payment will be forced 20% up this year to \$240 million, pushing the ratio above 80%. Therefore Mozambique is forced to ask international bankers to reschedule its foreign debt.

SA/AO 84.01.11 Luanda reports to the UN that there was no fundamental change in the military situation and no signs of withdrawal of SA armed forces from Angolan territory. The USSR publishes its TASS statement of Jan 5th as an official UN Sec.Council document.

SA/NAM 84.01.12 SWAPO reacts to SA offer of direct talks by stating:

"SWAPO hopes that Pretoria is now serious, that it's announcement that the so-called Administrator General, the colonial governor of Namibia, will meet SWAPO for direct talks is genuine." It added that SWAPO hoped the talks would not be a repeat of the 1981 Geneva talks "when South Africa turned the conference into a public relations charade by instigating its Namibian puppets to hurl abuse and insult at SWAPO, the UN and independent Africa." The only topic for discussion should be the calling of a ceasefire and the subsequent implementation of UN Resolution 435.

SWAPO insists, that the AG have a mandate to negotiate a ceasefire tied to the implementation of Res 435 of 1978.

Pik Botha reacted by saying that SWAPO's statement was "provocative" and "petulant": "SWAPO has chosen to make cheap propaganda points in its response to South Africa's indication that it would have no objection to discussions between SWAPO and a delegation led by the Administrator General...If SWAPO chooses to respond in such a provocative manner to South Africa's efforts to find a peaceful solution to the SWA question, then the SA Government cannot see much point in continuing with the exercise." (RDM 13.1.84)

SU/AO 84/1/12 Tripartite conference between USSR, Cuba and Angola.

The USSR and Cuba decide to step up their defence as well as their economic aid to Angola. Plans to build a new oil depot, a fishery plant and to extend the building industry were signed by Lopo do Nascimento (AO) and Alexander Kachanov, the deputy chairman of the Soviet Foreign Economic Relations Committee.

SA/MO 84/01/13 RDM reports that a consensus has been reached on "practical ways and means of eliminating all forms of subversion and violence". To be negotiated are the means to ensure that both parts adhere to the security agreement. The SA offer to Mo is alleged to be:

1. SA tourist traffic could be worth up to R 100 million a year. 2. A new agreement on delivery of Cahora Bassa electricity delivery could make MO earn more than R 50 million/year; 3. there will be more traffic on the Komatipoort-Maputo railway; 4. there might be an increase of Mozambican miners being recruited to SA.

SA/AO 84/01/13 SADF gives a press conference at Evali, 120 km inside Angola on Soviet weapons captured during operation Askari, amongst them three 30mm automatic grenade launchers and SAM 9 missiles.

SA/AO 84/01/15 The SADF states publicly that the last (! sic!) South African soldiers and SWATF members have left Angola and returned to SWA. The withdrawal from Southern Angola took them a week to complete. See entry SA/AO 84/02/01

MO 84/01/15 Mozambique strengthens defence structures. Samora Machel announces, that there will be three deputy ministers of defence: Lieut.-General Sebastiao Mabote, the chief of Staff of the FPLM; Major General Armando Panguene and Colonel Sergio Vieira. Panguene is also the the national political commissar of the FPLM and a member of the secretariate of FRELIMO's Central Committee.

Also appointed were two new secretaries of defence: Major General Joaquim Munhepe (commander of Sofala) and Major General Gideon Ndobe (member of the FPLM's political commissariate). The new military commander of Sofala is Brigadier Aleixo Malunga. Major General Antonio Hama Thai, at present military commander of Inhambane, was appointed head of the Mozambican Air Force. Major General Joao F. Pelembe was appointed director of the strategically important military training centre at Dondo in Sofala province. Pelembe had been governor of Gaza until his dismissal in 1982. Major General Salvado Mutumuke was made new military commander of Maputo province.

SA/NAM 84/01/16 The RDM (author Chris Freimond) in a propaganda article on the COIN unit Koevoet in Namibia ends the article with these remarks:
A controversial aspect is whether KOEVOET should be a police unit at all. It has no conventional police duties and when the war winds down it seems unlikely that the black personnel will be deployable in a conventional police role...In terms of the settlement details all military units must pull back to specified bases, but police units will continue with the normal duties. And KOEVOET - although a police unit - is tasked solely with hunting down and killing SWAPO guerrillas.

SA/MO 84/01/16 Security talks between SA and MO in Pretoria.

The South African delegation was made up of Lieut.-Gen. Johan Coetzee, Commander of Police; J.P. Roux, Secretary General of the Prime Ministers office; Lieut. Gen. Ian Gleeson, chief of Staff Operations of the SADF; Ray Killen, Deputy Director General of ministry of Foreign Affairs; E.W. van Zyl of the security Services and three members of Foreign Affairs.

