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bands, took place before 1,000 guests in an open sided wooden pavilion exactly where the Komati, hitherto mainly famous as a haunt of crocodiles and hippopotami, flows from South Africa into Mozambique between low wooded hills.

There was cheering and ululation as Mr. P.W. Botha, the South African Prime Minister, in trilby and lounge suit and President Samora Machel, in full military uniform, shook hands. It was hard to believe that South Africa had twice mounted ground or air attacks on alleged guerrilla bases in Mozambique within the last 10 months.

The essence of the agreement, the result of several months of negotiation, is that Mozambique will prevent the underground African National Congress (ANC) from using its territory for guerrilla attacks against South Africa, while Pretoria will withdraw its covert support for the insurgents of the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR) though neither the ANC nor MNR is mentioned by name.

After the signing, President Machel said the pact laid "the foundation for a definitive break of the cycle of violence" in Southern Africa. Mr. Botha spoke of his "vision of the nations (of the region) co-operating with each other in every field of human endeavour".

The agreement, Mr. Botha said, was based on immutable "economic and geographic realities". There was "no question of (its) being a temporary expedient from which one side or the other might desire to derive unilateral advantage".

President Machel referred to "great and even antagonistic" differences "between our political, economic and social concepts"—the closest he came to a direct mention of apartheid—but agreed that "we are indissolubly linked by geography and proximity".

Mr. Botha said South Africa had been one of the first countries "to confront colonial occupation and foreign exploitation" and countless numbers of women and children had died in concentration camps while their husbands, fathers and brothers fought against the might of the British Empire.

"We are both African countries, inhabited by African peoples whose past and whose future are firmly entrenched in the southern part of the African continent. We are Africa".

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## SOUTHERN AFRICA

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### Peace Pact Signed

After nearly a decade of hostility, the leaders of **South Africa** and **Mozambique** on March 16th, put aside their swords and took up their pens to sign an historic "non aggression and good neighbourliness" pact at a meeting on the banks of the Komati River.

The ceremony, preceded by the playing of national anthems by military

President Machel agreed that colonialism had bequeathed both countries a "burdensome" legacy.

"We, the Mozambique people, want to develop friendly relations with the South African people. None of us Mozambicans or South Africans, have another country. We are not foreigners to our continent or our countries".

Although heads of state or government from other black states in the region were invited to attend the ceremony, only Prince Bhekimpi Dlamini, the Prime Minister of **Swaziland**, accepted. Others were represented by their ambassadors. South Africa had been hoping that President Kaunda and possibly President Nyerere of **Tanzania** would come.

The absence of black leaders reflects the widespread suspicion that exists in the region about South Africa's motives and suggests that there will be no rush to sign similar agreements. (TT 17/3)

### Accord's Full Text

The Nkomati Accord—officially the "Agreement on Non-Aggression and Good Neighbourliness"—is a thorough and far reaching document. It is quite explicit on the duties of the signatories, South Africa and Mozambique, and it also makes provision for enforcement. The following is the full text as broadcast by *Radio Maputo* on March 16th.

Agreement on non-aggression and good-neighbourliness between the Government of the People's Republic of Mozambique and the Government of the Republic of South Africa:

The Government of the People's Republic of Mozambique and the Government of the Republic of South Africa, hereinafter referred to as the high contracting parties;

recognizing the principles of strict respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, sovereign equality, political independence and the inviolability of the borders of all states;

reaffirming the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states;

considering the internationally recognised principle of the right of peoples to self-determination and independence and the principle of equal rights of all peoples;

considering the obligation of all states to refrain, in their international relations, from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state;

considering the obligation of states to settle conflicts by peaceful means, and thus safeguard international peace and security and justice;

recognising the responsibility of states not to allow their territory to be used for acts of war, aggression or violence against other states;

conscious of the need to promote relations of good-neighbourliness based on the principles of equality of rights and mutual advantage;

convinced that relations of good-neighbourliness between the high contracting parties will contribute to peace, security, stability and progress in southern Africa, the continent and the world

Have solemnly agreed to the following:

**Article One:** The high contracting parties undertake to respect each other's sovereignty and independence and, in fulfilment of this fundamental obligation, to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of the other.

**Article Two:** (1) The high contracting parties shall resolve differences and disputes that may arise between them and that may or are likely to endanger mutual peace and security or peace and security in the region by means of negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration or other peaceful means and undertake not to resort, individually or collectively, to the threat or use of force against each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence.