The Mozambican Delegation was made up of Col. Jose Oscar Monteiro, minister of Justice and member of FRELIMO's Politbureau; Col. Sergio Viera, deputy defence minister; Major General Antonio Hama Thai, chief of the air force; Major General T. Nalyambipano, deputy minister of Security; Lieut. Colonel Fernando Homwana, assistant to the president; Francisco Madeira, the Mo ambassador to Tanzania; A. Chissano, Cabinet of the Presidencia and Major J. Chongo of the Mozambican Border Guards.

Communique: "Following a meeting in SWAZILAND on December 20 between ministers of both countries, delegations met at Pretoria yesterday for discussions on practical ways and means of achieving peace and security and good relationships between the two countries on the basis of internationally established principles of relations between sovereign states. They considered measures to be taken in order that the territories of neither state should serve as a springboard for aggression and violent action against the other. They also discussed practical mechanisms to ensure the implementation of the objective as well as the continuity of the process"

SA/MO 84/01/16 Parallel talks in Maputo on Cahora Bassa, on economic relations (transport and migratory labour) and on tourism.

NAM 84/01/16 SWAPO destroys a cool drink factory in Ovamboland, owned by the National Development Corporation and a business complex in Okakarara, about 200 km northeast of Windhoek, also owned by the First National Development Corporation.

After seven years of drought, now ended by rains, Namibia suffers under a locust plague and hailstorms.

AO/SA 84/01/17 Angolan government agrees on ceasefire talks with SA on conditions that 1) SWAPO will agree to the possible arrangement; 2) SA military units withdraw completely from Angolan soil; 3) SA promises to begin the implementation of UN Security Council resolution 435 (1978) on the independence of Namibia.

NAM 84/01/17 Five SWAPO fighters have been discovered in the Tsinsbis area north of the white farming area, but have not been tracked down by Koevoet.

Multiparty Conference.

The SWA branch of the Nationalist Party, AKTUR, has entered the MPC as a full participant, its delegation led by Kosie Pretorius. Direct negotiator is Eben van Zijl.

Militants within SWANU have already called present SWANU leader Moses Katjiuongoa a reactionary collaborator for his participation in the talks of the MPC.

AO 84/01/19 Rightwing members of the European parliament (french, british, german) invited UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi to address the European parliament. The French EMP, Olivier d'Ormesson, applied for a French visa for Savimbi.

US/SA/AO 84/01/20 Praia, Cabo Verde, tripartite consultations.

The US ambassador to Cabo Verde, John Yates and a senior state department official (Wisner ?) were reported by ANGOP to having met with two South African Foreign Office envoys, one of them being Dave Steward, the former South African ambassador to the UN. Angola's deputy foreign minister Venancio d'Moura was said to have participated in the meeting. Luanda, however, issued a denial that it was involved in the reported meeting. Mr. Steward has not returned to South Africa, but gone further to Mindelo, Zambia.

NAM 84/01/20 Anglican Church leaders condemn SADF in NAMIBIA.

The Anglican Bishop of Namibia, the Right Rev. James Kauluma and the Dean of Windhoek, the Very Rev. David Bruno, sent a letter to the British "Times" stating that SA troops in Namibia are unwelcome intruders: "...All personnel who come generally under the umbrella of "South Africa" - whether they be the police, the SADF, the SWATF, Koevoet, black, white or brown, - are regarded by most local people as having NO RIGHT to be there and, to some degree, as being their real "enemy".

It has been one of the devastating failures of the South African presence in Namibia, and especially in the north, that they have not, on the whole, commended themselves to the local population, but in fact have spread fear and mistrust and the people feel constantly intimidated."

SA/MZ 84/01/21 The MTR representative in Lisbon, Jorge Correia, said, peace could only be established by making the

MNR a key party to any negotiations between Mozambique and South Africa.

SA/SU 84/01/23 South African perception of Soviet strategy.

A security conference in Durban, organized by the South African Institute of International Affairs and the World Peace Foundation of Boston, represented by its trustee Robert Rotberg, came to the conclusion, that South Africa lacks the expertise to assess the Soviet threat to Southern Africa with any accuracy and that the USA does not wield as much power over the area as was often assumed.

SA/AO 84/02/01 DISENGAGEMENT OF SADF FROM ANGOLA TO BEGIN TODAY.

(Compare with statement at the end of operation Askari on 15th January 84)

Prime minister P.W. Botha said in the SA parliament: "On the basis of assurances received from the United States government during the latest round of discussions in Cape Town on January 27 and 28, I now wish to confirm the Republic of South Africa's decision to begin disengaging its forces in Angola with effect from today." To achieve a climate of increased security in the SWA/Angolan region "trilateral discussions between the RSA, the USA and Angola are not excluded", Botha said. The SA Government now expected SWAPO not to take military advantage of the situation, Botha said. He added that the South African disengagement did not mean that South Africa was backing down from its insistence that Cuban forces be withdrawn from Angola as a prerequisite of the UN settlement plan for Namibia.

In a meeting with MPC representatives a few days previously Mr. Botha said he had informed them that "the interests of the Republic of South Africa are of paramount importance to me and if there is to be a choice between the interests of the RSA and the interests of SWA I will give priority to the interests of the RSA...I also said, that the RSA is no longer prepared to shoulder the tremendous financial burden of SWA alone...I believe that the leaders of SWA who came to see me are now under no illusion about my government's determination to resolve this matter one way or another and as soon as possible...I therefore trust that South Africa's position is perfectly clear. It is up to the political leaders of SWA to decide what they are going to do and to do so urgently," Mr. P.W. Botha said.

SA/NA 84/02/01 MPC charged with creating new constitution.

In Windhoek the SA Administrator General, van Niekerk, said, Mr. P.W. Botha had also made it clear that the political leaders of SWA assembled in the Multi Party Conference should urgently accept more responsibility for the future of the territory. "The MPC today accepted this challenge", van Niekerk said, pointing out, that the MPC was now about to create a new political and constitutional dispensation in Namibia which was acceptable to the majority of its population.

SA/NA 84/2/4 RDM: AG 8 to be scrapped?

The RDM reports that P.W.Botha demanded of the MPC to scrap SWA's present ethnic constitution -AG 8 - The scrapping would mean the abolition of ethnicity from the constitution. That would be the end of the 2nd tier governments and would mean the formation of a strong central government. In this context it was reported that the MPC was considering the formation of an interim government. A spokesman for Dr.van Niekerk said, however, that "total scrapping of AG 8 is not on the table".- But informed sources say that even if the legislative assemblies of the 2nd tier governments are not scrapped, their functions and structure will be drastically changed in the direction of tighter financial control (see Thirion Commission on corruption).

SA/NA 84/2/5 MPC participant in future Namibia negotiations?

Mr.Shipanga said, South Africa had intimated it would accede to an MPC request to take part independently of any other party in discussions on the future of Namibia.

SWAPO stated in London, it was prepared to negotiate with a delegation headed by the South African Administrator General, but indicated that it was not prepared to discuss issues extraneous to UN resolution 435.

SA/NA 84/2/16 DEATH OF CUBAN LINKAGE FACTOR ?

Simon Barbers Argument (RDM): The US no longer endorses the position that Cuban withdrawal is a prerequisite for Namibian independence. Crocker in his Cape Town talks was determined that South African disengagement from Southern Angola on a trial basis must not fail. Perhaps the South Africans had intended it to fail. Crocker had three factors working for him: 1) Mozambique's willingness to negotiate detente with Pretoria even for the price of expelling the ANC; 2) The Soviet Union informed Pretoria that it was not prepared to see the MPLA beaten up and introduced into Angola SAM-9s, which had knocked down US bombers over Lebanon recently; 3) The US offered diplomatic recognition to the MPLA government without the Cuban strings attached. A few days before the Cape Town talks Frank Wisner, Crocker's deputy, got a positive Angolan response in his Cape Verde meeting. Therefore the US could assure P/W.Botha that the MPLA would not only accept the disengagement, but would also use its good and other (!) offices to dissuade SWAPO from interfering. Botha then agreed to reconsider his previously immutable insistence on total Cuban withdrawal before a Namibian solution. Botha also announced that tripartite US/SA/Angolan talks were a possibility. S.B.considers it significant that Lawrence Eagleburger said recently that Southern Africa might be one area the US could fruitfully discuss with the new USSR leadership. - The differences between the UNITA and the Angolan government are, acc. to the US, to be resolved once the "broader issues" are out of the way.

NA 84/2/16 SWAPO president Sam Nujoma contacts the governments of Great Britain and Canada to press them to push harder for the implementation of Res.435.SAWPO is obviously concerned that the US and SA will attempt a Namibia settlement under disregard of Res.435.

NA 84/02/18 The Multi Party Conference in Windhoek threatens to form an interim government, if a settlement is not

achieved soon. However, the MPC has not yet been able to agree on any one point. It could not agree on a unanimous call for an implementation of UNSC Res.435; the DTA does not want to risk an election loss; the NP (2nd an MPC ~~observer~~) has always been against 435.