(2) For the purposes of this article, the use of force shall include, *inter alia*:

- (a) Attacks by land, air or sea forces;
- (b) sabotage;

(c) unwarranted concentration of such forces at or near the international boundaries of the high contracting parties;

(d) violation of the international land, air or sea boundaries of either of the high contracting parties.

(3) The high contracting parties shall not in any way assist the armed forces of any state or group of states deployed against the territorial sovereignty or political independence of the other.

**Article three:** (1) The high contracting parties shall not allow their respective territories, territorial waters or air space to be used as a base, thoroughfare, or in any other way by another state, government, foreign military forces, organisations or individuals which plan or prepare to commit acts of violence, terrorism or aggression against the territorial integrity or political independence of the other or may threaten the security of its inhabitants;

(2) The high contracting parties, in order to prevent or eliminate the acts or the preparation of acts mentioned in paragraph (1) of this Article, undertake in particular to:

(a) forbid and prevent in their respective territories the organisation of irregular forces or armed bands, including mercenaries, whose objective is to carry out the acts contemplated in paragraph (1) of this article;

(b) Eliminate from their respective territories bases, training centres, places of shelter, accommodation and transit of elements who intend to carry out the acts contemplated in paragraph (1) of this article;


(c) Eliminate from their respective territories centres or depots containing armaments of whatever nature, destined to be used by the elements contemplated in paragraph (1) of this article;

(d) Eliminate from their respective territories command posts or other places for the command, direction and co-ordination of the elements contemplated in paragraph (1) of this article;

(e) Eliminate from their respective territories communication and telecommunication facilities between the command and the elements contemplated in paragraph (1) of this article;

(f) Eliminate and prohibit the installation in their respective territories of radio broadcasting stations, including unofficial or clandestine broadcasts, for the elements that carry out the acts contemplated in paragraph (1) of this article;

(g) Exercise strict control, in their respective territories, over elements which intend to carry out or plan the acts contemplated in paragraph (1) of this



article;

(h) Prevent the transit of elements who intend or plan to commit the acts contemplated in paragraph (1) of this article, from a place in the territory. Of either to a place in the territory of the other or to a place in the territory of any third state which has a common boundary with the high contracting party against which such elements intend or plan to commit the said acts;

(i) Take appropriate steps in their respective territories to prevent the recruitment of elements of whatever nationality for the purpose of carrying out the acts contemplated in paragraph (1) of this article;

(j) Prevent the elements contemplated in paragraph (1) of this article from carrying out from their respective territories, by any means, acts of abduction or other acts aimed at taking citizens of any nationality hostage in the territory of the other high contracting party; and

(k) Prohibit the provision on their respective territories of any logistic facilities for carrying out the acts contemplated in paragraph (1) of this article.

(3) The high contracting parties will not use the territory of third states to carry out or support the acts contemplated in paragraphs (1) and (2) of this article.

**Article four:** The high contracting parties shall take steps, individually and collectively, to ensure that the international boundary between their respective territories is effectively patrolled and that the border posts are efficiently administered to prevent illegal crossings from the territory of a high contracting party to the territory of the other and in particular, by elements contemplated in Article three of this agreement.

**Article five:** The high contracting parties shall prohibit within their territory acts of propaganda that incite a war of aggression against the other high contracting party and shall also prohibit acts of propaganda aimed at inciting acts of terrorism and civil war in the territory of the other high contracting party.

**Article six:** The high contracting parties declare that there is no conflict between their commitments in treaties and international obligations and the commitments undertaken in this agreement.

**Article seven:** The high contracting parties are committed to interpreting this agreement in good faith and will maintain periodic contact to ensure the effective application of what has been agreed.

**Article eight:** Nothing in this agreement shall be construed as detracting from the high contracting parties' right of self-defence in the event of armed attacks.

as provided for in the Charter of the United Nations.

**Article nine:** (1) Each of the high contracting parties shall appoint high-ranking representatives to serve on a joint security commission with the aim of supervising and monitoring the application of this agreement;

(2) The commission shall determine its own working procedure;

(3) The commission shall meet on a regular basis and may be specially convened whenever circumstances so require.