SA/AO/US 84/2/16 LUSAKA AGREEMENT ON DISENGAGEMENT

Tripartite talks in Lusaka. Members of the SA delegation are Pik Botha, Magnus Malan, Hans van Dalsen (Foreign Affairs), Dr. Neil Barnard (Dir.-Gen. of National Intelligence Service), Brand Fourie, the SA Ambassador to Washington, General Jannie Geldenhuys, chief of the SA army, the AG of SWA, Dr. Willie van Niekerk.

Angola is represented by the Minister of Internal Affairs, Alexandre Rodriguez. The US by Chester Crocker.

Parties agreed to establish a joint commission to monitor the disengagement process in the war zone of Southern Angola. At the invitation of the other two countries, the USA can participate in the commission's dealings.

A timetable has been set for the complete withdrawal of SA soldiers from Southern Angola, accompanied by an Angolan reassertion of its sovereignty over the evacuated territory. Angola will not allow its Cuban or SWAPO allies into the reoccupied territory.

Pik Botha equated the disengagement process which began on Jan 31 with a ceasefire and officially confirmed for the first time that disengagement meant withdrawal of South African troops from Southern Angola. He rejected reports that the USA is no longer insisting on withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola in the context of a Namibia solution./

SA/MZ/PO 84/2/13-19 Trilateral Talks on Cahora Bassa.

Problems: SA pays 0.5cents per kwh for energy transported along 1400 km of cable lines. Pretoria does not pay for electricity not received in South Africa, but produced by the Cahora Bassa installation. MNR sabotage put out of order some 43 pylons of the cable line. Result: Portugal which holds 82% of the Cahora Bassa corporation, has not been able to repay its debts incurred for the construction of the dam. The FRG alone granted credits of about 600 million DM for the construction of the dam to Portugal. Because of its recession Portugal wants to cut its losses and start earning profits on the dam. Portugal is said to demand that Pretoria pays for the power as it leaves the dam irrespective of whether the power reaches the Transvaal. (SUN EXP 19.2.)

SA/MZ 84/2/20 Bilateral Security Talks

Maputo. The South African Delegation: Pik Botha, Louis le Grange (Minister of Law & Order), Magnus Malan (Defence Minister), J. van Dalsen, Dir. General of Foreign Affairs; Dr. Neil Barnard, Dir. Gen. of National Intelligence Service; Gen. Johan Coetzee, Commissioner of the SA Police Forces; Lieutenant-General P. van der Westhuizen, chief of intelligence of SADF, Maj. Gen. J. F. J. van Rensburg, Secretary of the SA State Security Council.

See Communiqué of meeting in Noticias. At the end of the meeting there was a short press conference during which Pik Botha

said: "I raised the question of property owned by South Africans at the time of independence in Mozambique and we agreed to look into the matter and put forward proposals for practical solutions."

SA 84/2/21 Security Talks as argument against sanctions.
Deputy Foreign Minister Louis Nel told the American Chamber of Commerce in SA: "Events in South and Southern Africa during the last few months and weeks - if not days - have changed the scene in which the proponents of sanctions against, and revolutions in, South Africa have to operate." Nel further said, South Africa's neighbours had accepted the government's sincerity to act as a "positive, stabilizing force" in the region. A climat of mutual trust had been created and there were expectations of cooperation and peace.

SA/AO 84/2/21 Pressconference in Luanda by Lt Col Alexandre Rodrigues 'Kito':

"Questions about UNITA were raised with both the American and South African delegations. We expressed our concern to the South Africans because we know that there are UNITA groups in the disengaged areas. Obviously, (this) is only possible owing to the protection they get from the South African forces. Of course this is also a matter which the joint commission will try to solve as the work proceeds."

"South Africa has not directly answered ours statements that they support UNITA. However, they do not deny the existence of a UNITA presence on Namibian territory and that they in fact give such support... Yet we believe that the implementation of res 435 will solve the problem, since the South African troops will have to withdraw from Namibia. Once this happens we hope South Africa's support for UNITA will cease."

SA/AO 84/2/25 First Session of Trilateral Monitoring Commission.

It took place at Cuvelai in Southern Angola; it was prompted by the SA intelligence that some 800 SWAPO guerillas were on the move towards or inside Northern Namibia. The SUN Times reports: "The SA delegation accepted that the Angolan government could not be expected to exercise control over SWAPO forces which had already moved into the 'cordon sanitaire' which South African special forces have unofficially been maintaining in Southern Angola since 1981." The Angolan government declared that it could not be held responsible if SWAPO fighters were infiltrating Namibia from its territory, because the area was still under the control of South African troops. It is understood by both countries, that if SWAPO forces were encountered in Southern Angola by disengaging South African Security Forces, they would be attacked by them.