(4) The commission shall:

(a) Consider all allegations of infringements of the provisions of this agreement; Advise the high contracting parties of its conclusions; and

(b) make recommendations to the high contracting parties concerning measures for the effective application of this agreement and the settlement of disputes over infringements or alleged infringements;

(5) The high contracting parties shall determine the mandate of their respective representatives in order to enable interim measures to be taken in cases of duly recognised emergency;

(6) The high contracting parties shall make available all the facilities necessary for the effective functioning of the commission and will jointly consider its conclusions and recommendations.

**Article ten:** This agreement will also be known as the Accord of Nkomati

**Article eleven:** (1) This agreement shall enter into force on the date of the signature thereof;

(2) Any amendment to this agreement agreed to by the high contracting parties shall be effected by the change of notes between them.

In witness whereof, the signatories, in the name of their respective governments, have signed and sealed this agreement, in quadruplicate in the Portuguese and English languages, both texts being equally authentic.  
(R. Maputo 16/3)

### "New Prospects" for Mozambique

*Radio Maputo* commented that the Nkomati accord had opened new prospects of peace and security in the region, prospects that were new but for which the Mozambican people had searched long and ardently. "We could sum up these prospects thus—those who used to attack us and organised aggression against us have formally agreed to stop doing so."

"This type of hopeful opening constitutes an important victory for our people and a victory for the socialist

policy of peace of our party and state. The Nkomati accord was signed in the year in which we commemorate the 20th anniversary of the launching of the armed struggle of national liberation and the 10th anniversary of the signing of the Lusaka accords, which marked the victory of our people over colonialism (p. 3372). Separated by almost a decade each, these three events show the determination with which the Mozambique people have been and are struggling to achieve and defend independence and build peace. In this combination of efforts—designed to benefit freedom, peace, sovereignty and the relations among nations as well as the fatherland and all of humanity—one finds the magnificence of our peoples' struggle and the importance of the victory enshrined in the Nkomati accord."

"For us—the men and women who are profoundly marked by the realities and memories of war and the survivors of slavery, domination and aggression—peace must be mankind's way of life, and it must spread throughout the world. The people of Mozambique also know that the path one must follow in order to gain peace is arduous. Therefore, mixed with the natural joy we are experiencing today is our determination to defend this achievement with heightened vigilance, to step up the battle of production to overcome famine, and to press our campaign for the final liquidation of the armed bandits. These are the paths to peace."  
(R. Maputo 16/3)

Frelimo later made it clear that the Nkomati accord did not imply any change in Mozambique's position towards apartheid.

In an editorial in the weekly radio programme *Voice of Frelimo* the party reaffirmed its "political, moral and diplomatic support" for the South African liberation movement, the African National Congress (ANC) and will continue to condemn apartheid firmly."

Much of the editorial dealt with the implications of the Nkomati Accord for the bandits of the self-styled Mozambique National Resistance (MNR).

The editorial warned that this did not mean that the struggle against banditry would end immediately. "These enemies of the people will try in despair, to commit acts of vandalism, to survive and satisfy their instincts".

President Machel pointed out on March 17th that the agreement did not imply any sort of "ideological co-existence. We did not go to Nkomati to sign an agreement with any South African party", he stressed. (DNS 20/3)

**South Africa**, for its part, acted quickly to show Mozambique and other countries the benefits to be gained by scaling down support for ANC guerrillas. The Right-wing radio station supporting anti-government rebels in Mozambique, which is widely believed to operate from the northern Transvaal, suddenly announced on March 15th that it was closing down for "reorganisation".

The South Africans also donated six tons of medical supplies to Mozambique as aid for flood victims in the southern part of the country and offered 25,000 cartons of apples to drought-stricken areas further north.

A number of businessmen said they were investigating opportunities in Mozambique in fishing, hotels and other sectors. (FT 19/3)

### **Implicit Contradictions**

The *Financial Mail* (Johannesburg) thinks that there are, on the face of it, many contradictions implicit in the Nkomati Accord. Black Marxists shook hands with white capitalists; a decade of hostility was set aside—too easily? Certainly, the swiftness of events has taken many observers aback. From a simmering conflict between profoundly different social and economic systems, to a detailed and binding agreement covering far more than simple co-existence: all in a few months.

Even allowing for the economic benefits which should flow to the region as a whole, the major shift in South African-African relations that has taken place cannot be wholly accounted for as the outcome of what cynics might call constructive destabilisation. Mozambique is stricken by drought, ravaged by war, and starved of foreign currency—but the foundations of its state remain Marxist and revolutionary. It required more than the promise of credit and consumer goods to get Samora Machel to Komatipoort.

The activities of the Mozambique National Resistance movement were, of course, a compelling argument for coming to some kind of terms with Pretoria. Addressing a mass rally in Maputo in the wake of the Accord,

President Machel said: "Because of the bandits you had no soap, no razor blades, no combs and no clothes." The pact would mean that "we can now concentrate all our energies on economic development in peace and tranquility."

Nonetheless, says the *Financial Mail*, two extra factors seem to have come into play. The one is negative. It is, simply put, that the **Soviet** empire is under pressure, its worldwide resources strained by endemic leadership problems, the direct threat of the US nuclear deployment in Europe, and the continued attrition of Afghanistan.

The fringes of its power have become vague; its reliance on surrogates correspondingly disproportionate to its ambitions. Lines of command have grown tenuous. Among those private citizens in Maputo with the highest standards of living are diplomats—not least in East bloc ones. That kind of elementary comparison is readily made by poor Mozambicans. Outmoded military equipment such as Russia has supplied to Mozambique and Angola is no substitute for reconstruction and development aid.

The negative aspect is that while its material hold on its southern African satellites has been substantially weakened since the mid-Seventies, Russia remains the ideological centre of the communist world. Like the superstates envisaged by George Orwell, constructed on fear and falsehood, it has endured despite many pressures—including the cataclysmic battles of World War Two—and is likely to continue to endure for generations.

Such massive power can, in time, renew its sense of destiny in far-flung outposts. While Russia's problems are now compellingly close to home, Moscow's global ambitions can rightly be said to be only in abeyance. If the South African-Mozambique accord frays, the Soviets can be expected to step into the arena again.

But the second factor which led to the Nkomati Accord is far more positive. It rests on the assertion by South Africa's leadership that we are part of Africa, and that our problems must be solved on African soil. That was one particular significance of signing the Accord on the border—not, say, in Lisbon.

It is true that past prime ministers have stressed that they saw themselves as part of Africa. But until the advent of

the P.W. Botha administration, it was difficult not to perceive ambiguity in this stance. The attempts to buy world opinion and the promotion of compliant homeland leaders to the level of statesmen—stars in the famous constellation of states—were part of this ambiguity. The efforts failed. The world was not deceived.

The *rapprochement* with Mozambique is on a different scale altogether. President Machel is enormously respected in Africa and, indeed, the West. As Ambassador Brand Fourie suggested recently in Washington, South Africa can no longer hope to buy the good opinion of the West—the road to acceptance lies through Africa. If the South Africa-Mozambique accord holds, and others follow with equally influential nations, the prospect of sanctions must recede to invisibility. And moral antagonism against apartheid will ultimately achieve more when it is directed from within, by South Africans, and not from the various anti-apartheid cottage industries in Western capitals.

That immediately raises the question: will Pretoria really change apartheid? The answer must be that it will—that it will be impossible not to do so as the implications of the Mozambique pact, and yet others to come, sift through the society.

On the one hand, the generation of greater economic development in the sub-continent will break down barriers, far more rapidly than if South Africa clings to the bulwarks of separate development, enclosed in a military machine, its very lifestyle backed by such intangibles as the gold price and the length of droughts.

On the other hand, the residual colonial attitude of seeing and treating blacks as second-class citizens or labour units will be broken down as more and more people cross borders to do business or simply to see different societies for themselves. Foreign policy cannot be divorced from internal political developments—or even psychological perceptions.

The *Financial Mail* concludes that only a few years ago it was front-page news that a black teller had been appointed in a Johannesburg bank. Those who say that South Africa cannot change should look into any shop in any of our major centres and see who is manning the tills, running the computers, both serving and

participating in a unitary economy.

More changes must come. They will not do so overnight: that would be asking too much. But as white South Africans shed the inertia of the past, change will generate its own momentum.

That must be the real hope of the Nkomati Accord, beyond the highly desirable short-term security and economic benefits to South Africa and Mozambique. (FM 23/3)

### ANC's Response

Responding to recent developments in southern Africa the African National Congress said that "there can be no peaceful co-existence between freedom and independence on the one hand and colonialism on the other". On the same day as Mozambique and South Africa signed their non-aggression pact, the ANC issued a statement in Lusaka on behalf of the National Executive Committee calling for an intensification of the offensive against the South African regime. The statement came after the committee met to discuss the latest events in the region.