The South African delegates on the commission were General J.J. Geldenhuys, chief of the SADF, and D.W. Steward of the Department of Foreign Affairs. They expressed, as Pik Botha said, "extreme concern over recent SWAPO activities in the SWA/Namibian - Angolan border area, which are contrary to the letter and the spirit of the agreement reached in Lusaka." Effective monitoring operations are to start on the 8th of March 84.

SA/MZ 84/02/25 Commentary of Stanley Uys (RDM) on SA's political gains from negotiations with MZ:

1.)It is cheaper to control one's neighbours by emeshing them in a web of economic relationships thaby destabilising them.
- 2)A treaty with MZ will

help to legitimise black relationships with SA. 3) The treaty will sharpen the conflict of interest between the ANC and SWAPO on one side and the SADCC states, their host countries, on the other. 4)The present cohesiveness amongst the frontline states, within the OAU will diminish. 5.) The treaty will be a blow to the campaign for full economic sanctions against South Africa. 6.) SA propaganda will show the treaty as being the defeat of communism in Africa and as a triumph of the free enterprise system over the communist one. Mr. Botha's government is perfectly placed to act as the West's agent & instrument in the contest between Eastern and Western economic systems in Africa. 7.) It does not follow that a Namibian settlement will ensue from an Angolan treaty.

SA/LES 84/02/25 Pik Botha meets his Lesotho counterpart in Johannesburg; allegedly to discuss the effects of the new SA income tax legislation on Basotho working in SA; but they also discussed security matters. SA demanded a tighter non-aggression agreement with Lesotho.

UK/NAM 84/02/26 The British Uranium Procurement Organization announces that it will not renew its Uranium contract with Rossing Mine, which ends at Dec. 1984.

SA/AO 84/2/26 A recent group of foreign journalists which visited UNITA zones in Angola, travelled via road links to Zaire. They conclude that UNITA has been shoring up support in Zaire and Zambia. Meanwhile UNITA seized 77 foreign technicians in AO.

SA/MZ 84/2/27 Observer Editorial on SA strategy, quoted by RDM:

"The brazen nerve and lack of scruple" with which Pretoria pursued its interest was "a masterly demonstration of how to combine military and diplomatic means to achieve national ends...The ANC will now have to seek an internal strategy, a task of extraordinary difficulty in a country as formidably policed as South Africa."

SA/NAM 84/2/28 NO NAMIBIA SOLUTION BY END OF 1984, Botha.

SA Foreign Minister, Pik Botha, rejected Washington sourced reports that a "diplomatic package" had been put together which included an independence timetable for Namibia. Botha discounted the possibility of a settlement by the end of 1984.

At the weekend the MPC in occupied Namibia, especially Andreas Shipanga of SWAPO-D demanded the release of Toivo ya Toivo and Eliazer Tuhadeleni, both jailed for life in Robben Island in February 1968. Apparently a bid to upgrade the credibility of the MPC and another attempt of SWAPO-D to win the sympathy of SWAO supporters.

SA/MZ 84/2/28 Editorial of "The Nigerian", Lagos, quoted by RDM:

"President Machel must have reasoned that he is in a bind and reaching an understanding with the devil is the wiser choice...The lesson of this ugly development is that if all African countries had been more forthcoming with material support, Mozambique and other Frontline states would probably not have been put in as tight a spot as they have found themselves..."

A SHORT CHRONOLOGY OF THE NKOMATI ACCORD
Continuation

Country	Date	Event
SA/NAM	84/03/01	RELEASE OF TOIVO YA TOIVO

Four years before his 20 year sentence had run out, 59 year old Ya Toivo was released from Robben Island and later Windhoek Central Prison. As founder of the migrant labourer organisation which later developed into SWAPO, Toivo ya Toivo is enormously popular and respected. After his release he declared to a welcoming crowd in Katutura: "This is not my freedom. I went to jail for the freedom of my people. I went to jail for the freedom of my country. I will not be free until they are free." He disassociated himself from Andreas Shipanga (SWAPO Democrats, now member of the MPC) and brushed aside any talk of rivalry between himself and Nujoma: "We are a big family. It does not matter who leads, positions are not important." Ya Toivo flew later to Lusaka. On 18th March it was announced in Lusaka, that he was appointed member of SWAPO's Politbureau.

SA/MZ	84/03/05	PREPARATION OF ENERGY AGREEMENT
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The South African Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Louis Nel, arrives at Maputo in order to prepare the tripartite energy agreement to be signed between Portugal, SA and Mozambique next week.

SA/AA	84/03/08	DEON GELDENHUYS ANALYSES SA STRATEGY (Cape Times)
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SA's hawkish strategy towards its neighbours had the intended effect of producing or aggravating domestic instability in the target states. But SA does not possess a master plan for removing regimes in power in the neighbouring states, nor has it the resources to dislodge several governments and sustain perhaps unpopular puppet successor regimes in the face of determined resistance. This is not to say that Pretoria has not toyed with the idea of getting neighbouring governments replaced by more sympathetic ones.

SA's destabilization policy was a reaction in kind: Let SA destabilize them lest they really destabilize us. Therefore the military attacks against Angolan military and economic targets and SA's support for UNITA as a reaction in kind for Angola's support for SWAPO and the ANC. Therefore South Africa's economic pressure on Lesotho (border closures) and its support for the Lesotho Liberation Army as a reaction for the ANC presence in Lesotho; and therefore SA's complicity in sabotage raids and in economic pressure towards Zimbabwe - destabilisation as a preemptive strategy. This strategy was reinforced by a number of extraneous factors:

1. The USA played a role in easing tensions between RSA and Zimbabwe;
2. Portugal had an interest in easing tensions between Mozambique and RSA;
3. A crippling drought and then a disastrous flood on top of all other economic problems made MZ aware of the need for improved ties with SA.

SA	84/03/10	SA COUNT OF ANC ATTACKS SINCE 1976
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"Terrorists had killed 48 people in 220 incidents of terrorism in South Africa since 1976, while during the same period, 172 ANC terrorists had

been killed or captured", the SA minister of law and order, Mr. Louis Le Grange, said in Elliot, Natal yesterday. He said, "Natal tops the list with 39 incidents of terrorist activity, followed by Soweto with 28 and then the Border and eastern Transvaal with 24 each." If incidents in Transkei and Ciskei were added to those in the border area of the Eastern Cape, it pushed that region up to the second major terrorist target zone in South Africa, he said.

SA/NAM 84/03/11 SA TRYING TO BYPASS UN NAMIBIA SOLUTION ?

Tony Weaver of the SUN TIM suggests that SA is trying to circumvent Res.435 of 1978 as changed by the Western Contact Group. His argument:

1. SWAPO, denied bases in Southern Angola will have to abandon its military strategy; it will be forced to bargain with the internal parties.
2. SWAPO will be approached to consider elections with a minimal UN controlling presence and no UNTAG force.
3. The UNTAG force provided for by Res. 435 will be replaced by a regional force, consisting of South African and African elements.

Pik Botha suggested at the weekend a meeting between all parties to the fighting in Angola and Namibia, including UNITA, SWAPO, SA, the MPC and Angola. The British and the US governments did not directly criticise the proposal. They welcomed the proposal as "consistent with improving prospects for peace in the region", while at the same time reaffirming their commitment to UN SC Res 435, which has been modified substantially by the Western Contact Group since 1978.

ANGOP, the Angolan news agency, quoted a statement by the AO government released on March 13th as saying that only the SA government and SWAPO should be directly involved in such discussions and that the Angolans could only participate as observers. SWAPO responded by stating that it would only participate in such talks if it excluded discussions of Angola.

On March 14 Pik Botha rejected the accusation that SAC was trying to circumvent UNSC Res 435 by saying, his proposal for an all party conference was a simple peace initiative. "We suggest that if we all want peace, then those shooting at each other should get together around a conference table and talk peace. I did not indicate that we had waived the requirement that there should be firm agreement on Cuban withdrawal before Res.435 can be implemented. That still stands. Nor did I indicate in any way that Res. 435 should not be implemented."

US/MZ 84/03/13 OIL FINDS IN MOZAMBIKAN BASIN MOTIVE FOR US INTEREST IN NON AGGRESSION PACT ?

Surveys conducted in mid 1982 by Norwegian and US companies positively established the hydrocarbon potential of the Mozambican basin. Geologists insist that the former pessimism regarding the basin's hydrocarbon potential should be revised. Companies like Shell and ESSO describe the basin as the most promising province offshore East Africa. The main impediment to the development of a Mozambican oil industry is anxiety by potential investors that drilling equipment and personnel might be attacked by the MNR. Therefore oil industries welcome the present talks between SA and MZ. In response to requests from several of the 22 oil companies involved in the bidding for prospection rights the deadline for the bidding on offshore blocks has been postponed twice. The deadline is March 31.

SA/MZ 84/03/11-13 EXTRAVAGANT COSTS OF PEACE ? (SA editorials)

The Sunday Times writes: "Peace has a price tag. This country does not have the wherewithal to underwrite the reconstruction of a pitifully troubled Mozambique. Indirect aid to Mozambique, yes, be it the uninterrupted purchase of Cahora Bassa power, the channelling of exports through Maputo and even the sharing of fruit or milk powder surpluses when they occur. But the big bills... will have to be picked up by governments in Europe and North America."