It noted that South Africa had been involved in "a frantic diplomatic, political and propaganda counter-offensive" designed to isolate the ANC. Other principal objectives were said to be the undermining of the frontline states, the destruction of SADCC—the economic organisation of southern African states designed to reduce dependence on South Africa and a reduction in the international isolation of apartheid South Africa. It added that Pretoria was facing internal crisis and was anxious to neutralise opposition at its borders in order to give full attention to the crushing of the internal demands for democracy.

In an obvious reference to the Mozambique/South Africa agreement, the statement accused the Botha regime of reducing the status of independent states in the region to that of the Bantustans by forcing through similar "so-called non-aggression pacts" to those signed by Bophuthatswana and Ciskei. Such accords "cannot but help to perpetuate the illegitimate rules of the South African white settler minority".

Although recognising the great pressure that the peoples of the southern region were under, the ANC stressed that the responsibility for regional insecurity and economic difficulty rested with Pretoria. As they had always done,

they emphasised that so long as apartheid and its oppression in South Africa and Namibia continued to exist there would be no "just and lasting peace".

The statement recalled that at the important frontline states summit in Maputo, 1982 (p. 6373), member states affirmed the correctness of ANC strategy against Pretoria, a strategy which rested simultaneously on organised labour's action and armed struggle. They further committed intensified "material and diplomatic support" for the armed struggle, (see below). Clearly feeling that this jointly reached position was becoming obscured, the national committee said: "we remain and shall remain loyal to this perspective".

Stressing that the struggle was being waged inside the border and would be settled there, the statement demanded that those in support of the South African people's struggle "who count themselves among the anti-colonialist and anti-racist forces" should continue to show their support.

"Relying on our own strength, through action, we will frustrate the schemes of the enemy of the peoples of Africa. We are confident that the peoples of southern Africa will themselves remain loyal to this cause and firm in the resolve to stand with our people until victory is won." (WA 26/3)

According to the *Financial Times*, while the ANC officials acknowledge the military and economic pressures which forced Mozambique to the conference table, four aspects of the pact have left them bitter:

- (i) At no stage, it seems, was the ANC consulted by the Mozambicans. The news was broken only after the deal had been agreed;
- (ii) The terms of the pact go well beyond what, in the opinion of the ANC, Mozambique requires to ensure its security;
- (iii) ANC officials suspect that senior members of the Mozambique Government are attempting to redefine the ANC's role in South Africa by talking of a campaign for "civil rights" rather than a "liberation war", and stressing South Africa's status as a sovereign power, distinct from the colonial nature for former white ruled states in Africa. Such an interpretation could, ANC officials fear, undermine its guerrilla campaign; and
- (iv) By turning what the ANC believes

should have been a low key occasion at Foreign Minister level into a day of pomp and ceremony conducted by the two state leaders, the Mozambicans have made contact with South Africa more respectable, eroding the ANC campaigns to isolate the republic economically and diplomatically.

ANC officials point out that only two years ago their party won what seemed an irrevocable endorsement from the front line states at the summit in Maputo.

In response to what was termed South African "destabilisation" in the region, largely in the form of support for dissident movements, the front line leaders praised the ANC and pledged increasing "material and diplomatic support".

The role of Mozambique was crucial to such support. The other front line states were either far from South Africa's boundaries such as **Tanzania** and **Angola**, or as in the case of **Zambia**, **Zimbabwe** and **Botswana**, placed severe restrictions on ANC activity, banning training or transit of guerrillas in response both to South African pressure and their economic ties with Pretoria.

The Maputo statement, said the ANC, "was made in full recognition of the fact that the destruction of the apartheid regime and the liberation of **Namibia** (South West Africa) constituted the fundamental prerequisites for peace, stability and uninterrupted progress in our region."

The clear implication was that the front line states have retreated from their commitment.

But for all the anger there appears to be very little—in the short-term at least—the ANC can do to compensate for its loss. If, as seems the case, it was caught unaware by the pact it will have been unable to step up its infiltration of men and supplies into South Africa in advance.

Although South Africa's extensive border will always be vulnerable, there is now no diplomatically secure jumping-off point for infiltrators.

By March 24th ANC officials were looking beyond the immediate implications of the pact. No official would elaborate on a new strategy but it seems likely that the ANC will redouble its efforts within South Africa to influence events through its role inside trade unions, student and church

groups, while continuing the campaign of intermittent sabotage.

Although the South African government would dispute the claim, ANC officials maintain that they have so far avoided the tactics of crude terrorism—such as parcel bombs in city shops. But the frustration of recent weeks may well cause a younger, more impatient group in the ranks to emerge, who will argue that any means justifies the end. (FT 21/3, WA 26/3)

### Guarded Approval

Southern Africa's frontline states responded with guarded approval to the conclusion of the Nkomati accord.

Angola's President dos Santos expressed "complete solidarity" with the accord, while Tanzania's President Nyerere said South Africa's commitment to halting aggression was what the frontline states had always sought. President Kaunda of Zambia said he had never doubted Mozambique's commitment to the struggle against apartheid. Zimbabwe's Prime Minister, Mr. Robert Mugabe, said he would remain an ally in the consolidation of the hardwon peace, and Botswana's President Masire expressed understanding in its moves towards peace. (AED 23/3)

The Prime Minister of Swaziland, Prince Bhhekimpi, described the signing of the treaty as a triumph for peace and the people of southern Africa, and a dream come true. The Prince, said that the signing was a great achievement for the South African Prime Minister, Mr. P.W. Botha, and President Samora Machel of Mozambique. It was also an achievement for the late King Sobhuza of Swaziland, who had for some time over the past years dreamed of such an event and had taken time and the initiative to bring the two men to the negotiating table to solve their differences. Of President Machel, Prince Bhhekimpi said it took a brave man to make such a bold decision despite the fact that many African countries disagreed with him. President Machel had done so in the face of much pressure from people talking from platforms far away from the realities of the region. He said Mozambique could now expect more investment and more jobs. (R. Johannesburg 17/3)

A spokesman for the Government of Lesotho described as wild speculation a report in the Johannesburg newspaper

the *Star* of March 15th, that a non-aggression treaty between South Africa and Lesotho was on the negotiating table. The spokesman further denied that Lesotho was among the countries that were next in line for the signing of a treaty similar to the one signed between South Africa and Mozambique. The spokesman said that it was this kind of speculation by overzealous South African officials and newspapermen that tended to cloud issues. He added that Lesotho had clearly stated that she was not considering a non-aggression pact with South Africa, and no negotiations whatsoever were taking place between South Africa and Lesotho on this question.

The Prime Minister of Lesotho, Dr. Jonathan, had made a policy pronouncement on this question and there would be no deviation from the position he had stated clearly that the problems of southern Africa would not be solved by pacts of this nature, but by the dismantling of the policy of white supremacy in the region. (R. Maseru 17/3)

On March 20th Radio Maputo reported that the Malawi Minister of Transport and Communications, Mr. E.C.I. Bwanali, who had been in Mozambique since March 15th, had said that his country would reap benefits from implementation of the Nkomati accord since Malawi's trade routes to Beira had until now been disrupted by South African-backed bandits.

The Minister added that Malawi would not allow Mozambican rebels to set up bases on its soil now that South Africa had committed itself to stop helping the insurgents. Malawi "is not and never will be a base of destabilisation against Mozambique", Mr. Bwanali said.

The Mozambican Government has claimed in the past that the MNR used Malawi as a springboard for its raids, notably when the rebels opened a campaign in Mozambique's Zambezia Province adjacent to Malawi late in 1982. (DN 24/3)

A joint communique issued at the end of a visit to Cape Verde by President Vieira of Guinea-Bissau said that the two countries expressed their total support for Angola and Mozambique in their contacts with South Africa. The two were making a "valuable contribution to search for a peaceful

solution to the problems of Southern Africa".

The Ivory Coast Foreign Minister, Mr. Simeon Ake, quoted on *Radio France International* said "if Angola and Mozambique have come as far as negotiating and entering into dialogue with South Africa, it is the realities of the area which have imposed themselves on them". (WA 26/3)

### African Press Comment

The *Daily Nation* (Nairobi) says that the non-aggression accord signed by Mozambican President Samora Machel and South African Prime Minister Pieter Botha is unprecedented in Pretoria's relations with black Africa. It has far-reaching implications not only for southern Africa, but also for the whole spectrum of relations between the rest of Africa and Pretoria as well as others.