The Cape Times follows the same argument by pointing out that the new 1984 constitution in SA raised the material expectations of Coloureds and Indians. Conclusion: the industrialized countries in the West will have a real interest in weaning states such as Mozambique and Angola away from Soviet influence.

A. Hammond Tooke of the SUN TIM of 18th of March disagrees: dividends of peace will benefit South Africa, he states and adds, that SA aid to Southern Africa will have three phases: 1) Crisis management is needed to resolve the famine relief phase of the programme. SA's private and public transport system (including the SADF) is well placed to help in the movement of emergency food relief. The cost of food is largely borne by aid programmes of Western countries. 2.) In the reconstruction of Southern Africa's infrastructure, international funding and South Africa's raw materials can be combined to transform the situation. 3.) Third phase is the normalisation of commercial relations. Political uncertainties constitute the obstacles to trade and investment in black Africa. Peace is the trigger to unblock private investment. peace lowers the investment risks, thus opening the way for overseas and SA private money and management to transform the societies of the neighbouring countries. SA stands to benefit as the natural conduit for aid and assistance into Africa from abroad. Government lines of credit and guarantees under these conditions would become selfliquidating as development projects finally started to pay off.

SA 84/03/14 ANC ATTACK ON FUEL DEPOT AT ERMELO (East.TV)

The ANC claimed responsibility for a limpet mine attack at a fuel depot in Eastern Transvaal, in which 5 fuel storage tanks and a petrol tanker were damaged last Sunday.

SA/MZ 84/03/16 ANC STATEMENT ON SOUTH AFRICA'S STRATEGY FOR 1984

"Over the last few weeks the racist and colonial regime of South Africa has been involved in a frantic diplomatic, political and propaganda counter-offensive in Southern Africa. Some of the principle objectives of this offensive are:

1. To isolate the ANC throughout Southern Africa and to compel the independent countries of our region to act as Pretoria's agents in emasculating the ANC, the vanguard movement of the South African struggle for national emancipation.
2. To liquidate the armed struggle for the liberation of South Africa
3. To gain new bridgeheads for the Pretoria regime in its efforts to undermine the unity of the frontline states, destroy the SADCC, to replace it with a so-called "Constellation of States" and thus to transform the independent countries of Southern Africa into its client states.
4. To use the prestige of the frontline states in the campaign of the white minority regime to reduce the international isolation of apartheid South Africa and to lend legitimacy to itself and its colonial and fascist state.

In pursuit of these aims, the Botha regime has sought to reduce the independent countries of our region to the level of its bantustan creations, by forcing them to join Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei Bantustans in entering into so-called non-aggression pacts with Pretoria...The ANC is profoundly conscious of the enormous political, economic and security problems that confront many of the peoples of our region. The blame for many of these problems must be laid squarely on the Pretoria regime which has sought to define the limit of aggression and destabilisation. We are convinced that this regime...cannot be an architect of justice and peace in our region... The situation in our region continues to point to the correctness of the decisions of the Maputo Frontline States summit held in March 1982. That summit observed that 'under the leadership of the ANC the people, through strikes and armed action, are vigorously rising - against apartheid'.

Pretoria hopes that after it has 'pacified' our neighbours and driven the ANC out of our region, it will then have a free hand to suppress the mass democratic movement of our country...Our principle task at this moment therefore is, and must be, to intensify our political and military offensive inside South Africa...Relying on our strength, through action, we will frustrate the schemes of the enemy of the peoples of Africa and continue the forward march to the destruction of the system of white minority colonial domination in our country. The central and immediate question of South African politics is the overthrow of the white minority regime...This question will be and is being settled, in struggle, within the borders of our country and nowhere else..." Lusaka, 16 March 1984.

SA/MZ 84/03/16 NON AGGRESSION PACT SIGNED AT NKOMATI

Text:Article 1.

The high contracting parties undertake to respect each other's sovereignty and independence and, in fulfilment of this fundamental obligation, to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of the other.

Article Two (1): The high contracting parties shall resolve differences and disputes that may arise between them and that may or are likely to endanger mutual peace and security in the region by means of negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration or other peaceful means and undertake not to resort, individually or collectively, to the threat or use of force against each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence.

(2) For the purposes of this article, the use of force shall include, inter alia: a) attacks by land, air or sea forces; b) sabotage; c) unwarranted concentration of such forces at or near the international boundaries of the high contracting parties; d) The high contracting parties shall not in any way assist the armed forces of any state or group of states deployed against the territorial sovereignty or political independence of the other.

Article three: (1) The high contracting parties shall not allow their respective territories, territorial waters or air space to be used as a base, thoroughfare, or in any other way by another state, government, foreign military forces, organisations or individuals which plan or prepare to commit acts of violence, terrorism or aggression against the territorial integrity or political independence of the other or may threaten the security of its inhabitants;

(2) The high contracting parties, in order to prevent or

eliminate the acts or preparation of acts mentioned in paragraph (1) of this article, undertake in particular to

a) forbid and prevent in their respective territories the organisation of irregular forces or armed bands, including mercenaries, whose objective is to carry out the acts contemplated in paragraph (1) of this article;

b) Eliminate from their respective territories bases, training centres, places of shelter, accomodation and transit of elements who intend to carry out the acts contemplated in paragraph (1) of this article;

c) Eliminate from their respective territories centres or depots containing armaments of whatever nature, destined to be used by the elements contemplated in paragraph (1) of this article;

d) Eliminate from their respective territories command posts or other places for the command, direction and coordination of the elements contemplated in paragraph (1) of this article;

e) Eliminate from their respective territories communication or telecommunication facilities between the command and the elements contemplated in paragraph (1) of this article;

f) Eliminate and prohibit the installation in their respective territories of radio broadcasting stations, including unofficial or clandestine broadcasts, for the elements that carry out the acts contemplated in paragraph (1) of this article;

g) Exercise strict control, in their respective territories, over elements which intend to carry out or plan the acts contemplated in paragraph (1) of this article;

h) prevent the transit of elements who intend or plan to commit the acts contemplated in paragraph (1) of this article, from a place in the territory of either to a place in the territory of the other or to a place in the territory of any third state which has a common boundary with the high contracting party against which such elements against which such elements intend or plan to commit such acts;

i) Take appropriate steps in their respective territories to prevent the recruitment of elements of whatever nationality for the purpose of carrying out the acts contemplated in paragraph (1) of this article;

j) Prevent...acts of abduction...

k) Prohibit the provision on their respective territories of any logistic facilities for carrying out the acts contemplated in paragraph (1) of this article.

3) The high contracting parties will not use the territory of third states to carry out or support the acts contemplated in paragraphs (1) and (2) of this article...

Article Nine: (1) Each of the high contracting parties shall appoint high ranking representatives to serve on a joint security commission with the aim of supervising and monitoring the application of this agreement..."

P.W.Botha, the SA primeminister, said after the signing of the accord that his vision was of a CONSTELLATION OF STATES; he saw a "subcontinent in which countries worked together to rationalise and increase food production, develop regional trade, establish housing programmes, education and training schemes, health services, employment opportunities..." Botha stressed that the accord was not a "temporary expedient from which one side or the other might derive unilateral advantage."

SA/MZ 84/03/16 COMMENTARIES ON NKOMATI ACCORD

Stranley Uys in the Eastern Province Herald (17.March) predicts a threefold demilitarisation as a consequence of the accord: 1) The black struggle in SA will take on an evolutionary, not a revolutionary form, and the ANC will find itself embracing concepts which it has rejected until now, namely that apartheid is reformable. 2) SA will try to de-glamourise SWAPO and to scale it down to the same compromised level as the internal parties in Namibia before SA allows elections. 3) The total onslaught ideology with all its disciplinary functions in the apartheid system has been ended with the signing of the accord. If subversion on SA borders has been eradicated, then all that will be left will be internal subversion. If the police cannot handle it then the programme to reform apartheid will have failed. In any case Uys demands a de-militarisation of the apartheid state and remarks that the authoritarian apparatus of control assembled in the SA constitution of 1984 seems inappropriate for the era which has been ushered in by the Nkomati accord.

The FM (23/3) is of the opinion that it will be impossible for Pretoria not to change the apartheid system as the implications of the accord sift through the SA society.

The Economist (24/March) points out that both sides needed the Nkomati accord and an easing of foreign relations. a period of peace. But there is no such convergence of interests about the apartheid system: to Apartheid, the accord is an irrelevance. The constitutional changes, the reforms in the labour laws remain within the limits of the apartheid system: the cooption of coloureds, Asians and "insider blacks" has always been part of the strategy. There is no sign of an end to influx control or the group areas act. The new 'Aliens Amendment Bill' will declare that nine million black South Africans who have been allocated to the homelands are now aliens; the bill will impose swinging fines on anybody who employs them in white areas: the regulation of population movement is being toughened. The unspoken logic of this article points out, that it is foolish to want to redefine the ANC's role in South Africa as a civil rights movement, to undermine the ANC's guerrilla campaign and to erode the ANC's campaign to isolate SA economically and diplomatically.

The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung shows scepticism whether Nkomati has been a real breakthrough for the Botha regime: SA may overestimate its economic strength when it proposes to become the economic motor of Southern Africa; the liberation movements may not have accepted the accord; the policy of the minority regime in SA towards the black citizens has not yet moved; the echo of black Africa is reserved to cool towards the accord, FAZ notes.