With the expected end of the anti-government attacks by the Mozambican rebels—who have so far enjoyed South African backing—Mozambique and those other countries that depend on its routes to sea will be free of the disruptions that hurt their economies a great deal.

It opens the chance for the two countries, in the words of Mr. Botha yesterday, "to live together in peace and harmony", and in those of Mr. Machel "to a definitive break in the cycle of violence that has been established in this region".

But any celebration now may turn out to be premature. Peace in Southern Africa depends on much more than just non-aggression pacts between Pretoria and neighbouring countries.

As the South African mining magnate, Mr. Harry Oppenheimer, and others have warned recently, peace depends on the resolution of South Africa's internal political problems. It is, therefore, essential that Pretoria move rapidly on substantive internal reforms even as it is pursuing better relations with black Africa.

The *Daily Nation* thinks that it will be a big mistake for South Africa to think that cutting off military backing for South African black fighters from neighbouring countries will in itself be enough to end a struggle necessitated by repression, economic and political disenfranchisement.

Lack of rear bases may reduce the level of the struggle, but it would not end

it as long as it has the active support or even sympathy of the local people. And that would be true in Namibia and South Africa itself. The only way to end it is to create conditions to make them unnecessary to take up arms. (DN 17/3)

*Le Soleil (Senegal)* commented at length on the non-aggression and good neighbours pact between South Africa and Mozambique on March 17th. In an editorial entitled "An African Camp David" the newspaper said "by accepting to sign a non-aggression pact the Mozambican, Samora Machel and the racist, Pieter Botha, have started off a new era which is similar to the America-Israeli-Egyptian Camp David".

"The Nkomati agreement marks a hiatus in the Southern African countries' desire to co-ordinate their efforts to become economically independent of South Africa". After pointing out that Mozambique did not wish to enlist the help of the Cubans as Angola had done, the editorial concludes: "Mozambique preferred to treat with the devil. Sadat's experience shows Machel to be wrong from the outset. It remains to us to await history's judgement."

*Fraternite Matin (Ivory Coast)*, in an editorial on March 17th says "The dialogue which Mozambique and Angola proposed to South Africa only confirms the Ivory Coast's analysis of the question. It constitutes a new argument in favour of making an effort to untie the knot of fear and hatred which surrounds South Africans today".

The paper stresses that the "dialogue itself is a courageous and lucid realisation of reality against which the redundant rhetoric of the revolutionaries in South Africa knocks itself out." *Fraternite Matin* accuses these revolutionaries of deliberately disregarding the "international dimensions of the South African problem beneath the drama of apartheid, which the Ivory Coast denounces." "States like Angola and Mozambique", the paper adds, "do not need lessons in nationalism from anyone. Their decision is a result of pragmatism."

The paper concludes that it was not necessary to wait until suffocation was imminent for the front-line states to engage in dialogue with South Africa.

(AFP 17/3)

## Realities of Power

The *Economist* (UK) comments in an editorial on March 24th that realism is a rare enough commodity in Africa for the Komatipoort declaration between South Africa and Mozambique to be welcomed wholeheartedly. At that little border town on March 16th Mozambique's President Samora Machel duly received his reward for nine years of Marxist incompetence and an illusory alliance with Russia. From now on he toes South Africa's line on everything from trade to the suppression of the anti-apartheid fighters of the African National Congress, or faces the downfall of his government at the hands of South African-backed guerrillas. Something similar may be happening on the other side of southern Africa. The withdrawal of South African troops from Angola, and the possible withdrawal of Cuban ones, may conceivably be leading to a settlement of the apparently endless Namibia argument. The southern African scene could at last be reflecting the reality of military and economic power in the region.

That reality is harsh, but it is the only basis on which a workable policy can be built. For two decades, the politics of the region have been distorted by fanciful predictions of continued black revolution. Those people in the west who led South Africa's black neighbours to believe that history would deliver South Africa ripe into their hands have merely condemned them to poverty and humiliation. They have also given apartheid a stunning political coup.

After Komatipoort, the new realism should spread in both directions. The black states can concentrate less on regional revolution, and more on recovering from drought and socialism in tolerant partnership with the regional superpower. They know the alternative: another and disastrous, bout of destabilisation by South Africa's military arm. The South Africans, in turn, have their own interest in helping their neighbours to recover from the effects of destabilisation. They need a healthy regional economic partnership.

South Africa's white minority is understandably euphoric. The end of a costly war is in sight. The country's enemies are grovelling. After years of failed appeasement, and then more years of successful thump-and-talk, the cordon sanitaire once represented by the Portuguese and British colonies has been all but re-established. The prime

minister, Mr. P.W. Botha, has a foreign policy success to cap his victory in last November's constitutional referendum (p. 7043), and to wave in the face of his critics of both left and right. He is stronger than ever.

## Botha's Options

Will Mr. Botha use this strength to make political concessions to the blacks, or complacently conclude that South Africa can now snuggle back into the cushions of apartheid? asks the *Economist*. It has long been clear that apartheid has more to do with the survival instinct of South Africa's dominant white tribe than with any archaic ideology. It derives its continuing potency both from white fear of over-rapid urbanisation by the rural black population, and from alarm at the experience of majority rule to the north.

In recent years there have been signs that classical apartheid is weakening under the pressure of economic change. Job reservation has all but collapsed. Some bits of "petty apartheid" have been dismantled. The new constitution offers some political rights to Asians and to mixed-race coloured people. Strengthened by November's overwhelming white support for this constitution, Mr. Botha has set up a cabinet committee on new constitutional arrangements for urban blacks. Black unions are flourishing.

Yet these changes remain within the limits of neo-apartheid. The co-option of coloureds, Asians and "insider blacks" has always been part of the strategy. There is no sign of an end to influx control or the group areas act. Such pillars of apartheid as the immorality and mixed-marriages acts stand untouched. Mr. Botha's new aliens amendment bill will declare that nine million black South Africans who have been allocated to the dusty backyards miscalled "homelands" are now aliens, and will impose swingeing fines on anybody who employs them in white areas. There has recently been an intensification of "black spot" removals, of pass-law arrests and of political detentions. It is this regulation of population movement which, in a drought-stricken region, makes neo-apartheid so heartless a policy. If anything, it is being toughened.

Mr. Botha's new constitution, which comes into effect this year, was worth supporting not because it dismantled apartheid, which it did not, but because

more involvement of coloureds and Asians in politics (and one day some blacks) is likelier to bring change to South Africa than any plausible alternative. Only through such change can white rule ever be diluted, and some hope of political advance be offered to the black majority.

The *Economist* concludes that there should be no illusions about what the Komatipoort agreement means for this hope. The easing of South Africa's foreign relations with its black neighbours is a good thing because both sides need a period of peace. There is no such convergence of interests about apartheid. To apartheid, Komatipoort is an irrelevance. (EC 24/3)

### Action Against ANC

The Mozambique-South Africa joint security commission met for the first time in Maputo on March 26th as further raids were carried out against the African National Congress (ANC).

The **South African** team was led by the Police Commissioner, General Johan Coetzee, and the **Mozambican** team by the Deputy Defence Minister, Colonel Sergio Vieira. The commission was set up under the non-aggression pact signed on March 16th.

The meeting took place in a house in central Maputo overlooking the bay. More than two dozen houses, the ANC office and the ANC women's sewing co-operative were searched by police and heavily-armed soldiers during the previous weekend. Light weapons, watches, and money were confiscated.

The searches continued on March 26th, and included the ANC pig farm outside Matola.

In the talks leading to the non-aggression pact, South Africa tried to force Mozambique to expell the ANC. The ruling Frelimo Party resisted, and so far no ANC members have been forced to leave. Mr. Joe Slovo who, South Africa says, is a key link with ANC guerrillas, is still in Maputo. But Frelimo clearly would like to control those ANC members who choose to remain, especially those without jobs or links to the ANC "diplomatic mission". Heads of neighbourhood councils, for example, have been instructed to compile lists of ANC members living in their areas.

Although the Government provides housing to some ANC members, it does

not know the location of all South African refugees. In part, this is because many ANC members do not trust Mozambican security. The wisdom of this was shown when Mr. Jorge Costa, a top security official who had dealt with the ANC, defected to South Africa two years ago (p. 6496).

When South Africa raided Maputo three years ago and killed 13 ANC men, it was the ANC and not the Mozambican army which finally repelled the raiders and killed two South African soldiers (p. 5921).

Mozambique did not consult the ANC on the new restrictions and the weekend raids occurred without warning.

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(See pp. 7164, 7195)

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